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Abstract 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is an aspect of private 
international law, and concerns situations where a successful party to litigation seeks 
to rely on a judgment obtained in one court, in a court in another jurisdiction.  The 
most common example where the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
may arise is where a party who has obtained a favourable judgment in one state or 
country may seek to recognise and enforce the judgment in another state or country.  
This occurs because there is no sufficient asset in the state or country where the 
judgment was rendered to satisfy that judgment. 
 
As technological advancements in communications over vast geographical distances 
have improved exponentially in recent years, there has been an increase in 
cross-border transactions, as well as litigation arising from these transactions.  As a 
result, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is of increasing 
importance, since a party who has obtained a judgment in cross-border litigation may 
wish to recognise and enforce the judgment in another state or country, where the 
defendant’s assets may be located without having to re-litigate substantive issues that 
have already been resolved in another court. 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine whether the current state of laws for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and 
the European Community are in line with modern-commercial needs.  The study is 
conducted by weighing two competing objectives between the notion of finality of 
litigation, which encourages courts to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to 
them, on the one hand, and the adequacy of protection to safeguard the recognition 
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and enforcement proceedings, so that there would be no injustice or unfairness if a 
foreign judgment is recognised and enforced, on the other.  
 
The findings of the study are as follows.  In both Australia and the United States, 
there is a different approach concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
rendered by courts interstate or in a foreign country.  In order to maintain a single 
and integrated nation, there are constitutional and legislative requirements authorising 
courts to give conclusive effects to interstate judgments.  In contrast, if the 
recognition and enforcement actions involve judgments rendered by a foreign 
country’s court, an Australian or a United States court will not recognise and enforce 
the foreign judgment unless the judgment has satisfied a number of requirements and 
does not fall under any of the exceptions to justify its non-recognition and 
non-enforcement.  In the European Community, the Brussels I Regulation which 
governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments among European Union 
Member States has created a scheme, whereby there is only a minimal requirement 
that needs to be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  Moreover, 
a judgment that is rendered by a Member State and based on any of the jurisdictional 
bases set forth in the Brussels I Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in 
another Member State without further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  
However, there are concerns as to the adequacy of protection available under the 
Brussels I Regulation to safeguard the judgment-enforcing Member States, as well as 
those against whom recognition or enforcement is sought. 
 
This dissertation concludes by making two recommendations aimed at improving the 
means by which foreign judgments are recognised and enforced in the selected 
jurisdictions.  The first is for the law in both Australia and the United States to 
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undergo reform, including: adopting the real and substantial connection test as the 
new jurisdictional basis for the purposes of recognition and enforcement; liberalising 
the existing defences to safeguard the application of the real and substantial 
connection test; extending the application of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) in 
Australia to include at least its important trading partners; and implementing a federal 
statutory scheme in the United States to govern the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.  The second recommendation is to introduce a convention on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  The 
convention will be a convention double, which provides uniform standards for the 
rules of jurisdiction a court in a contracting state must exercise when rendering a 
judgment and a set of provisions for the recognition and enforcement of resulting 
judgments. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Study 
This research study examines the current regimes for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and the European Community and 
makes recommendations aimed at improving the way in which those regimes operate. 
 
The study is conducted by weighing two competing objectives.  The first is that the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments should be consistent with the 
objective of finality of litigation.  The notion of finality of litigation is that there 
should be an end to litigation and that a judgment obtained in one suit should become 
final and conclusive in the second suit without the need for re-litigation.  However, 
in view of the differences of laws between those which rendered and those asked to 
recognise and enforce judgments, there ought to be circumstances in which a court 
may refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if to do so would be unjust or 
unfair.  As such, the second objective is that there should be protection available to 
safeguard the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
The notion of finality of litigation has its origins in the doctrine of res judicata, which 
requires that there should be an end to litigation and that a party should not be vexed 
more than once in relation to the same matter.1  In other words, it is in the interests 
of litigants and the public as a whole that if a subject matter has been litigated and 
                                                 
1  See, eg, Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446, 466 (Fullagar J); Miller and Caddy (1986) 84 
FLR 169, 176. 
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decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, it should not be re-litigated between the 
same parties or their privies in the second suit.  As Fullagar J stated in Jackson v 
Goldsmith, ‘where an action has been brought and judgment has been entered in that 
action, no other proceedings can thereafter be maintained on the same cause of 
action.’2 
 
Where the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is concerned, the 
objective of finality of litigation will encourage courts to recognise and enforce 
judgments foreign to them.  This is an important objective especially in modern-day 
trade and commerce where there has been an increasing growth in cross-border 
transactions, as well as litigation arising from these transactions.  In cross-border 
litigation a party who has obtained a favourable judgment in one court realises that the 
defendant did not have sufficient assets in the state where the judgment was rendered 
to satisfy that judgment.  In order to collect the debt due under the judgment, the 
judgment holder would seek to recognise and enforce the judgment in a foreign state 
where the defendant’s assets may be found without having to re-litigate substantive 
issues that have already been resolved in another court. 
 
Despite the notion of finality of litigation, it is not suggested that foreign judgments 
should automatically be recognised and enforced without restriction or judicial 
scrutiny.  On the contrary, there are factors which, when present, will justify the 
non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  The underlying 
rationale is that for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, a judgment rendered 
in one state or country would have been subject to a system of law different from 
                                                 
2   (1950) 81 CLR 446, 466. See also Baldwin v Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assoc, 283 US 522, 525 
(1931). 
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those asked to recognise and enforce the judgment.  In other words, given the 
differences of substantive and procedural laws between states and countries, a matter 
which has been decided in one state or country may be decided differently if it was 
heard in another state or country.  Accordingly, when a court is asked to recognise 
and enforce a foreign judgment, there ought to be circumstances in which the court 
may refuse to do so if the recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment would 
be unjust or unfair.  However, this is not to say that the mere differences of laws 
between judgment-rendering and judgment-enforcing states would justify the 
non-recognition or non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  Instead, what is required 
is that the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment would violate basic rights 
of litigants (ie, the right to be legally represented or to be heard) or fundamental 
domestic laws and policies of the judgment-enforcing state.3  There are certain 
recognised factors which, if established, will allow a court to refuse to recognise and 
enforce a foreign judgment.  In general, the factors include that the court that 
rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the 
parties-to-the-dispute.  Similarly, if a foreign judgment was rendered as a result of 
fraud, breach of litigants’ rights to a fair hearing or the effect of recognising or 
enforcing a foreign judgment is likely to violate the public policy of the 
judgment-enforcing state, the judgment-enforcing state should be able to refuse to 
give effect to that judgment. 
 
As stated earlier, this research study examines the current regimes for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and the 
European Community.  With respect to Australia and the United States, 
                                                 
3   See, eg, Osorio v Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1347 (2009); Jenton Overseas Investment 
Pte Ltd v Townsing [2008] VSC 470 [22]. 
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consideration is given to the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by 
courts in a foreign country as well as domestically within those countries since, for 
the purposes of private international law, each state and territory of a federation is 
treated as a foreign judgment.4  As far as the European Community is concerned, the 
focus of examination is the Brussels I Regulation which governs the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments within European Union Member States.   
 
This study draws the following conclusions.  In Australia and the United States, in 
order to maintain a single and integrated nation, there are constitutional and 
legislative requirements authorising courts to give conclusive effects to interstate 
judgments.  However, in the United States, due to the degree of variation of laws 
among the states, a state court asked to recognise and enforce an interstate judgment 
may review the judgment under certain grounds to ensure that it was obtained fairly 
and appropriately.  In contrast, given the significant differences of substantive and 
procedural laws between each country, an Australian or a United States court will not 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment unless the judgment has satisfied a number 
of requirements and does not fall under any of the exceptions to justify its 
non-recognition and non-enforcement.  With respect to the position in the European 
Union, the Brussels I Regulation has created an effective scheme facilitating the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments among the European Union Member States.  
Under the Brussels I Regulation, there is only a minimal requirement that needs to be 
satisfied for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  Moreover, a judgment 
that is rendered by a Member State and based on the rules of jurisdiction set forth in 
                                                 
4  See, eg, Laurie v Carroll (1958) CLR 310, 331; Robinson v Norato, 71 RI 256, 269 (1945). But 
see, Pfeiffer v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, [65] (‘However, the terms of s 118 indicate that as 
between themselves, the states are not foreign powers as are nation states for the purposes of 
international law’). 
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the Brussels I Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another Member 
State and without further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  However, 
there are concerns as to the adequacy of protection available under the Brussels I 
Regulation to safeguard the recognition and enforcement proceedings, particularly 
those against whom recognition or enforcement is sought, as well as the 
judgment-enforcing Member States. 
 
This study concludes by making two recommendations.  The first is that a set of 
legislative reforms to the law in both Australia and the United States be introduced to 
improve the recognition and enforcement schemes in those countries.  The second is 
that a convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments be introduced. 
 
The set of legislative reforms to the law in Australia and the United States should 
include the following: (a) adopting the real and substantial connection test formulated 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments v De Savoye5 and Beals v 
Saldanha 6  as the new jurisdictional basis for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement; (b) liberalising the existing defences to safeguard the application of the 
real and substantial connection test; (c) extending the application of the Foreign 
Judgments Acts 1991 (Cth) in Australia to include at least its important trading 
partners; and (d) implementing a federal legislative scheme in the United States to 
govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments. 
 
The proposed convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
                                                 
5  [1990] 76 DLR (4th) 256. 
6  [2003] 3 SCR 416. 
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foreign judgments should be introduced to facilitate the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments among contracting states.  It is envisaged that the convention will have 
a better reception from countries whose legal systems derive from the common law of 
England such as Australia and Canada since the provisions proposed under the 
convention would be more familiar to those countries.  The proposed convention 
will be in the form of a double convention, which provides a uniform standard for the 
rules of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.  
The purpose of proposing a double convention model is that it will create the effect 
that if a judgment was rendered by one court in a contracting state and based on any 
of the jurisdictional grounds set forth in the convention, it would be entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in other contracting states without further review of its 
underlying jurisdictional basis.  Where the procedures for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments are concerned, the convention should implement a 
registration scheme by which a judgment given by a contracting state is enforced in 
another contracting state, upon the mere filing of the judgment with the latter state.  
Also, the convention should set forth a number of circumstances in which a 
contracting state is not obliged to recognise and enforce a judgment of another 
contracting state. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research study are therefore to: 
a) determine whether the existing regimes for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and the European Community 
are effective to meet modern commercial needs; 
b) identify any failings in those existing regimes for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments; 
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c) identify if anything can be done to improve the existing regimes for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; 
d) recommend changes to the existing regimes for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments to bring them into line with modern commercial needs. 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
In order to achieve the research objectives, this research study will: 
(a) examine the theoretical justifications and policy considerations underlying and 
supporting the existing regimes in selected jurisdictions;  
(b) analyse the existing frameworks for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in selected jurisdictions; 
(c) evaluate the existing frameworks from the perspective of the notion of finality of 
litigation, which encourages the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, as well as from the perspective of the defences which may justify 
non-recognition and non-enforcement; and 
(d) propose a number of recommendations to improve the means upon which foreign 
judgments are recognised and enforced in selected jurisdictions. 
 
1.4 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is one of the three constituent 
elements of what is known as private international law, or the conflict of laws.7  The 
other two are jurisdiction and choice of law.8  Private international law is a body of 
rules and principles devised by most nation states to deal with legal relations of a 
                                                 
7  The term ‘conflict of laws’ is especially in common use in the United States. However, it is argued 
that neither the term ‘private international law’ or ‘conflict of laws’ adequately describes the 
subject matter. See, eg, Reid Mortensen, Richard Garnett and Mary Keyes, Private International 
Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2011) 4-5 [1.3]-[1.4]. 
8   Ibid 3-4 [1.1]-[1.2]. 
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private nature between individuals and corporations that have a foreign element.9  
Accordingly, private international law is an aspect of municipal law of each country 
and it can arise in any dispute involving any branch of private law such as contracts, 
torts or family law.10  In order to fall within the sphere of private international law, 
the matter must involve a foreign element.  In determining the existence of a foreign 
element in a matter, one must refer to whether the matter has some contact with a 
foreign system of private law since, private international law is concerned with 
matters of private law and therefore, the relevant unit for the purposes of private 
international law is the private law area.11 
 
Private international law is distinct from public international law.12  Unlike private 
international law which governs relations of a private nature involving individuals and 
private associations, public international law is a state-based order governing the 
relations between States, States and international organisations, and States and other 
international actors.13  Another significant difference between public and private 
international law is the legal sources from which they originate.  As noted earlier, 
private international law is an aspect of municipal law that is developed at state or 
national level, the legal sources of public international law are principally found in 
treaties, conventions and customary international law, the effect of which can only be 
                                                 
9   Ibid 3 [1.1]. 
10  Ibid 5-6 [1.5]-[1.6]; Edward I Sykes and Michael C Pryles, Australian Private International Law 
(Law Book Company, 3rd ed, 1991) 1. 
11  Sykes and Pryles, above n 10, 4; Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 7, 6 [1.6]. 
12  However, there are some who argue that the distinction between public and private international 
law is only for analytical purpose since, due to expansion of public international law into a wide 
variety of subject matters in the modern era, they do from time to time intersect. See, eg, Donald 
Rothwell, International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspective (Cambridge 
University, 2011) 19-22 (for instance, the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitral 
decisions in foreign nations is an instrument developed through public international law and 
assumes great significance for private international law and international commercial arbitration). 
13  Ibid, 19; Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 7, 5 [1.5]. 
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enforced if it is implemented as a part of national law. 14   As such, public 
international law is universal in a sense that it is the same regardless of which country 
it is considered in, whereas the content of private international law varies from 
country to country and even from state to state in a federation.15 
 
In private international law, matters of jurisdiction concern whether a court has the 
power to hear and determine a dispute.  This power to adjudicate includes both 
subject matter and in personam or personal jurisdiction.  Subject matter jurisdiction 
is the authority of a court to hear the specific kind of claim that is brought before that 
court.16  Whether a court has the authority over a particular claim is generally 
stipulated at common law or by statute.  For instance, in Australia, common law 
prevents a court from entertaining a claim that essentially concerns rights to, or over, 
land outside Australia.17  Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is the power of a 
court over the parties to a lawsuit.  For instance, in Australia, the law of personal 
jurisdiction principally concerns the amenability of a defendant to the court’s writ.  
As the High Court of Australia explained in Laurie v Carroll,18 a court will have the 
necessary jurisdiction or power to hear a dispute when the person against whom 
litigation is commenced is physically present within the territory where the court sits 
and is being served with a writ. 
 
In the event a court decides that it has jurisdiction and will hear a dispute, it may need 
to decide which jurisdiction’s laws are to be applied to resolve the dispute.  This is a 
                                                 
14  See, eg, Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286-7. 
15  Rothwell, above n 12, 22; Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 7, 5 [1.5]. 
16  See,eg, David Syme v Grey (1992) 38 FCR 303, 312. 
17  See, eg, Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 VR 428. But see Du Bray v 
Mcllwraith [2009] NSWSC 888, [36] (where by virtue of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Foreign Land) 
Act 1989 of New South Wales, a court is able to exercise jurisdiction over land situated outside 
New South Wales). 
18  Laurie v Carroll (1958) CLR 310, 323. 
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question of choice of law.  When a dispute involves a foreign element for the 
purposes of private international law, a court hearing the dispute will need to 
determine whether it should apply its own law or in view of the foreign element, to 
apply the law of some other states.19  There are established principles upon which a 
court in determining what law is to be applied to resolve a dispute involving a foreign 
element may refer to.  In general, these principles operate based on the connecting 
factors that a case has with a particular state or country and that such differs according 
to the nature of the action.  For instance, in matters for immovable property, the 
connecting factor is the place where property is situated20 and in matters for foreign 
torts, it is the lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the commission of the tort) that 
should be applied by Australian courts as the law for the determination of rights and 
liabilities.21  However, it should be noted that the question of the choice between the 
law of the forum or the foreign state is only important if the application of the two is 
likely to lead to a conflicting result.22 
 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments concerns situations where a 
successful party to litigation seeks to rely on a judgment obtained in one court in a 
court in another jurisdiction.  This could occur where a plaintiff has obtained a 
judgment in his or her favour in a particular state, but discovers that the defendant 
does not have sufficient assets in the state where the judgment was rendered to satisfy 
that judgment.  In these circumstances, the plaintiff having obtained a judgment in 
                                                 
19  See, eg, Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331 (an 
Australian living in the People’s Republic of China was injured in a fall in an apartment provided 
by an Australian company. Five years after the accident, the applicant sued the Australian company 
for negligence in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The issue before the court was whether 
it is the law of Australia or China that sets the limitation period for the bringing of the applicant’s 
claim in tort). 
20  See, eg, Haque v Haque (No 2) (1965) 114 CLR 98, 121. 
21  See, eg, Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491, 517, 534. 
22  Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 7, 193 [7.1]. 
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one state would seek to recognise and enforce that judgment in a foreign state where 
the defendant’s assets are found.23  The recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments may also arise in situations where a judgment rendered in one court is set 
up by a defendant as a defence to resist an action brought against him or her in a court 
in another state on the same matter.  An example is where a plaintiff who has 
obtained a judgment that has already been satisfied by the defendant may be 
prevented from re-litigating the same claim against the same defendant in another 
court.24  However, in these situations where a judgment is relied upon as a defence, 
the court will determine whether recognition can be accorded to that judgment.  
There is no question of enforcement in these circumstances.25   
 
For the purpose of illustrating the circumstances in which the action for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may arise, suppose that a 
manufacturer resident in New South Wales of Australia (party A) entered into a 
commercial transaction with an American corporation resident in the state of 
California (party B) for the sale of goods.  Goods were delivered to party B and 
retailed in the United States.  However, the goods were later found to be defective 
and a recall was made.  Party B suffered an extensive loss and sought 
indemnification from party A.  Assuming that commercial negotiations over the 
matter came to naught and party A made no further response to the indemnification 
                                                 
23  See, eg, Independent Trustee Services Ltd v Morris [2010] NSWSC 1218 (enforcement of foreign 
money judgment in Supreme Court of New South Wales). Recognition and enforcement of 
judgments which are non-monetary in nature such as injunctions and orders for specific 
performance, on the other hand, is generally not allowed under common law action while there are 
some statutory exceptions. See also White v Verkouille [1990] 2 Qd R 191 where the court was 
asked to enforce a judgment with respect to the appointment of a receiver. 
24  See, eg, Taylor v Hollard [1902] 1 KB 676, 681. 
25   ‘Recognition’ means that a foreign judgment is considered final and conclusive and that it binds 
the parties. ‘Enforcement’ means where the foreign judgment compelling the judgment debtor to 
pay can be executed against the judgment debtor’s assets. While recognition is a precedent to 
enforcement, not every type of judgment requires enforcement. For example, judgments declaring 
the status of a person or the title to a thing do not require the action of enforcement. 
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request, party B brought legal proceedings in California and obtained a judgment 
against party A.  As party A had no valuable assets in the United States to satisfy that 
judgment, in order for party B to collect the debt due under the judgment, it petitioned 
the court in New South Wales to recognise and enforce the judgment.  The question 
arises as to whether the judgment obtained in California could be recognised and 
enforced in New South Wales where the assets are located. 
 
As explained earlier, private international law is part of domestic law as opposed to 
public international law.  As a result, the rules concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments vary from country to country and even from state 
to state.  For instance, countries such as Australia and the United States are more 
open to foreign judgments than countries such as the Netherlands, where foreign 
judgments of a foreign court cannot be enforced directly, unless it is on the basis of 
either a treaty or EU law (applicable in the Netherlands).26  The disparity of the rules 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is problematic and the 
problem is only likely to grow in years to come.  This is for the reason that as the 
incidence of cross-border transactions increases, partly due to technological 
advancement, there is an increasing growth of litigation arising from these 
transactions involving foreign elements such as parties-in-dispute who are located in 
different countries.27  Consequently, a party who has obtained a favourable judgment 
in one state or country may need to have the judgment recognised and enforced in 
another state or country for the purpose of execution without the need for re-litigation.  
Imagine that a party, after going through a long and costly legal proceeding in one 
                                                 
26  See, eg, Charles Platto and William G Horton (eds), Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Worldwide 
(Graham & Trotman and International Bar Association, 2nd ed, 1993) 158. 
27  See, eg, Richard Garnett, ‘The internationalization of Australian jurisdiction and judgments law’ 
(2004) 25 Australian Bar Review 205, 205; Pham Kim, ‘Enforcement of Non-Monetary Foreign 
Judgments in Australia’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 663, 664. 
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court in a state, obtains a favourable judgment.  The party then realises that the 
judgment could not be recognised and enforced in a court in another state where the 
assets are located.  This may be simply because this other state does not recognise 
and enforce foreign judgments at all.  In this circumstance, in order to collect the 
debt due under the judgment, the party may be required to commence a local 
proceeding in the state where the assets are located.  As far as the objective of 
finality of litigation is concerned, this would not only defeat the purpose of prior 
litigation, it may also have a number of adverse consequences.  For instance, there 
will be an increase in costs in litigation proceedings and consequently, parties may be 
discouraged from engaging in cross-border transactions.  Also, there may be a waste 
of judicial resources if parties are required to re-litigate substantive issues in order to 
secure their rights and remedies abroad. 
 
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of the dissertation is organised as follows. 
 
Chapter Two-Theoretical Justifications and Policy Considerations 
This chapter explores the bases upon which foreign judgments are recognised and 
enforced in Australia, the United States and the European Community.  The first part 
of this chapter examines the theoretical perspective, including comity, reciprocity and 
obligation theory.  It is argued in this part that while the theoretical bases lay the 
foundation upon which the selected regimes for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments rest, there are criticisms as to the adequacy of these bases.  The 
second part of this chapter considers the policy perspective, particularly the notion of 
finality of litigation argued as an important objective to support the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as circumstances in which foreign 
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judgments may be denied recognition and enforcement.  This Part argues that the 
notion of finality of litigation, which requires that there be an end to litigation, will 
encourage courts to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to them.  However, in 
view of the differences of laws between those which rendered and those asked to 
recognise and enforce judgments, there ought to be circumstances in which courts 
may refuse to recognise and enforce foreign judgments if to do so would be unjust or 
unfair. 
 
Chapter Three-The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Australia and United States 
This chapter considers the positions in Australia and the United States for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by courts interstate and in a 
foreign country.  The examination includes the requirements that must be satisfied 
for the purposes of recognition and enforcement and certain recognised defences 
which, if established, may justify the non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  It is concluded in this chapter that, as far as interstate judgments are 
concerned, there are constitutional and legislative requirements authorising Australian 
and United States courts to recognise and enforce interstate judgments so as to 
maintain a single and integrated nation.  However, in the United States, given the 
degree of variation of laws among the states, a state court asked to recognise and 
enforce an interstate judgment may review the judgment under certain grounds to 
ensure that it was obtained fairly and appropriately.  In contrast, if the recognition 
and enforcement action in Australia or the United States involves a judgment rendered 
by a court in a foreign country, the judgment will not be recognised and enforced 
unless it has satisfied a number of requirements and does not fall under any of the 
exceptions to justify its non-recognition and non-enforcement.  The purpose of the 
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requirements and defences is to ensure the administration of justice, which is 
especially important given the significant differences of substantive and procedural 
laws between each country.  However, it is argued that the requirements and 
defences should not be imposed and construed in a way that may cause hardship for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments especially in modern-day trade 
and commerce. 
 
Chapter Four-The Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in the European 
Community 
This chapter examines the Brussels I Regulation that governs the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments within European Union Member States.  The examination 
includes the provisions specifying the rules of jurisdiction a court in a Member State 
must exercise when rendering a judgment, and the procedures for the recognition and 
enforcement of resulting judgments.  It is argued in this chapter that the Brussels I 
Regulation has created an effective scheme for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement.  Under the Brussels I Regulation, there is only a minimal requirement 
that needs to be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  Moreover, 
a judgment that is rendered by a court in a Member State and based on any of the 
jurisdictional grounds set forth in the Brussels I Regulation is entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in another Member State without further review of its 
underlying jurisdictional basis.  However, there are concerns as to the adequacy of 
protection available under the Brussels I Regulation to safeguard the recognition and 
enforcement proceedings, particularly those against whom recognition or enforcement 
is sought, as well as the judgment-enforcing Member States. 
 
Chapter Five-The Hague Convention Negotiation for a Multilateral Convention 
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on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
This chapter explores the efforts to date in creating a multilateral convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  In particular, this chapter looks 
at the two attempts initiated in 1962 and 1992 under the auspices of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law.  In addition, this chapter examines the 
provisions under the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements concluded in 2005 
as a result of the 1992 attempt and its likely effect in Australia, the United States and 
the European Community if implemented.  This chapter draws the conclusion that 
the main reason for the failure in concluding a worldwide convention on recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments is not the issue about the procedures for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather lies with the question of 
underlying jurisdiction assumed by courts when rendering judgments. 
 
Chapter Six-Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter makes two recommendations aimed at improving the means upon which 
foreign judgments are recognised and enforced in the selected jurisdictions.  The 
first recommendation is for the law in both Australia and the United States to undergo 
reform.  This includes: adopting the real and substantial connection test formulated 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investment v De Savoye and Beals v 
Saldanha as the new jurisdictional basis for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement; liberalising the existing defences to safeguard the application of the real 
and substantial connection test; extending the application of the Foreign Judgments 
Act 1991 (Cth) in Australia to include at least its important trading partners; and 
implementing a federal statutory scheme governing the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments in the United States.  The second recommendation is to 
introduce a convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
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judgments.  The convention will be in the form of convention double, which 
provides uniform standards for the rules of jurisdiction that a court in a contracting 
state must exercise when rendering a judgment and regulates the procedures for the 
recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments among contracting states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
Chapter Two 
Theoretical Justifications and Policy Considerations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the bases upon which foreign judgments are recognised and 
enforced in Australia, the United States and the European Community.  The first part 
of this chapter considers the theoretical bases in Part Two, including comity, 
reciprocity and obligation theory.  This Part draws the conclusion that while the 
theoretical frameworks lay the foundation upon which the selected regimes for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments rest, the adequacies of the bases 
are debatable.  Part Three of this chapter considers the policy perspective, 
particularly the notion of finality of litigation argued as an important objective to 
support the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as 
circumstances in which foreign judgments may be denied recognition and 
enforcement.  It is argued in this Part that the objective of finality of litigation, which 
requires that there be an end to litigation, will encourage courts to recognise and 
enforce judgments foreign to them.  However, in view of the differences of laws 
between those which rendered and those asked to recognise and enforce foreign 
judgments, there ought to be circumstances in which courts may refuse to recognise 
and enforce foreign judgments if to do so would be unjust or unfair. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Justifications 
Before turning to the discussion on the theoretical frameworks, it is important to 
consider the principle of territorial sovereignty that justifies the limited effect of a 
judgment in one court rendered by another court.  The principle of territorial 
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sovereignty can be understood from two aspects: internal and external.28  From the 
internal perspective, a sovereign state has an exclusive right to exercise its power and 
authority within the boundary of its territory.  In other words, any and all people, 
things and transactions found within the territory will be subject to the exclusive 
control of the sovereign state, including its judicial power. 29   Accordingly, a 
sovereign state has the power to bring any individual found within its borders before 
its court and renders a judgment against that individual.  In this sense, a sovereign 
state’s power is limitless.  From the external perspective which is concerned with 
relations of sovereign states, a sovereign state is an independent state and cannot 
intervene in the internal or external affairs of other states such as intervention by a 
foreign judicial authority.30   
 
Under the principle of territorial sovereignty, the effect of a judgment rendered by one 
court in a sovereign state cannot be extended into another sovereign state.  This is for 
the reason that a judgment rendered by one sovereign state is regarded as a judicial 
product of that state only, since it is announced by a court deriving its authority from 
that state and the effect of the judgment is limited to the territory of the sovereign 
whose court rendered the judgment.31  While the principle of territorial sovereignty 
seeks to protect the supreme power of a nation, the effect of which may have an 
                                                 
28  H L Ho, ‘Policies Underlying the Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Judgments’ (1997) 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 443, 447-8. 
29  Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714, 722 (1878) (Justice Field: ‘every state possesses exclusive 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. No state can exercise 
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory’); Ho, above n 28, 
447 (this is an internal sense of sovereignty, connoting the idea of a supreme within a political 
community). 
30  This flows from the principle of independence and legal equality of states, see Charter of the 
United Nations art 2(4), (7); Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, ILC (1949) art 3. 
See also Joyce v Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd (2011) 195 FCR 213, [36], [55]-[56]. 
31  Friedrich K Juenger, ‘The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ 
(1988) 36(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 6 (‘under the notion of territorial 
sovereignty, judgments came to be regarded as governmental acts whose compulsory effect was 
limited to the sovereign’s territory’); Hessel E Yntema, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Anglo-American Law’ (1935) 33(8) Michigan Law Review 1129, 1144-45. 
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adverse impact on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments since, by the 
operation of the territorial sovereignty, a sovereign state cannot give effect to a 
judgment that is the judicial product of another sovereign state.  Consequently, a 
strict adherence to the principle of territorial sovereignty may hamper international 
trade and commerce and cause a disruption to international order and harmony.32 
 
2.2.1 Comity and Reciprocity 
The doctrine of comity was introduced in the 17th century, through the works of Dutch 
scholar Ulrich Huber, to reconcile between the needs of international commerce, trade 
and intercourse of nations on the one hand and territorial sovereignty on the other.33  
The comity doctrine was contained in Huber’s three maxims, which are: first, the laws 
of each state have force within the limits of that government and bind all those 
subjects to it, but not beyond; second, all persons within the limits of a government, 
whether they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof; 
and third, sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within the 
limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause 
prejudices to the powers or rights of such government or of their subjects.34  While 
the first two maxims recognise the principle of territorial sovereignty in which no 
sovereign state is under an obligation to apply foreign laws or to give effect to foreign 
judgments, the third maxim states that courts in one sovereign state may exercise 
foreign laws or give effect to foreign judgments as a matter of convenience and 
utility.35  The third maxim was created in view of the rise of multi-state transactions.  
                                                 
32  Juenger, above n 31, 4, 7. 
33  Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis, translated in Ernest G 
Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws 162 (New Haven; Yale University Press, 
1947). 
34  Ibid 164. 
35  Ibid 138; Louisa B Childs, ‘Shaky Foundations: Criticism of Reciprocity and the Distinction 
between Public and Private International Law’ (2006) 38 International Law and Politics 221, 238 
(in the Dutch edition of Huber’s work, he compared comity to ‘the high authorities of each country 
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As Huber explained, ‘nothing could be more inconvenient to commerce and to international 
usage than that transactions valid by the law of one place should be rendered of no effect 
elsewhere on account of a difference in the law.’36 
 
Accordingly, the comity doctrine provides a basis, allowing courts in one sovereign 
state to apply foreign laws or to give effect to foreign judgments while still preserving 
state sovereignty.  It operates out of deference and not compulsion or duty-it is 
through tacit consent that a sovereign state applies foreign laws or gives effect to 
foreign judgments.  The tacit consent, however, may be withheld if to do so would 
prejudice the interests of the state or its subject.37   
 
Although Huber’s comity doctrine had limited influence on the civil law continent in 
private civil disputes,38 the idea was embraced by the American scholar Joseph Story 
and laid an important foundation in the United States’ practices on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  In Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 
which has made a significant contribution in American conflicts principles,39 he 
acknowledged the principle of territorial sovereignty and stated that ‘the laws of one 
country can have no intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except within the territorial limits 
and jurisdiction of that country’ and that ‘no state or nation can, by its laws, directly 
affect, or bind property out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein, 
whether they are natural born subjects, or others.’  However, ‘whatever force and 
                                                                                                                                            
offer each other a hand’); Joel R Paul, ‘Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard 
International Law Journal 1, 17 [hereinafter Comity in International Law]. 
36  Lorenzen, above n 33, 164-5; Donald Earl Childress III, ‘Comity as Conflict: Resituating 
International Comity as Conflict of Laws’ [2010] 44 University of California, Davis 11, 22. 
37  Lorenzen, above n 33, 139. 
38  Paul, Comity in International Law, above n 35, 30-1. 
39  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in Regard to 
Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills,  
Successions, and Judgments (1834). 
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obligation the laws of one country have in another, depends solely upon the laws, and 
municipal regulation of the latter…and upon its own express or tacit consent.’40  
Accordingly, despite the principle of territorial sovereignty, a sovereign state might 
give effect to foreign laws and judgments on the basis of comity.41  However, the 
notion of comity is to rest on ‘mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the 
inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral 
necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return.’42  Therefore, 
what Story had proposed as the true foundation of the laws of one nation within the 
territories of another was the comity of nations derived from the voluntary consent of 
the latter state, unless doing so would be ‘contrary to its known policy, or prejudicial 
to its interests.’43 
 
Despite the notion of comity providing a justification upon which foreign judgments 
may be recognised and enforced, it is non-obligatory in nature and short of a legal 
binding effect.  As such, the problem with the comity doctrine is that it may create 
uncertainty since courts are under no obligation to give conclusive effects to foreign 
judgments and whether a court will or will not do so may depend on the familiarity 
and the degree of trust and confidence it has in another sovereign state.44 
 
The comity doctrine was considered by the United States Supreme Court in the 
seminal case of Hilton v Guyot (‘Hilton’), which involved a suit brought by a French 
company against its American trading partners operating in France, for sums owed by 
                                                 
40   Ibid §§ 7-8, 18, 20, 23. 
41  Ibid § 33. 
42  Ibid §§ 35-36. 
43  Ibid § 38. 
44  Ho, above n 28, 451-2. 
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the American defendants.45  The matter was tried in a French court and a final 
judgment was awarded to the French plaintiffs.  The French plaintiffs sought to have 
the French judgment recognised and enforced in the United States because the 
American defendants liquidated their assets in France. 46  In the action for the 
recognition and enforcement of the French judgment, the court considered the comity 
doctrine and imposed a requirement that the French judgment should be given effect 
only if the French court gave effect to an equivalent decision of the United States 
court.  However, the majority of the court held that since the French court would not 
have given effect to an equivalent judgment by a United States court, the court was 
under no obligation to enforce the French judgment.47 
 
In reaching its decision, the Hilton court stated that comity is ‘neither a matter of 
absolute obligation’ nor a ‘mere courtesy and good will,’ but it is the ‘recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory’ to the judicial proceedings of another 
nation, ‘having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.’48  In other words, when a United States court consents to give effect to a 
foreign judgment, it does so not as a matter of obligation or good will, but as a matter 
of taking into account common convenience and mutual necessities between the 
United States and the sovereign state which rendered the judgment.49  Accordingly, 
the recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered by a foreign country will be 
denied in the United States if that foreign country does not give conclusive effect to 
                                                 
45  159 US 113 (1894). 
46  Ibid 114-6. 
47  Ibid 210-1, 215, 217 (by the law of France at that time, ‘no foreign judgment can be rendered 
executory in France without a review of the judgments au fond–to the bottom, including the whole 
merits of the cause of action on which the judgment rests’). 
48  Ibid 163-4. 
49  See also Somportex Ltd v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp, 453 F 2d 435 (3rd Cir 1971) affirming 
this interpretation of comity. 
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judgments rendered by the United States courts. 
 
It follows that the notion of comity that operates on the basis of deference for 
sovereign states may carry the effect of reciprocity.  As far as the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is concerned, the notion of reciprocity can take one 
of two forms.  On the one hand, it may be used positively so that a state will accept 
foreign judgments and give them effect within the limits of its territory.  This is done 
with the anticipation that foreign states will give similar reception for its judgments in 
return.50  Reciprocity in this sense may have the effect of inducing courts to honour 
foreign judgments.  On the other hand, however, reciprocity can be used in a 
negative sense.  For example, if a court in a state refuses to recognise and enforce a 
judgment rendered by another state, a court in the latter state may do likewise by 
refusing to give effect to the former state’s judgment, even if that judgment has 
satisfied all the requirements for enforcement. 51  Reciprocity in this sense can 
therefore be used as a tool of retaliation against states that do not return the same 
favour of recognising and enforcing foreign judgments.  The Hilton decision 
examined earlier is an example of this negative reciprocity, where the United States 
court, for want of reciprocity, refused to recognise the French judgment on the basis 
that French courts would not give effect to American judgments. 
 
The notion of reciprocity is endorsed as a condition for the purposes of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in many jurisdictions, including Australia and 
the European Community.  In Australia, the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) states 
that a judgment rendered by a court of a foreign country will be entitled to recognition 
                                                 
50  Ho, above n 28, 454 (quoted ‘we do justice that justice that may be done in return’ from Russian 
Republic v Cibrario [citation omitted]). 
51  Ibid 453-4. 
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and enforcement in an Australian court provided that that court would give similar 
effect to Australian judgments. 52  The courts whose judgments qualify for the 
reciprocal treatment are specified in the Foreign Judgments Regulation 1992 (Cth).53  
In the European Community, in light of a common market within the Community, the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
was drafted and imposed upon each of the European Community Member State the 
obligation to recognise and enforce judgments rendered by another Member State.54  
 
While reciprocity is imposed as a requirement for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia and within the European Community, the United States 
courts in large part have dropped such a requirement in their treatment of foreign 
judgments after the Hilton v Guyot decision.  One of the first cases in which state 
courts in the United States reject reciprocity was the decision by the New York Court 
of Appeals in Johnston v Compagnie General Transatlantique, which examined the 
effect of a French judgment in the State of New York.55  In this case, the court noted 
that there is no such thing as comity of nations between the State of New York and the 
Republic of France.  However, the question at issue was ‘one of private rather than 
public international law, of private right rather than public relations.’56  Accordingly, 
the court ‘will recognise private rights acquired under foreign laws and the sufficiency 
of the evidence establishing such rights.’ 57  The New York Court of Appeals 
therefore did not follow the Hilton v Guyot decision and gave effect to the French 
                                                 
52  See, Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), art. 5. 
53  See, Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992 (Cth) Schedule. 
54  See, Countil Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [2002] OJ L 
12/1. 
55  152 NE 121 (NY 1926). 
56  Ibid 123. 
57   Ibid. 
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judgment despite the lack of reciprocity.  In reaching this decision, the court held 
that ‘comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of “practice, convenience and 
expediency.”’  It therefore rests ‘not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the 
persuasiveness of the foreign judgment.’58 
 
Similarly, as a result of the decision in Erie Railroad v Tompkins,59 federal courts in 
the United States have abandoned the reciprocity requirement for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement.  In this case, the United States Supreme Court held 
that there was no general federal common law and when matters before federal courts 
involving diversity of citizenship between different states or citizens of one state and 
a foreign country, federal courts have the constitutional obligation to apply the state 
law in which they are located.60 
 
The notion of reciprocity has been the subject of criticism.  It is argued that if a 
foreign judgment is refused recognition due to a lack of reciprocal arrangement with 
the state asked to recognise and enforce the judgment, the litigants are being punished 
unfairly for a governmental policy that he or she has no control of.61  However, there 
are some who view reciprocity as a means of persuading other countries to enter into 
reciprocal agreements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
This is particularly advanced by the game theory paradigm of the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma,’ whereby for the purposes of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, the two states have the options of: co-operate and give effect to their 
                                                 
58   Ibid. 
59  304 US 64 (1938). 
60  Ibid 71, 78. See also Klaxon Co v Stentor Electric Mfg Co, 313 US 487, 496 (1941) (Reed J). 
61  Juenger, above n 31, 33 (‘it seems unfair to penalise private litigants, who are neither to blame nor 
in a position to change matters, for the rendition state’s lack of comity’). See also William G 
Southard, ‘The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (1977) 16 Columbia 
Journal of International Law 327, 348-9.  
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respective judgments; one state unilaterally gives effect to the judgment of the other; 
or both states do not co-operate and refuse to give effect to the respective 
judgments.62  While the dominant strategy for both states is not to recognise and 
enforce the other state’s judgment, the game theorists argue that reciprocity can 
provide a means for the co-operative behaviour in recognising and enforcing the other 
state’s judgments.  Also, repetitive recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments by the states for a period of time can lead to a co-operative strategy rather 
than un-cooperative.63 
 
2.2.2 Obligation Theory 
Another basis recognised to support the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments is the obligation theory.  Particularly, this theory was relied upon by the 
English authorities to justify the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
since the 19th century.64  The obligation theory had profound influence in Australia 
and constituted the basis upon which foreign judgments are recognised and enforced 
at common law in Australia.65 
 
                                                 
62  The prisoner’s dilemma is a game of two players, each suspected of committing a crime. If both 
suspects confess, each suspect will receive, say, a two year sentence. If neither suspect confesses, 
each suspect will receive a one year sentence. If one suspect confesses and the other remains silent, 
the one who confesses will receive no sentence while the one remains silent will receive a three 
years sentence. Therefore, the two suspects will avoid extended sentences if both cooperate and 
either confess or not confess. However, if one does not confess and the other confesses, the 
non-confessing will receive an extremely long sentence while the confessing will benefit from it 
by receiving the shortest possible sentence. See Appendix I. See also Michael Whincop, ‘The 
Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments’ (1999) 23 
Melbourne University Law Review 416; Susan L Stevens, ‘Commanding International Judicial 
Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2002) 26 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 115. 
63   Whincop, above n 62, 419. 
64  Albert venn Dicey, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th ed, 
2006) 566, 569. 
65  Michael Tilbury, Gary Davis and Brian Opeskin, Conflict of Laws in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 179.  
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The obligation theory was first stated by Parke B in Russell v Smyth66 and Williams v 
Jones67 and later approved in Godard v Gray68 and Schibsby v Westenholz69 in the 
following words: 
Where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from 
one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of 
debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of 
foreign and colonial courts are supported and enforced. And taking this as the principle, 
it seems to follow that anything which negatives the existence of that legal obligation, or 
excuses the defendant from the performance of it, must form a good defence to the 
action.70 
 
It follows from the passage that under the obligation theory, a foreign judgment is 
comparable as an action of debt arising between parties in a private transaction and 
imposes upon the defendant a legal obligation to be answerable to that action of debt.  
To some extent, the obligation theory parallels the vested rights theory which had 
profound effects in England through the works of Dicey.71  The vested rights theory 
was advanced on the basis that, while all laws and judicial decisions are confined 
within its territory and cannot claim extra-territorial effect without the other sovereign 
state’s consent, a sovereign state applies foreign laws or gives effect to foreign 
judgments on the basis of rights vested in those laws and judgments and not the laws 
or judgments themselves.72  In other words, courts do not apply foreign laws or give 
                                                 
66  (1842) 9 M & W 810. 
67  (1845) 13 M & W 628. 
68  (1870) LR 6 QB 139, 148. 
69  (1870) LR 6 QB 155, 159. 
70   Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139, 148. 
71   A V Dicey, Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons 
& The Boston Book, 1898). 
72  Ibid 24-32; R D Carswell, ‘The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private International Law’ (1959) 8 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 268, 271. 
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effect to foreign judgments as such, but simply recognise and give effect to the vested 
rights. 
 
In contrast to the vested rights theory, which purports to establish that rights are 
vested under foreign judgments, the obligation theory is advanced on the presumption 
that obligations are created inherently at the instant judgments are made.  As such, 
what is in fact recognised and enforced under the obligation theory is not the 
judgment itself but the obligation it produced.  The presumption that foreign 
judgments are like legal obligations created in debt actions has led the English courts 
to lay down certain conditions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  That is, a foreign judgment must satisfy these conditions in order to be 
recognised and enforced in England.  Also, the English courts have stipulated that in 
a number of circumstances, a court may refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment if to do so would be unjust or unfair.    
 
In Australia, courts have adopted a similar position as the English courts.  For 
instance, in Koop v Bebb where the court was asked to determine whether an action 
for a tortious act, while committed in New South Wales, can be maintained in Victoria, 
the court stated that:73 
 
The law of the forum enforces an obligation of its own creation in respect of an 
act done outside the territorial jurisdiction of the forum, but only if the act would 
have been a civil wrong if done in the territory of the forum and the act had a 
particular character according to the law of the place in which it was done. 
 
                                                 
73  Koop v Bebb (1951) 84 CLR 629, 644. 
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In other words, the Koop court was of the view that in order for a tortious action to lie 
in one state for a wrong alleged to have been committed in another state, it must be 
that the wrong is of such a character that it would have been actionable if it had been 
committed in the state in which the action is brought and it must not have been 
justifiable by the law of the state where it was done.74  By transposing the rule to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, for an Australian court to 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, the judgment must be recognisable and 
enforceable in the state where it was originally rendered.  It is by virtue of this 
concept that a foreign judgment is entitled to be recognised and enforced on the 
obligation theory basis. 
 
Despite the obligation theory being recognised as the basis upon which foreign 
judgments are recognised and enforced in England and Australia, it has been criticised 
as an inadequate basis.  According to Professor Ho, the obligation theory fails to 
address the fundamental questions as to why foreign judgments are treated as legal 
obligations and why the obligations should be given extra-territorial effects.75  Also, 
given that not all judgments would impose obligations, the obligation theory has 
difficulty explaining why judgments on status and declaratory judgments are 
recognisable and enforceable.76  However, even though the obligation theory has left 
a number of issues unaddressed, its simplicity has provided a means for reaching 
certain conclusions.  For instance, by treating foreign judgments as contract debts, it 
justifies the conclusivity of judgments in a foreign state and makes the recognition 
and enforcement proceedings easier for judgment holders.77  Also, by relying on the 
                                                 
74  Ibid, 642. 
75  Ho, above n 28, 445. 
76  Ibid; Hans Smit, ‘International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States’ (1962) 9 
UCLA Law Review 44, 55. 
77  Ho, above n 28, 446. 
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obligation theory, there is no need for a court asked to recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment, to give regard as to how the court that rendered the judgment would treat 
foreign judgments as it is required under the notion of reciprocity.78 
 
2.3 Policy Considerations 
This Part considers the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments from the 
policy perspective.  The policy consideration addresses the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments from a practical standpoint, by answering questions 
such as why should a court give conclusive effect to a foreign judgment and what are 
the implications when a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced.  The answers 
to these questions are becoming important especially in modern-day trade and 
commerce since, due to the increasing growth of cross-border litigation, there is an 
increasing demand that judgments obtained in one court be recognised and enforced 
in another court without the need for re-litigation.   
 
2.3.1 Res Judicata 
In searching for the policy bases, it is believed that the doctrine of res judicata is the 
real basis underlying and supporting the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.79  Res judicata is a common law doctrine which is grounded on the 
policy that ‘where an action has been brought and judgment has been entered in that 
action, no other proceedings can thereafter be maintained on the same cause of 
action.’80  In other words, if a subject matter has already been litigated and decided 
                                                 
78  Niv Tadmore, ‘Recognition of Foreign In Personam Money Judgments in Australia’ (1995) 2 
Deakin Law Review 129, 137. 
79  See, eg, Willis L M Reese, ‘The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad’ (1950) 50 
Columbia Law Review 783, 784-5; Smit, above n 76, 56; Tadmore, above n 78, 138-40. 
80  Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446, 466 (Fullagar J). See also Baldwin v Iowa State 
Traveling Men’s Assoc, 283 US 522, 525 (1931) (‘that there be an end of litigation, that those who 
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall 
be considered forever settled as between the parties). 
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by one court of competent jurisdiction, it cannot be re-litigated between the same 
parties or their privies in the second suit and the judgment obtained in the first 
adjudication should become final and conclusive in the second suit without needing to 
re-litigate substantive issues.  The doctrine of res judicata therefore requires that 
there should be an end to litigation and that no person should be proceeded against 
twice for the same cause.81 
 
Despite the aim of res judicata to is to put an end to litigation, its effect only extends 
to domestic and not to foreign judgments.  Where domestic judgments are concerned, 
if a plaintiff has successfully obtained a judgment in a proceeding, the original cause 
of action is said to have merged in the judgment.82  In other words, a plaintiff having 
obtained a judgment in one court in a state is bound by the result of that judgment and 
cannot attempt to commence a new suit on the same cause of action in another court 
in the same state.  Similarly, if a defendant succeeded in a lawsuit, the original cause 
of action is barred.  That is, the defendant may use the judgment obtained in one 
state as a bar against a second action on the same claim in that state.83  In both cases, 
the original cause of action is extinguished and the judgment is final and conclusive as 
to matters litigated. 
 
The merger doctrine which applies to domestic judgments, however, does not extend 
to judgments given by courts in foreign countries.  As is stated, ‘a judgment in 
personam in a court of a foreign country, while it constitutes a good cause of action in 
a domestic court, does not merge the original cause of action or extinguish the 
                                                 
81  Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446, 466 (Fullagar J). 
82  Ibid; Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, 531-2 (Dixon J). 
83  See, eg, MacDonald v Grand Trunk Ry, 71 NH 448 (1902). See also Courtland H Peterson, ‘Res 
Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments’ (1963) 24 Ohio State Law Journal 291, 302-3 (‘when 
res judicata is projected to the level of interstate judgments, it tends to merge with the full faith 
and credit principle both in the language and the reasoning of the American courts’). 
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original contract debt, and it is no bar to an action thereon in a domestic court unless it 
has been paid or satisfied.’84  Accordingly, a party who has obtained a judgment in 
one state and that has not been satisfied, for the purposes of collecting his or her debt 
due under that judgment in another state, the party may pursue an action on the 
unsatisfied foreign judgment or an action on the original cause of action despite it 
having already been litigated elsewhere.  As will be seen in Chapter Three, a 
judgment holder seeking to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment in Australia or 
the United States may do so by either pursuing an action on the foreign judgment or 
by filing a new suit on the original cause of action. 
 
The non-merger rule in relation to foreign judgments sits uneasily with the doctrine of 
res judicata as it allows a judgment holder to re-litigate a matter despite it having 
already been adjudicated once.  While, as some argue, a second lawsuit is not a 
duplication of prior foreign proceedings since a judgment given by a state would have 
been rendered under a system of law different from the state asked to enforce the 
judgment.85  Others are of the view that a plaintiff who successfully obtained a 
foreign judgment should be limited to the recovery thus obtained so long he or she has 
had an opportunity to seek full relief in the foreign forum.86  Despite the competing 
arguments with respect to the application of res judicata to foreign judgments, for the 
interest of justice and socially desirable objectives of avoiding repetitive litigation and 
the conservation of judicial resources, it is argued that the underlying objective of res 
judicata is as important to domestic as to foreign judgments. 
 
                                                 
84  Swift v David, 181 F 828, 829 (9th Cir 1910). See also Brali v Hyundai Co (1988) 84 ALR 176, 
179-180 (this case concerns the enforcement of interim awards); Delfino v Trevis (No 2) [1963] 
NSWR 194, 196-7. 
85  See, eg, Smit, above n 76, 62-3. 
86  See, eg, Courtland H Peterson, ‘Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws’ (1972) 72 Columbia Law Review 220, 230-2. 
 34 
2.3.2 Finality of Litigation and Exceptions 
A Finality of Litigation 
The finality of litigation, derived from res judicata, requires that there should be an 
end to a proceeding and that a judgment obtained in one proceeding should be final 
and conclusive in the second proceeding.  As far as the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments is concerned, the finality of litigation plays an important 
objective as it will encourage courts to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to 
them and therefore prevent re-litigation of the same claim and issue, which has 
already been tried once elsewhere.  Accordingly, the notion of finality of litigation 
will have positive implications such as being fair and just to litigants and facilitate 
commerce and trade. 
 
Where litigants are concerned, when a judgment holder has obtained a favourable 
judgment in a proceeding and seeks to recognise and enforce the judgment in a court 
in another jurisdiction that is likely to give conclusive effect to that judgment, it will 
save the judgment holder from going through the time and expense of re-litigating the 
matter.87  However, when the judgment holder is being placed in the position of 
re-litigating the matter afresh, it brings unfairness upon the party in a number of 
aspects.  For instance, re-litigation gives the party against whom recognition and 
enforcement is sought a second chance to defend the case and the possibility of 
removing his or her assets out of the state where re-litigation takes place.  Also, 
re-litigation provides no sense of guarantee that the same result would be obtained.  
Thus, all the time, effort and cost spent in obtaining an earlier judgment may be 
wasted.  Moreover, the judgment holder may encounter difficulties in re-pursuing an 
                                                 
87   Richard Frimpong Oppong, ‘Enforcing Foreign Non-Money Judgments: An Examination of Some 
Recent Developments in Canada and Beyond’ (2006) 39 University of British Columbia Law 
Review 257, 273-4 (‘it is severely unjust to be forced to relitigate a matter already adjudicated 
upon by a competent authority’); Ho, above n 28, 460. 
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action in an unfamiliar jurisdiction or even be forced to give up due to the cost.88  
From the defendant’s point of view, the notion of finality of litigation has the effect of 
preventing a plaintiff from forcing a defendant to defend a matter which has already 
been determined.  This is especially so if the plaintiff is the losing party in a foreign 
proceeding and attempts to litigate afresh the same matter in another jurisdiction.  In 
that circumstance, the defendant should be able to rely on the foreign judgment in its 
favour and plead estoppel to prevent re-litigation.89 
 
The notion of finality of litigation is also observed to be closely related to the 
facilitation of commerce and trade.  For instance, where a judgment rendered by one 
court in a state is likely to be recognised and enforced in another state, it will provide 
a sense of security to parties engaging in cross-border transactions, that their rights 
and remedies would be enforced abroad.  Conversely, if there is little or no assurance 
that their rights and remedies would be given effect when carried abroad, it may 
undermine the traders’ confidence and faith in international commercial 
transactions.90  As Professor Perez states, ‘traders seek security provided by the 
enforcement of legal rights and the provisions of an adequate remedy,’ unenforceable 
judgments may lead exporters to ‘undervalue the gains from trade’ and ‘fail to take 
advantage of otherwise beneficial trading opportunities.’91 
 
Similarly, Professor Mortensen observes that an extended scheme for the recognition 
                                                 
88  Ho, above n 28, 460; Pham, above n 27, 672 (‘why should a plaintiff be compelled to begin an 
action in the [jurisdiction] where the defendant now resides, whatever the inconvenience and costs 
this may bring, and whatever degree of connection the relevant transaction may have with another 
[jurisdiction]?’ Quoted La Forest J in Morguard Investment Ltd v De Savoye [citation omitted]). 
89   See, eg, MacDonald v Grand Trunk Ry, 71 NH 448 (1902). 
90  Antonio F Perez, ‘The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate between Private and 
Public Law Solutions’ (2001) 19(44) Berkeley Journal of International Law 44, 44; Reid 
Mortensen, ‘Judgments Extension under CER’ [1999] New Zealand Law Review 237, 238. 
91  Perez, above n 90, 44. 
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and enforcement of judgments in a multi-state market area is likely to provide a 
favourable setting for trade. 92  He provides three reasons for this. 93  First, it 
motivates defendants to participate in the first set of proceedings and therefore creates 
procedural and cost efficiencies in litigation.  Second, it provides a sense of legal 
certainty where the application of a law to a particular relationship is reasonably 
predictable regardless of where in the market area the relationship is considered.  
And third, it is a better deterrent to default in the payment of commercial debts.  
Thus, as Professor Mortensen states, ‘free trade is helped by the free circulation of 
judgments.  When the latter is made possible, political boundaries in the market area 
are less likely to deter the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital.’94 
 
B Exceptions to Finality of Litigation 
The notion of finality of litigation is not absolute and there should be factors which, 
when proven, will justify the non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  This is so given the differences of laws between states and countries, a 
judgment rendered by a state would have been subject to a system of law different 
from those asked to recognise and enforce the judgment.  As such, when a court is 
asked to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, it should be able to refuse to do so 
if the recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment would be unjust or unfair. 
 
The circumstances in which a court may refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment include, for instance, the foreign proceeding which rendered the judgment 
was not judicially sound to do so because there was no impartial hearing of evidence 
or the court acted on a bribe.  Similarly, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
                                                 
92  Mortensen, above n 90, 239. 
93   Ibid 239-41. 
94  Ibid 239, 241-2. 
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judgment should be refused if the party against whom recognition or enforcement is 
sought was not given a fair and proper opportunity in presenting his or her case before 
the judgment-rendering court or the effect of recognising and enforcing the foreign 
judgment will violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing state.  Accordingly, 
there have been a number of exceptions recognised to justify the non-recognition and 
non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  In general, these exceptions include fraud, 
denial of natural justice and violation of public policy.95  The first two seek to ensure 
procedural fairness of the foreign proceedings and the third seeks to protect 
fundamental values of the judgment-enforcing state upon the recognition and 
enforcement of the foreign judgment.  As these exceptions are adopted as part of the 
schemes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the selected 
jurisdictions and are examined in later parts of the dissertation, it is sufficient to point 
out here that a judgment will be refused recognition and enforcement if it was 
obtained as a result of fraudulent means, depriving the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
or the effect of recognising and enforcing a foreign judgment is likely to violate 
fundamental justice and interest of the judgment-enforcing state. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter considers the theoretical frameworks and policy considerations 
underlying and supporting the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in 
the selected jurisdictions.  From the theoretical perspective, the notions of comity, 
reciprocity and obligation theory are identified as the bases upon which foreign 
judgments are recognised and enforced in Australia, the United States and the 
European Community.  While these theoretical bases inform the manner in which 
foreign judgments are recognised and enforced, they are not short of criticisms and 
                                                 
95  Ho, above n 28, 462. 
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the adequacies continue to be debated.  On the one hand, the notion of comity is a 
principle based on deference for sovereign states and, as such, it provides a liberal 
basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  However, comity 
gives discretion to courts as to whether to or not to recognise and enforce foreign 
judgments since it is non-obligatory in nature and short of a legal effect binding on 
states to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to them.  Also, given that comity 
carries the effect of reciprocity, it may incur retaliation between states where a state 
may refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment given by another state because the 
latter state refused to do likewise with respect to the former state’s judgment.  
Obligation theory, on the other hand, being a concept comparable to an action of debt 
arising between parties in a private transaction, fails to justify the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in cases where the judgment is non-monetary in 
nature such as a declaratory judgment or judgment on status. 
 
As far as policy consideration is concerned, which attempts to address recognition and 
enforcement from a practical standpoint, it is argued that the notion of finality of 
litigation is an important objective for the purposes of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.  As examined, the finality of litigation is based on considerations 
that there should be an end to litigation and that a judgment rendered in one 
proceeding should be final and conclusive in another.  Accordingly, the objective of 
finality of litigation will encourage courts to recognise and enforce judgments foreign 
to them and as such, a number of implications may be derived such as being just and 
fair to litigants and facilitate commerce and trade.  However, not all situations would 
call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as this is justified in 
cases where rights and interests of litigants were deprived in the court of origin, or the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment is likely to violate fundamental 
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values and principles of the judgment-enforcing state.  In these circumstances, a 
court should be able to refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if to do so 
would be unjust or unfair. 
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Chapter Three 
The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Australia and United States 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns the positions in Australia and the United States for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, including judgments rendered by 
courts interstate and in a foreign country.  The recognition and enforcement of 
interstate judgments is considered in Part Two and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign country judgments is considered in Part Three of this chapter.  It is found in 
this chapter that insofar as interstate judgments are concerned, in order to maintain a 
single and integrated nation, there are constitutional and legislative requirements 
authorising Australian and United States courts to recognise and enforce interstate 
judgments.  However, in the United States, due to the degree of variation of laws 
among the states, a state court asked to recognise and enforce an interstate judgment 
may review the judgment under certain grounds to ensure that it was obtained fairly 
and appropriately.  In contrast, if the recognition and enforcement action involves a 
foreign judgment, an Australian or a United States court will not recognise and 
enforce the foreign judgment unless it has satisfied a number of requirements and 
does not fall under any of the exceptions to justify its non-recognition and 
non-enforcement.  The purpose of the requirements and defences is to ensure the 
administration of justice, which is important especially considering the significant 
differences between the substantive and procedural laws of the country that rendered 
the judgment and those in Australia or the United States.  However, it is argued that, 
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in light of modern-day trade and commerce, the requirements and defences should not 
be imposed and construed in a way so as to cause hardship for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
3.2 Interstate Judgments 
3.2.1 Australia 
Australia is a federation of six states and several territories.  While, for the purposes 
of recognition and enforcement, a judgment rendered by one state or territory is in 
some sense foreign to another state or territory,96 section 118 of the Australian 
Constitution commands that ‘full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the 
Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings 
of every State.’ 97  This means that, within the Australian federation, a judgment 
given by one state should have the same status and effect in another state as if the 
judgment was given by that state.98   
 
The recognition and enforcement effects to be given to interstate judgments 
(including judgments rendered by territory courts) are governed by the Service and 
Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth),99 which is federal legislation and applies 
throughout Australia.  In particular, Part 6 of SEPA provides procedures for the 
enforcement of judgments granted by an Australian state or territory in another state 
or territory. 
 
A Judgment 
Under the application of SEPA, a judgment is defined as ‘a judgment, decree or order 
                                                 
96   Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310, 331; Pedersen v Young (1964) 110 CLR 162, 170. 
97  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 s 118 
98  See, eg, Re DEF (2005) 192 FLR 92 [48]-[58]. 
99  Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) (hereinafter ‘SEPA’). 
 42 
given, entered or made by a court in a civil proceeding,’ whether it is a money 
judgment or a judgment requiring a person to do or not to do an act.  Judgments 
made in the course of criminal proceedings are also included, but not an order made 
under proceeds of crime legislation, unless it is for a pecuniary penalty order.100 
 
B Enforcement 
For the purpose of enforcement under Part 6 of SEPA, a judgment holder must lodge a 
copy of a judgment with an appropriate court in a state or territory other than the place 
of rendition.101  An appropriate court is defined depending on the level of court in 
which the judgment was originally given.  For example, if the court of rendition is a 
Supreme Court, the appropriate court for registration of the judgment is the Supreme 
Court of another state or territory.102  In any other cases, the appropriate court is the 
court in the state or territory of registration in or by which relief as given by the 
judgment could have been given.103 
 
Upon registration of a judgment, it has the same force and effect as if the judgment 
was given by the court where it is registered for the purpose of enforcement.104  In 
terms of registering a judgment, there is no condition required except that the 
judgment must, at the time when the proceeding is taken, be capable of being 
enforced in the court of rendition or a court in the place of rendition.105   
 
Once an interstate judgment has been registered for the purpose of enforcement, the 
party against whom the judgment has been registered cannot raise any of the defences 
                                                 
100 Ibid s 3(1). 
101 Ibid s 105(1). 
102 Ibid s 105(6)(a). 
103 Ibid s 105(6)(b). 
104 Ibid s 105(2). 
105  Ibid s 105(5). 
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in an attempt to set aside the registration.  This is explicitly stated in s109 of SEPA 
where common law rules of private international law cannot be applied to resist 
enforcement.106  However, a party may challenge the enforcement of an interstate 
judgment by applying for a stay of proceedings.107  In order to apply for a grant of 
stay, the application must be made to a court in the rendering state or territory within a 
time frame, and that the application for relief must be sought in an expeditious 
manner.108 
 
C Jurisdiction 
As explained earlier, under the application of SEPA, if a judgment was rendered by 
one state or territory for the purpose of enforcement in another state or territory, it 
cannot be subject to any form of review, including the jurisdictional competence of 
the court that rendered the judgment.109  This waiver of jurisdictional inquiry is due 
to the fact that the jurisdiction that a court must exercise when rendering a judgment 
has already been regulated by SEPA.  In other words, given that the jurisdictional 
basis a court purports to exercise when rendering a judgment has already been unified 
throughout Australia, a court in one state or territory asked to enforce judgments 
rendered by other states or territories does not need to review the underlying basis.  
The jurisdictional basis is set forth in s15 of SEPA, which states that an initiating 
process issued in a state or territory may be served in another state or territory as if the 
process has been served in the place of issue.110  This is irrespective of whether there 
is any connection between the court issuing the initiating process and the party or the 
                                                 
106  Ibid s 109. 
107  Ibid s 106(1). 
108  Ibid ss 106(2)-(3). 
109  See, eg, Harris v Harris [1947] VLR 44 (the Supreme Court of Victoria recognised a divorce 
decree pronounced by the NSW Supreme Court despite the lack of jurisdiction on the NSW 
Supreme Court since the petitioner was not domiciled in NSW). 
110  Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) ss 15(1), 12. 
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subject matter in dispute.  In other words, for the purpose of SEPA, a court in one 
state or territory is conferred jurisdiction upon the service of a writ on a defendant 
who is present anywhere in Australia and any judgment rendered by a court in the 
state or territory on that basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another 
Australian state or territory without further review of its underlying jurisdictional 
basis.   
 
However, a court vested with jurisdiction pursuant to s15 of SEPA may decline to 
exercise it if it determines that there is a more appropriate court elsewhere in Australia 
for hearing the dispute.111  This is specified in s20 of SEPA which governs the 
decline of jurisdiction by inferior courts112 and states that in the event a court is 
conferred jurisdiction, it may order a stay of proceedings if it is satisfied that a court 
of another state or territory that has jurisdiction to determine all the matters in issue 
between the parties is the more appropriate court to determine those matters.113  
Factors which may be considered by a court in determining whether a court of another 
state or territory is the appropriate court for the proceeding include:114 the residence 
of parties and likely witnesses; the place where the subject matter of the proceeding is 
situated; the financial circumstances of the parties; the agreement between the parties 
as to the forum; the law that would be most appropriate to apply to the dispute; and 
whether a related or similar proceeding has been commenced against the defendant or 
another person.  Insofar as Supreme Courts are concerned, s5 of the Jurisdiction of 
Courts (Cross-vesting) Act specifies that a Supreme Court conferred jurisdiction may 
decline to exercise it by transferring the matter to another Supreme Court, the Federal 
                                                 
111  Ibid s 20. 
112  Ibid s 20(1) (s 20 does not apply in relation to a proceeding in which the Supreme Court of a State 
is the place of issue).  
113  Ibid s 20(3). 
114  Ibid s 20(4). 
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Court or the Family Court if the other court is the more appropriate forum.115  
However, unlike the list of factors set forth in SEPA which governs the decline of 
jurisdiction by inferior courts, Supreme Courts are given broader discretions in terms 
of whether to transfer proceedings.  The factors which may be considered by 
Supreme Courts include that the Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction in the 
case and that another court would be the appropriate court for hearing the matter or it 
is in the interest of justice that the proceeding be determined in another court.116 
 
D Evaluation 
Due to the effects of the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit principle 
and the provisions under SEPA, Australia has created an effective scheme for the 
recognition and enforcement of interstate judgments.  By the application of SEPA, 
which regulates the enforcement of interstate judgments, a judgment given by one 
state or territory is enforced in another state or territory upon registration of the 
judgment.  Upon registration of the judgment, the judgment cannot be subject to 
jurisdictional review since the rules of jurisdiction have already been regulated 
throughout Australia.  Moreover, given the unification of common law among the 
Australian states and territories where a litigation proceeding that is brought in one 
state will be subject to the same set of principles if proceeding is brought in another 
state, 117 there is no exception allowed to resist the registration of an interstate 
judgment.  Thus, the Australian scheme for the enforcement of interstate judgments 
not only reflects the underlying purpose of a single and united nation as intended 
under the Australian Constitution, it is also likely to encourage the free movement of 
                                                 
115  Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), ss 5(1), (2), (3). The federal, sate and 
territory parliaments have all passed Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act to resolve 
jurisdictional problems between federal courts and state and territory Supreme Courts.  
116  Ibid s 5(1)(b), 2(b), 3(b). See also Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711. 
117  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 (there is but one common 
law in Australia). 
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judgments within the Australian federation. 
 
3.2.2 United States 
Under the effect of the full faith and credit clause which requires that full faith and 
credit be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
every other state,118 a judgment given by one state in the United States is generally 
treated as being conclusive and enforceable in another state.  That is, a judgment 
given by a state court must be given essentially the same conclusive effect by another 
state court as it has in the state of origin.119 
 
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act enacted by most states in the 
United States implements the full faith and credit clause and regulates the 
enforcement of judgments granted by one state in another state.120  However, unlike 
the scheme provided for under SEPA which is the only option for the enforcement of 
interstate judgments in Australia, the enactment of the Uniform Act will not deprive a 
judgment holder of the right to pursue a different option such as by bringing an action 
to enforce his or her judgment.121 
 
A Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1964 
The Uniform Act provides enforcement procedures for any state court judgment, 
including a decree or order of a court of the United States which is entitled to full 
faith and credit.122  As with the application of SEPA where an interstate judgment 
may be registered in a court of another state or territory for the purposes of 
                                                 
118  United States Constitution art IV § 1. 
119  See, eg, Padron v Lopez, 289 Kan 1089, 1096 (2009). 
120  Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 was revised in 1964 to streamline the 
enforcement procedure (hereinafter ‘Uniform Act’).  
121  Ibid s 6. 
122  Ibid s 1. 
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recognition and enforcement, section 2 of the Uniform Act specifies that a party may 
enforce an interstate judgment upon the filing of the judgment in the office of a Clerk 
of an appropriate court of the state where enforcement is sought.123  Promptly upon 
the filing of the judgment, the party against whom enforcement is sought must be 
notified of the registration of the judgment.124  Once the judgment is registered, it 
‘has the same effect, and is subject to the same procedures, defences and proceedings 
for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a [District Court] of this state and 
may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.’125 
 
It follows that a judgment registered under the Uniform Act for the purpose of 
enforcement will be treated in like manner as a local judgment of the state where 
enforcement is sought and may be subject to collateral review.  This is for the reason 
that due to the degree of variation of laws among the states in the United States, a 
state court asked to enforce an interstate judgment may review the judgment so as to 
ensure that it was obtained fairly and appropriately.  However, given the purpose of 
the full faith and credit clause is to maintain a single and economically integrated 
nation in the United States, the grounds upon which a state court may review an 
interstate judgment at the recognition and enforcement stage are limited to two 
instances: where there is extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the judgment and 
where there is a lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court.126  In contrast to the position 
in Australia where SEPA regulates the rules, an interstate judgment registered under 
SEPA for recognition and enforcement cannot be subject to any form of review, 
whether it is the jurisdictional competence of the court that rendered the judgment or 
                                                 
123  Ibid s 2. 
124  Ibid s 3. 
125  Ibid s 2. 
126  See, eg, Thorson v LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 708 NE 2d 543, 546 (1999); Padron v Lopez, 289 Kan 
1089, 1099 (2009). 
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the common law defences such as fraud. 
 
Under the defence of fraud, an interstate judgment may be subject to review if 
extrinsic fraud was alleged to exist in the original proceedings while the judgment 
was given.  In other words, there was fraud which deprived a party of an adequate 
opportunity in presenting his or her claim or defence to the court of origin.127  
Examples of extrinsic fraud include that the court acted on a bribe or was misled into 
coming to a decision.  In contrast, intrinsic fraud such as perjured testimony or 
falsified documents, if alleged, is insufficient to resist the enforcement of an interstate 
judgment since it could have been raised and dealt with in the court of origin.128  
Where the jurisdictional competence of the judgment-rendering court is concerned, 
given that this defence is considered in detail in section 3.3.3 below, it is sufficient to 
point out here that when a party seeks to register an interstate judgment in a state 
court for the purpose of enforcement, the court asked to do so may inquire into the 
jurisdictional competence of the court pronouncing the judgment to ensure that the 
judgment was rendered upon a jurisdictional basis that is within the United States 
Constitution of due process standards. 129   That is, the party against whom 
enforcement is sought was sufficiently connected to the forum state where the 
judgment was rendered and the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant was not 
unreasonable so as to violate the notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
 
B Evaluation 
Under the effects of the full faith and credit clause and the Uniform Act, a state court 
is authorised to give conclusive effect and enforce a judgment given by another state 
                                                 
127  See, eg, United States v Throckmorton, 98 US 61, 65-6 (1878). 
128  Ibid. 
129  See, eg, Falcon v Faulkner, 567 NE 2d 686, 691 (1991).  
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court.  However, as observed, a judgment rendered in one state for the purpose of 
enforcement in another state may be subject to review under certain grounds including 
the underlying jurisdictional basis and fraud.  As a result, a state court asked to 
enforce an interstate judgment may refuse to do so if it determines that the original 
court did not have jurisdiction or there was extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the 
judgment.  While this collateral review undermines the effect as far as the objective 
of finality of litigation is concerned, the fact that there is a significant degree of 
variation of laws among the states in the United States, it is important that a state 
court asked to enforce an interstate judgment to conduct a review of the judgment so 
as to prevent any potential injustice or unfairness. 
 
3.3 Foreign Judgments 
Unlike the schemes for interstate judgments, the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia and the United States is less straightforward.  For the 
most part, there is no constitutional obligation binding on Australian or United States 
courts to give full faith and credit to foreign judgments.130  Instead, in view of the 
differences of laws between those which rendered and those in Australia or the United 
States asked to recognise and enforce judgments, a different procedure than that for 
interstate judgments must be followed. 
 
In Australia and the United States, a party seeking to recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment must pursue his or her action at common law or under an applicable 
statutory scheme. 
                                                 
130  See, eg, Aetna Life Ins Co v Tremblay, 223 US 185, 190 (1912) (‘[Full Faith and Credit] is not 
conferred by the Constitution or by any statute of the United States in respect to the judgments of 
foreign states or nations’); Rowe v Silverstein & Benson [1996] 1 VR 509, 511 (Section 118 of the 
Constitution…requires the giving of full faith and credit throughout the Commonwealth to the 
judicial proceedings of every state). 
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3.3.1 Common Law 
Under the common law scheme, a judgment holder seeking to recognise and enforce a 
foreign judgment in an Australian or a United States court has two options.  The 
judgment holder may bring a fresh action on the original cause of action or commence 
a local proceeding on the unsatisfied foreign judgment.131 
 
A Original Cause of Action 
A judgment holder may commence a fresh proceeding on the original cause of action 
despite it having already been litigated elsewhere.  If this option is pursued, the 
proceeding will follow the procedures required as a local proceeding.  While an 
action on the original cause of action is the result of the non-merger principle 
examined in chapter two, whereby a foreign judgment does not merge with the 
underlying claim and therefore enables the judgment holder to proceed on the original 
claim, it is argued that this option sits uneasily as far as the objective of finality of 
litigation is concerned.  As explained earlier, the objective of finality aims to put an 
end to litigation where substantive issues have already been adjudicated by a court 
competent to do so.  However, by allowing recourse on the original cause of action, 
it will encourage re-litigation of issues which have already been considered 
elsewhere.   
 
Accordingly, one of the drawbacks in pursuing an action on the original claim is that 
it may be a waste of judicial resources.  This is especially so if the original 
jurisdiction which rendered the judgment was the more appropriate forum to try the 
dispute.  On the other hand, one may argue that by bringing an action on the original 
                                                 
131  See, eg, Delfino v Trevis (No 2) [1963] NSWR 194, 196; Swift v David, 181 F 828, 829 (1910).  
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cause of action, it will give the judgment holder the option of having a matter re-heard.  
The re-litigation is important especially in situations where the court which rendered 
the judgment is not the best forum to do so due to factors such as the court did not act 
impartially.  In this circumstance, re-litigation is justified and will ensure the 
administration of justice. 
 
B Unsatisfied Foreign Judgment 
The second option which is open to a party seeking to collect his or her debt due 
under a foreign judgment in Australia or the United States is by commencing a local 
proceeding on the unsatisfied foreign judgment.  That is, the judgment holder could 
obtain a foreign judgment and petition the Australian or United States court in the 
state where the judgment debtor’s assets are situated, to recognise that foreign 
judgment.  Once the judgment is recognised by the Australian or United States court, 
the court where enforcement is sought will issue its own judgment enforcing that 
foreign judgment.132 
 
While an action on the unsatisfied foreign judgment prevents re-litigation on the same 
matter and authorises a party to proceed on the judgment obtained in a foreign state, 
the judgment will not be recognised and enforced in Australia or the United States 
unless it has satisfied a number of requirements and does not fall under any of the 
defences to justify its non-recognition and non-enforcement.  This is for the reason 
that given the significant differences of laws between each country, the imposition of 
the requirements and defences is a way to ensure that there would be no injustice or 
unfairness if a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced in Australia or the United 
                                                 
132  See Sykes and Pryles, above n 10, 108; Robert J Kaler, ‘United States’ in Dennis Campbell (ed), 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (LLP, 1997) 435, 435-6. 
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States.  
 
As far as the requirements that must be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement are concerned, a foreign judgment may be recognised and enforced in an 
Australian court provided that:133 (a) the rendering court must have exercised a 
jurisdiction in the international sense which the Australian courts will recognise; (b) 
the judgment must be final and conclusive; (c) if it is a judgment in personam, it must 
be for a fixed debt or definite sum of money; and (d) the parties to the foreign 
judgment and to the enforcement proceedings must be identical as this will ensure 
rights and entitlements of the judgment in the original proceedings will pass to the 
same parties in the enforcement proceedings.134   
 
In the United States, the seminal decision of Hilton v Guyot (‘Hilton’)135 laid the 
common law foundation for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
A foreign judgment is prima facie recognisable if the following conditions are 
satisfied, namely, the: (a) foreign judgment must have been final and complete; (b) 
competent court had personal jurisdiction; (c) competent court had subject matter 
jurisdiction; (d) defendant had timely and proper notice of the proceedings and an 
opportunity to defend himself; and (e) courtroom proceedings were of a civilised 
jurisprudence recorded formally and clearly.  As noted in chapter two, the Hilton 
court imposed reciprocity as a requirement for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement, by which a foreign judgment will be recognised and enforced in the 
United States provided that the court that rendered the judgment gives like effect to 
                                                 
133  See, eg, Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider 211 FLR 113, [8]; Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, 
above n 7, 140. 
134  Blohn v Desser [1962] 2 QB 116, 124. 
135  159 US 113, 202-3 (1894). 
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judgments rendered by the United States court.  However, most state courts in the 
United States have waived this requirement in their treatment of the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.136 
 
A foreign judgment satisfying the above-mentioned requirements is entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in an Australian or a United States court, unless any of the 
defences are applicable.  If any of the defences are successfully raised, an Australian 
or a United States court will not recognise and enforce the foreign judgment.  The 
defences available in Australia and the United States are similar, and include that: the 
foreign judgment was obtained by fraud; the foreign judgment was obtained in 
proceedings in which the defendant was denied natural justice; the recognition or 
enforcement of the foreign judgment would be contrary to public policy of the 
judgment-enforcing state; and the foreign judgment is in conflict with a prior final 
judgment within the judgment-enforcing state, between the same parties and 
concerning the same issues or is in conflict with a foreign judgment.   
 
Despite the similarities between Australia and the United States concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments at common law,137 there is a 
significant difference.  In Australia, subject to statutory modification, the common 
law rules applicable in different states and territories are the same.  In other words, 
there is one common law in Australia.138  The unification of common law throughout 
Australia is due to the High Court of Australia sitting as the final court of appeal in all 
                                                 
136  See, eg, Johnston v Compagnie General Transatlantique 152 NE 121 (NY 1926); Stevens, above n 
62, 126, 129 (Hilton established federal common law that was binding on federal courts but not 
state courts). 
137  See Appendix 3 for a comparison of the requirements and defences under the common law 
schemes in Australia and United States. 
138  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563. 
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questions of federal, state and territory laws.139  Thus, as far as recognition and 
enforcement is concerned, a foreign judgment which is subject to the common law 
principle of one state will be subject to the same set of principles if proceedings are 
brought in another state.  Accordingly, this is likely to create consistency and 
provide a level of predictability for parties seeking the recognition and enforcement 
proceedings in Australia.  In contrast, there is not one but potentially 50 different 
common law principles existing in the United States since the Supreme Court of the 
United States does not exercise general appellate review as the High Court of 
Australia does and therefore, leaves the Supreme Court of each state in the United 
States as the ultimate appellate court.140  The implication of this is that a party 
seeking to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment in the United States cannot 
assume that there is one common law principle but has to look to the law of the 
particular state where enforcement is sought.  Accordingly, this would not only 
complicate the recognition and enforcement proceedings, it may also have the 
undesirable effect of inconsistency due to the differences in the common law 
principles. 
 
3.3.2 Statutory Scheme 
A judgment holder having obtained a judgment in a foreign state or country and who 
seeks to recognise and enforce the judgment in Australia or the United States may do 
so by pursuing an action under an applicable statutory scheme. 
 
A Australia 
i Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) 
                                                 
139  Ibid. See also Martin Vranken, ‘Australia’ in Jan M Smits (ed), ELGAR Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006) 105, 108. 
140  United States Constitution art III § 2; Mark Leeming, ‘Common Law within Three Federations’ 
(2007) 18 Public Law Review 186, 191. 
 55 
In 1991, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) 
(‘FJA’) which replaced the statutory scheme of each state and territory and became 
the only legislation in Australia governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.141  Even though the FJA brought a number of benefits over the previous 
state and territory laws, such as greater efficiency in negotiating and implementing 
arrangements with other countries for the reciprocal enforcement of foreign 
judgments,142 the initial purpose for the enactment of the FJA was to strengthen the 
trade relationship between Australia and New Zealand.  In 1988 when the 
governments of both Australia and New Zealand signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Harmonisation of Business Law, it provided an opportunity for 
both countries to review a number of areas, among which included the recognition 
and reciprocal enforcement of judgments given by each country.143  As a result, the 
FJA was enacted in Australia to implement arrangements agreed with New Zealand 
on a number of items, including the enforcement of certain New Zealand 
judgments.144 
 
The FJA applies to any judgment which is ‘a final or interlocutory judgment or order 
given or made by a court in civil proceedings.’145  A judgment made by a court in 
criminal proceedings is also capable of being recognised and enforced under the FJA, 
as long as it is for the payment of a sum of money in respect of compensation or 
damages to an injured party.146  Similarly, judgments which are non-monetary in 
nature may also come within the scope of the FJA, however, there is no reciprocal 
                                                 
141  Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), effective 27 June 1991. 
142  Foreign Judgments Bill 1991 (Cth), second reading by Mr. Duffy (Holt-Attorney-General). 
143  John H Farrar, ‘Harmonisation of Business Law between Australia and New Zealand’ (1989) 19 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 435, 441; Mortensen, above n 90, 237-8. 
144  Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 3(1). 
145  Ibid s 3(1). 
146  Ibid. 
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arrangement made to that effect to date.147  Accordingly, the application of the FJA 
is extended to non-money judgments, whereas common law action in Australia is 
limited to the recognition and enforcement of money judgments. 
 
For the purposes of FJA, a foreign judgment is enforced upon the registration of the 
judgment with either the Supreme Court of a state or territory or the Federal Court, 
depending on the nature of the judgment.148  Once the judgment is registered with an 
appropriate court, it can be enforced as if it was a judgment given in the local 
Australian court.149  That said, however, there are a number of conditions that must 
be satisfied before a foreign judgment can be successfully registered under the FJA 
for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.   
 
First, there must be a reciprocal arrangement in place between the Australian and 
foreign courts.  In other words, the application of the FJA is subject to reciprocity, by 
which foreign judgments would only be given effect by Australian courts if foreign 
courts would give substantial reciprocity of treatment to judgments of the relevant 
state’s or territory’s courts. 150   The notion of reciprocity therefore renders the 
geographical application of the FJA narrower than common law action, being 
confined to judgments given by the superior courts and certain inferior courts 
specified in the Foreign Judgments Regulation 1992 (Cth).151  The list of countries 
included in the Foreign Judgments Regulation 1992 (Cth) with which Australia has 
reciprocal arrangements are, however, few and of mostly English common law 
descent or at least countries which have been influenced from the English common 
                                                 
147  Ibid s 5(6). 
148  Ibid s 6(2). 
149  Ibid s 6(7). 
150  Ibid s 5(1). See, eg, Taffa v Taffa [2012] FamCA 181 [161]. 
151 Foreign Judgments Regulation 1992 (Cth), reg. 4, 5, Schedule. 
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law.152  However, it should be noted that the United States is not a country to which 
the FJA is applicable despite the similiarities in culture and in the legal systems 
between Australia and the United States and the fact that Australia has a close trading 
relationship with the United States.153  Part of the reasons for which is that, as will 
be seen in other parts of the dissertation, the United States’ award of damages, 
especially in product liability and antitrust cases, are considered by many countries 
including Australia to be too high and, therefore, unacceptable.  As a result, the only 
recourse upon which United States’ judgments may be recognised and enforced in 
Australia is through common law action, where Australian courts will conduct review 
of judgments before they can be recognised and enforced. 
 
Second, to be successfully registered under the FJA, the foreign judgment must satisfy 
a number of requirements.  These include: a judgment to which the FJA applies;154 a 
final and conclusive judgment;155 a judgment to which application must be made 
within six years after the date the judgment was rendered;156 a judgment not wholly 
satisfied157 (if a judgment has been partially satisfied by the date of application for 
registration, it can be registered as to the part unsatisfied 158); and a judgment 
enforceable in the country of the original court.159 
 
                                                 
152 Ibid s 5(3). See Appendix 2 a list of countries and courts whose judgments fall under the scope of 
FJA. 
153  See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade at a Glance 2011 < 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trade-at-a-glance-2011.html> (United States ranked the 
first in Australia’s import and export markets in 2010). 
154  Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 5(4)(b). 
155  Ibid s 5(4)(a). 
156  Ibid s 6(1). 
157  Ibid s 6(6)(a). 
158  Ibid s 6(12). 
159  Ibid 6(6)(b). See also Celtic Resources Holdings Plc v Arduina Holding BV [2006] WASC 68 
(registration was refused by the Supreme Court of Western Australia on the basis that at the date of 
the application, the original judgment was not enforceable in the country of the original court due 
to the lack of service upon the defendant). 
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And third, a foreign judgment registered under the provisions of the FJA should not 
be set aside by any of the grounds specified in section 7(2).  These grounds largely 
reflect those at common law and include:160 the registered judgment not being a 
judgment to which the FJA applies; the judgment being registered for an amount 
greater than is actually due; the foreign court did not have jurisdiction in the 
circumstances of the case (the jurisdictional bases upon which judgments may be 
rested are prescribed in Section 7(3)); the judgment debtor did not receive actual 
notice of the original proceedings in sufficient time to enable him or her to defend 
those proceedings; the judgment was obtained by fraud; the judgment has been 
reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside in the courts of the country of the original 
court; the rights under the judgment are not vested in the person by whom the 
application for registration was made; the judgment has been discharged or wholly 
satisfied; or the judgment is contrary to the public policy. 
 
ii Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) 
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) is enacted by the Commonwealth 
Parliament of Australia to regulate procedures specifically for the enforcement of 
judgments rendered by New Zealand courts.161  The enactment of the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act is the direct result of the Trans-Tasman Treaty concluded between 
Australia and New Zealand, which aims to streamline the process of resolving civil 
proceedings with a trans-Tasman element and minimise barriers to enforcing certain 
foreign judgments and regulatory sanctions.162  Under the Trans-Tasman Treaty, an 
                                                 
160  Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(2)(a)(i)-(xi). 
161  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) (not yet in force). The New Zealand Government 
passed similar legislation in August 2010 to govern the enforcement of judgments rendered by 
Australian courts. 
162  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on 
Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement, signed 24 July 2008 (the 
‘Trans-Tasman Treaty’), art 2. 
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initiating process in civil proceedings issued out of a court in one country will be 
served in the other and that establishes the jurisdiction of the court without additional 
requirements.163  Accordingly, any judgment rendered by a court in a country on this 
jurisdictional basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another country 
without further review of its underlying basis.  Also, the Trans-Tasman Treaty 
broadens the range of civil court judgments that may be enforced across the Tasman 
and that it limits the grounds upon which a foreign judgment may be denied 
recognition and enforcement.164 
 
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) implements the Trans-Tasman Treaty 
and provides a liberal scheme as far as New Zealand rendered judgments is concerned.  
Upon Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act coming into effect, a New Zealand judgment 
would be enforced in Australia if it is a registrable New Zealand judgment and is 
registered in an Australian court.165  A registrable New Zealand judgment is defined 
as a judgment given in a civil proceeding by a New Zealand court and certain 
tribunals, and judgments given in criminal proceedings to pay an injured party a sum 
of money or an imposition of a regulatory regime criminal fine.166  Upon registration 
of a New Zealand rendered judgment in an Australian court, the judgment may be set 
aside on a small number of grounds including that if the judgment is contrary to 
Australian public policy or if it is registered in contravention of the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act.167 
  
B United States 
                                                 
163  Ibid art 4. 
164  Ibid arts 5(6), (8). 
165  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), sec. 65. 
166  Ibid sec. 66. 
167  Ibid sec. 72(1). 
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i Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act 1962 
Unlike Australia, there is no federal statutory scheme to govern the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States.  Instead, the matter is dealt 
with by state legislation, under the state versions of the Uniform Foreign Money 
Judgments Recognition Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1962.168  Notwithstanding the title of the UFMJRA, which 
seems to indicate that it is a unification of the laws among the states, the primary 
objective of the UFMJRA is in fact that United States judgments would more likely be 
recognised and enforced abroad.169  As mentioned previously, the United States 
recognised the notion of comity and has adopted a liberal reception for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments.  However, such a reception is not returned 
abroad.  This is due to, among other things, the lack of a national approach in the 
United States for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, which has 
given foreign nations the impression that their judgments would not likely be 
recognised and enforced in the United States.  As such, the United States hoped that, 
by enacting the UFMJRA as a statutory proof to foreign nations, the United States 
judgments would gain wider acceptance abroad.170   
 
The adoption of the UFMJRA across the United States has not been uniform. 
Currently there are only 33 states that have adopted the Act171 and among the 33 
states, eight have imposed reciprocity as a requirement in their versions for the 
                                                 
168  Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962) (hereinafter ‘UFMJRA’). 
169  Ibid Prefatory Note. 
170  Ibid. 
171  Uniform Law Commissioners, Legislative Fact Sheet-Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act 
<http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments%20Re
cognition%20Act> (The states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, US Virgin 
Islands, Virginia and Washington). 
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purposes of recognition and enforcement.172  Consequently, a foreign judgment may 
be denied recognition and enforcement in a state where reciprocity is imposed as a 
mandatory requirement.  For example, a judgment holder having obtained a 
judgment from a country and wishing to recognise and enforce the judgment, for 
example in the state of Texas, may be denied recognition on the ground that there is 
no reciprocal arrangement existing between the country and Texas.  The same action, 
however, if brought in another state, for example New York, may avoid such a 
problem since the New York version of the UFMJRA does not impose reciprocity as a 
condition for recognition and enforcement.  In this situation, the state (Texas) that 
requires reciprocity as a condition for the purposes of recognition and enforcement 
simply throws the judgment out and forces the judgment holder to litigate the matter 
afresh in a local Texas court.  In contrast to the position in Australia where the FJA 
operates on the basis of reciprocity and is narrow in geographical application, most of 
the states that have enacted the UFMJRA are not bound by the reciprocity 
requirement. 
 
The UFMJRA is a codification of the common law rules that have been applied by the 
majority of the United States courts.  As such, the provisions of the UFMJRA 
substantially mirror the common law principles.173  Under the application of the 
UFMJRA, a judgment that is ‘final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered’174 
is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another state (the same requirements are 
observed with respect to the application of the FJA in Australia) unless a ground for 
                                                 
172  Six states have incorporated reciprocity as a discretionary basis for non- recognition (Florida, 
Idaho, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio and Texas), and two states (Massachusetts and Georgia) have 
made lack of reciprocity a mandatory ground for non-recognition. 
173  Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962) Prefatory Note. 
174  Ibid s 2. 
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non-recognition is found.175  The UFMJRA specifies a number of mandatory as well 
as discretionary grounds for the justification of non-recognition.  The establishment 
of a mandatory ground will bar a foreign judgment as a matter of law, whereas 
discretionary grounds give courts discretion whether to refuse recognition.  
Mandatory grounds include where: (a) the judgment was rendered under a system 
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process 
of law; 176  (b) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant177 (the basis for assumption of jurisdiction is set forth in section (5)).  
However, section 5(b) allows a court to accept other jurisdictional basis not 
prescribed under the UFMJRA.  In other words, a court may give effect to a foreign 
judgment based upon a ground not authorised under the UFMJRA, as long as it 
conforms with the due process standard;178 and (c) the foreign court did not have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter.179  In contrast to the position in the United States, 
the FJA in Australia precribies a list of jurisdiction that is inclusive.  That means that 
an Australian court is entitled to refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if 
the jurisdictional basis upon which the judgment is based is not any of those specified 
under the FJA. 
 
Under the discretionary grounds, a court does not need to recognise a foreign 
judgment if:180 (a) the defendant in the proceedings of the foreign court did not 
receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; (b) the 
judgment was obtained by fraud; (c) the cause of action on which the judgment was 
                                                 
175  Ibid s 3. 
176  Ibid s 4(a)(1). 
177  Ibid s 4(a)(2). 
178  Ibid Prefatory Note (In codifying what bases for assumption of personal jurisdiction will be 
recognised, which is an area of law still in evolution, the Act adopts the policy of listing bases 
accepted generally today and preserving for the courts the right to still recognise other bases).  
179  Ibid s 4(a)(3). 
180  Ibid s 4(b)(1)-(6). 
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based is repugnant to the public policy of the state in which enforcement is sought; (d) 
the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; (e) the proceeding 
in the foreign court was contrary to a forum selection clause entered into between the 
parties; and (f) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign 
court was a seriously inconvenient forum. 
 
The UFMJRA was updated in 2005 by the Uniform Foreign Country 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act.181  The primary differences between the 1962 
and the 2005 Acts are that the 2005 Act clarifies the following:182 a judgment entitled 
to full faith and credit under the United States Constitution is not enforceable under 
the 2005 Act; the burden of proof is on the party seeking recognition of a foreign 
judgment; the burden of proof for establishing a specific ground for non-recognition is 
upon the party raising it; a specific procedure for judgment enforcement; and a statute 
of limitation on enforcement of a foreign country judgment.  Since the 2005 Act is 
still relatively new and substantially based on the 1962 Act, analysis of the United 
States’ statutory scheme in this dissertation is primarily based on the 1962 Act. 
 
ii Restatements of the Law 
Restatements of the Law offer an alternative legal basis to courts that have not 
adopted the UFMJRA.  Despite Restatements not being formal sources of law and 
are non-binding in nature, they may be persuasive authorities to courts when making 
                                                 
181 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005). Jurisdictions that have 
adopted this Act include: California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and 
Washington. See Uniform Law Commissioners, Legislative Fact Sheet-Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act 
<http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgmen
ts%20Recognition%20Act>.  
182  Uniform Law Commissioners, Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Summary 
<http://www.nccusl.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20R
ecognition%20Act>.  
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determinations regarding matters such as recognition of foreign judgments.183 
 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws addressed the enforcement question in 
section 98, that:184  
a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding 
will be recognised in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the 
underlying claim are concerned.   
 
Section 481 of Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law provides that:  
a final judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of 
money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or determining interests in 
property, is conclusive between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in 
the United States.185   
 
A judgment entitled to recognition under Restatement (Third) may be enforced in 
accordance with the procedures of the state where enforcement is sought.186  Section 
482 of Restatement (Third) also provides a list of mandatory and discretionary 
grounds which substantially mirror the provisions under the UFMJRA for the 
non-recognition of foreign judgments.187  
 
                                                 
183  Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Law in the United States: A General and Comparative View (Kluwer 
Law and Taxation, 1988) 21; Karl M Meessen, ‘Conflicts of Jurisdiction under the New 
Restatement’ (1987) 50 Law and Contemporary Problems 47, 47; American Law Institute, 
Overview – Institute Projects <http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instituteprojects>. 
184 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (American Law Institute, 1971) (‘Restatement (Second)’) 
§98. 
185  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute, 
1987) (‘Restatement (Third)’) § 481(1). 
186  Ibid § 481(2). 
187  Ibid § 482. See also Appendix 4 for a comparative view of the statutory schemes in FJA, UFMJRA 
and Restatement (Third). 
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This dissertation concerns only the provisions of Restatement (Third).  However, 
given the substantial similarities between the provisions in Restatement (Third) and 
the UFMJRA, examination of the statutory regime will be placed on the latter, unless 
specific reference is made to the relevant provisions of the former. 
 
3.3.3 Requirements 
As mentioned previously, a party seeking to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment 
in Australia and the United States must satisfy a number of requirements, regardless 
of whether the action is taken at common law or under an applicable statutory scheme.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, the following requirements are examined, namely: 
jurisdiction, the finality and conclusiveness of judgments, notice to defendants, fixed 
sum of money and a system of civilised jurisprudence compatible with United States’ 
due process. 
 
A Jurisdiction 
The term ‘jurisdiction’, though it carries a number of different meanings, is referred to 
the adjudicatory competence of one court to hear and determine a matter in this 
present account.  For the purposes of recognition and enforcement, whether a foreign 
court had jurisdiction to render a judgment capable of being recognised and enforced 
in another court will depend on the law of the state where recognition and 
enforcement is sought.  In other words, where an Australian or a United States court 
is asked to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, it will not do so unless it is 
satisfied that the foreign court that rendered the judgment had jurisdiction to be 
determined by reference to the law of the state in Australia or the United States.  
While the purpose of the jurisdictional scrutiny is to ensure that the party against 
whom the judgment is to be recognised and enforced is sufficiently connected to the 
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state where the foreign court sits, the difficulty is that the foreign judgment will be 
subject to review under the rules of jurisdiction, which varies from country to country 
and even from state to state. 
 
In Australia, it is required that in order for a court to recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment, the judgment must have been rendered upon the jurisdictional basis of 
presence or submission.  In other words, the party against whom recognition and 
enforcement is sought must either be served with the original proceedings while 
present in the foreign state or voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court.  In the United States, other than presence (US term: in-state service) and 
voluntary submission (US term: consent and appearance), in order for a court to 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, it must be satisfied that the 
judgment-rendering court had jurisdiction that does not go beyond the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution.  For the purpose of this dissertation, this 
section will also consider the Canadian perspective, specifically the real and 
substantial connection test formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada as a response 
to modern-day trade and commerce.  Accordingly, the real and substantial 
connection test may be contrasted to the positions in Australia and the United States 
since it provides a broad jurisdictional basis for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. 
 
i Presence or In-State Service 
There are different rules in determining the requirement of presence or in-state service, 
depending on whether the defendant is a natural person or a legal entity. 
 
Natural Person 
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If the defendant is a natural person, it is recognised in both Australia and the United 
States that the service of process on a defendant while present within a foreign 
territory will render the defendant being subject to the jurisdiction of that territory.188  
This presence, however, is valid even if the defendant’s stay in the foreign territory is 
only temporary and the purpose of the stay is irrelevant to the underlying event, as 
long as it is the voluntary and physical presence of the defendant.189   
 
Although it is a settled position in the United States that a defendant’s presence in a 
foreign state while being served with the original process is a recognised jurisdictional 
basis, there were concerns as to whether this basis should be subject to the scrutiny of 
due process standards.  This issue arose in Burnham v Superior Court190 where the 
plaintiff was served with a California court summons and his estranged wife’s divorce 
petition while taking a trip to California for business purposes and to visit his 
children.191  The court in splintered reasoning, unanimously agreed that a party being 
personally served while present in a forum state will be subject to the jurisdiction of 
that court, irrespective of whether the party was only briefly in that state and whether 
the purpose for the stay was relevant to the underlying event.192  On the issue of 
whether the in-state service should be subject to review under the due process 
standards, Justice Scalia stated that ’jurisdiction based on physical presence alone 
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’193  Justice Brennan, while recognising the in-state service, stated 
                                                 
188  Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310, 323-4; Goldey v Morning News, 156 US 518, 521 (1895). 
See also Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(3)(a)(iv) (the term ‘resided’ may be understood as 
the meaning of presence in the common law sense); Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act (1962) s 5(a)(1). 
189  Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310, 331. 
190  109 L Ed 2d 631 (1990). 
191  Ibid 638. 
192  Ibid 638-44. 
193  Ibid, 645. 
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that he would ‘undertake an independent inquiry into the fairness of the prevailing 
in-state service rule.’194 
 
Under the presence or in-state service rule, a defendant will be subject to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court and a judgment rendered on that basis is entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in Australia or the United States as long as he or she is 
physically present inside the foreign territory where the court sits and is served with 
the originating proceedings.  It follows that a person may be subject to the 
jurisdiction of a court of a territory, regardless of the period of the stay in that territory 
and whether the stay is related to the underlying claim.  This, however, may raise a 
number of concerns.  For instance, if a defendant has little or no connection with a 
foreign territory where he or she was served with the originating proceedings, the 
person may be forced to defend the matter to his or her detriment, ie, unfamiliarity 
with the foreign proceeding and resultant cost.195  Similarly, the presence/in-state 
service rule may render the court where the matter is litigated an inappropriate forum 
because of the lack of connection between the defendant and the territory where the 
court sits.  Thus, while the presence/in-state service has long been a basis recognised 
in Australia and United States when determining jurisdiction, it may cause unfairness 
to litigants and impose hardships on courts. 
 
It should be noted that the in-state service rule at common law has a limited effect 
under the statutory scheme in the United States.  According to section 4(b)(6) of the 
UFMJRA, the in-state service may be declared invalid if a defendant could show that 
                                                 
194  Ibid 651. 
195  See, eg, Grace v MacArthur, 170 F Supp 442 (ED Ark 1959) where a person in an aircraft that 
flies over the air space above a state is within the territorial limits of that state and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of that state. 
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the foreign court is a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.196  
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) rejects that the service of process on a person only 
transitorily in the territory of a state would give rise to jurisdiction, regardless of 
whether the due process standards have been met.197  In Australia, while there is no 
counterpart to that effect as it does in the United States, the court in Joye v Sheahan 
stated that a defendant’s mere presence in the jurisdiction, without more, at the time 
of issue of process, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.198 
 
Corporation 
If the defendant is a corporation, the concept of presence is more difficult to define 
since ’corporation is a legal person but it has no corporeal existence.’199  Thus, in 
order to determine whether a corporation is present in a foreign state for the purposes 
of recognition and enforcement, a test different than that for natural persons must be 
relied upon. 
 
In Australia, courts have followed the English approach and held that a corporation is 
considered present in a foreign territory if it carries on business there.  In order to 
show that there has been business carried on, the corporation must satisfy the 
following conditions:200 (a) the corporation has its own fixed place of business in the 
foreign territory, from which the corporation has carried on its own business for more 
than a minimal time; or (b) a representative has carried on the corporation’s business 
for more than a minimal time from a fixed place of buisness in the foreign territory, 
                                                 
196  Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962) s 4(b)(6). 
197  Restatement (Third) s 421 cmt e. 
198  Joye v Sheahan (1996) 62 FCR 417, 421. 
199  Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, 519. 
200  Ibid 530; National Commercial Bank v Wimborne (1979) 11 NSWLR 156 (Holland J). 
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and (c) in either of these two instances, the corporation’s business is transacted from 
that fixed place of business. 
 
There is generally no difficulty to establish the first part of the requirement, that is, 
the corporation has its own fixed place of business if this is done by maintaining a 
branch office in that foreign territory, whether it is owned or leased by the company.  
Difficulty may arise, however, if the business was carried on by a representative of the 
corporation in the foreign territory.  In this situation, in order to determine whether 
the corporation is present in the foreign territory, it is necessary to look into the 
functions of the representative to determine whether it has been carrying on the 
overseas corporation’s business or has been doing no more than carry on its own 
business.  An important factor relevant in determining the representative’s function 
is whether the representative has authority on behalf of corporation to make contracts 
with persons in the foreign territory binding on the corporation.201  As it was ruled in 
Adams v Cape Industries Plc, while the defendants (an English registered company 
and its worldwide marketing subsidiary) carried on business in the United States 
through its marketing subsidiary, NAAC and its successor CPC (both companies 
incorporated in Illinois), the defendants were not present in the United States since 
NAAC and CPC were carrying on exclusively their own business and not that of the 
defendants and neither NAAC nor CPC had general authority to contract on behalf of 
the defendants.202 
 
Therefore, under the presence requirement, in order for a corporation to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the corporation must have some form of presence 
                                                 
201 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, 530-1; National Commercial Bank v Wimborne (1979) 
11 NSWLR 156, 165. 
202  Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433. 
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in the foreign territory where the court sits, such as by maintaining a fixed place of 
business or by having a representative carrying on business on its behalf.  
Accordingly, this requirement will ensure that a corporate defendant has a sufficient 
connection to a foreign state before it can be subject to the jurisdiction of that state.  
However, the major concern with the presence requirement lies with its narrowness.  
This is particularly so since in light of modern-day technology, it is not unusual that a 
corporation may conduct business in a foreign territory without necessarily having set 
a foot there by having a branch office or engaging a representative to act on its behalf.  
In this circumstance, if an action is brought against, say, an Australian corporate 
defendant in a foreign jurisdiction, and the defendant did not have its own fixed place 
of business in that jurisdiction nor had any representative carrying on business for the 
defendant in that jurisdiction since all the communication was done electronically, a 
judgment obtained in that proceeding would be unenforceable against the defendant in 
Australia if the defendant did not submit to that foreign jurisdiction.  Therefore, it is 
argued that by relying on the presence requirement for the purposes of recognition 
and enforcement, it is too narrow to support modern-day trade and commerce and 
may render a foreign judgment unenforceable in Australia.   
 
In the United States, as far as corporations are concerned, instead of relying on the 
in-state service rule, personal jurisdiction in the United States is interconnected with 
the due process clause.  In other words, whether a foreign court’s (including an 
interstate court) assumption of jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is valid and 
recognisable in the United States must be subject to the United States Constitution of 
due process standards. 
 
ii The Due Process Standards 
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Under the United States’ due process standards, there must be firstly, a sufficient 
connection between a defendant and a state attempting to exercise jurisdiction (the 
‘minimum contacts test’).203  This is for the reason that by imposing the minimum 
contacts requirement, defendants will be protected from the burdens of litigating in a 
distant or inconvenient forum.204  The minimum contacts test used to justify courts’ 
assumption of jurisdiction include specific and general jurisdictions, to be considered 
further below.  And secondly, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
should not be unreasonable and unfair so as to violate the traditional notions of ‘fair 
play and substantial justice.’205  This requirement will ensure that a state, through its 
courts, ‘does not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereign in a federal system.’206  In determining whether the assumption of 
jurisdiction is fair and reasonable, the court has identified a number of factors, 
including:207 (i) burden on the defendant of litigating the claim; (ii) the forum state’s 
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (iii) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief; and (iv) the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies. 
 
The minimum contacts test was introduced in the landmark decision in International 
Shoe Co v Washington208 where International Shoe was a Delaware corporation, 
having its principal place of business in St Louis, Missouri, and was engaged in the 
manufacture and sale of shoes and other footware.  It had no offices in the state of 
Washington and made no contacts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there.  
However, International Shoe employed 11-13 salesmen resident in Washington for 
                                                 
203  International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). 
204 Worldwide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 291-2 (1980). 
205 International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). 
206 Worldwide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 291-2 (1980). 
207  Ibid 292. 
208  326 US 310 (1945). 
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three years to carry business there.  The salesmen did not have offices in Washington.  
The prices, terms, and acceptance or rejection of footwear orders were established 
through the headquarters in Missouri.  Apart from soliciting orders, the salesmen did 
not have authority to make contracts or collections.209  The issue before the Supreme 
Court of the United States was whether International Shoe’s activities in Washington 
made it subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington courts.  The court held that 
even though International Shoe maintained no offices in the state of Washington, the 
solicitation of orders by the salesmen in Washington were systematic and continuous 
and therefore was sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction.210  In coming to this 
conclusion, the court relied on the due process clause and stated that:211 
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within 
a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that 
privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as these obligations arise out of or are 
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requies the corporation 
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be 
undue. 
Accordingly, the court lifted the territorial limits traditionally imposed on the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v Neff212 and stated that:213 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he has certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.’ 
                                                 
209  Ibid 313-4. 
210  Ibid 320. 
211  Ibid 319. 
212  95 US 714, 720 (1877) (‘The authority of every tribunal is necessary restricted by the territorial 
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits 
would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption 
of power, and be resisted as mere abuse’) 
213  International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). 
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It follows that while the minimum contacts test has overcome the difficulties 
associated with the notion of territorial jurisdiction by authorising a court to exercise 
jurisdiction based on a substantial connection without the defendant being physically 
present in a forum state, there is a lack of a clear indication as to what would 
constitute a minimum contact.  This lack of guidance is particularly seen from the 
examination below of the two types of jurisdiction.  However, it should be noted that 
even though the examination is at interstate level, the same standard is applied at 
international level for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.214 
 
Specific Jurisdiction 
This type of jurisdiction states that a court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant if 
there is a connection of a single or occasional underlying event with the defendant’s 
activities in the forum state.215  Under this principle, however, the Supreme Court of 
the United States had added layer upon layer of requirements.  For example in 
Hanson v Denckla,216 the court held that in order to meet the minimum contacts 
standard, there must be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the 
resources or protection of the state.  As the court stated:217 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-resident 
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. The application 
of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is 
                                                 
214  See, eg, De La Mata v American Life Ins Co, 771 F Supp 1375 (D Del 1991) (A Delaware federal 
court concluded that a Bolivian court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a US life insurance 
company defendant was appropriate because judgment debtor had sufficient minimum contact with 
Bolivia); Nippon Emo-Trans Co Ltd v Emo-Trans, 744 F Supp 1215 (EDNY 1990) (the New York 
federal court concluded that personal jurisdiction exercised by the Tokyo court over a US 
corporation was appropriate because the judgment debtor was doing business in Japan on a 
substantial continuous and permanent basis). 
215  International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 317 (1945). 
216  357 US 235 (1958). Cf McGee v International Life Insurance Co, 355 US 220 (1957). 
217  Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253 (1958). 
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essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities with the forum state, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws. 
 
In Worldwide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson,218 the court introduced the foreseeability 
requirement to the purposeful availment test laid down in Hanson v Denckla and held 
that, in order to subject a non-resident defendant to the jurisdiction of a forum state, it 
must be foreseeable that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the state are 
such that he or she would be reasonably anticipated facing court in that jurisdiction.219   
 
In another decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court,220 it was held that 
the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which is a 
corporation based in Japan and which did no business in California.  The decision 
was concluded, however, not on the basis that there was insufficient contact between 
the defendant and California since the court were evenly divided on that issue.  
Instead, the court considered the case under the reasonableness standard.221  The 
facts of the case were that the original plaintiff brought an action against a Taiwanese 
company, after losing control of a motorcycle due to a faulty motorcycle tyre tube 
valve.  The Taiwanese company in turn sought indemnification from Asahi, the 
manufacturer of tube valve assemblies.  The original plaintiff settled with the 
Taiwanese company out of court, leaving the indemnification issue with the California 
court.222  In weighing a number of factors such as that the California plaintiff was no 
longer a party, that California had little interests in the dispute, and that to try the 
                                                 
218  444 US 286 (1980). 
219  Ibid 297. 
220  94 L Ed 2d 92 (1987). 
221  Ibid 98-9. 
222  Ibid 97-8. 
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dispute in California would be inconvenient for both parties, the court was persuaded 
that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would violate the notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.223 
 
General Jurisdiction 
A minimum contact is said to have existed if there is a general contact between the 
defendant and the forum state, irrespective of any connection between the underlying 
event and the defendant’s activity in the forum state. 224  Thus, unlike specific 
jurisdiction in which the defendant’s act must be related to the underlying dispute, 
there is no requirement of such a connection under the general basis of jurisdiction.  
The in-state service of individual defendants, express consent and voluntary 
appearance are examples of the general basis.  Also, it is recognised in the United 
States that a defendant’s contact such as the general doing business in a forum state is 
sufficient to give rise to a valid ground, as long as the defendant’s activity in the 
forum state is ‘continuous and systematic.’225  The rationale underlying this general 
doing business ground is said to be that the extensive and continuous activities of a 
corporate defendant in a forum state would symbolise the defendant’s presence in that 
state and therefore is sufficient to be subject to the jurisdiction of that state.226  
However, unlike the situation with respect to specific jurisdiction, there is little 
indication from the United States courts as to what degree of involvement is enough 
to justify the ‘continuous and systematic’ standard, 227  and worse, there is no 
                                                 
223  Ibid 105-6. 
224  International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 317 (1945). 
225  See, eg, Perkins v Benguet Consol Mining Co, 342 US 437 (1952). 
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(‘there has been no readily identifiable articulated standard for “continuous and systematic” 
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predictability in how the court will rule the case.228  So far, the Supreme Court has 
only, on two occasions, considered the issue of general doing business ground, yet, 
the unpredictability of result is observed.229 
 
In Perkins v Benguet Consol Mining Co,230 the plaintiff filed suit in Ohio against a 
Philippine corporation.  The court found that although the underlying cause of action 
did not arise in Ohio and did not relate to the corporation’s activities there, an 
assertion of jurisdiction was valid under the due process clause.  The decision was 
based on the fact that during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the 
corporation had conducted ‘continuous and systematic’ activities in Ohio, such as 
maintaining an office in Ohio and employed several employees in the office.  Also, 
the president kept corporate funds in Ohio banks, and drew and distributed salary 
cheques there.231  In contrast, the court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v 
Hall232 did not find any sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum 
state to establish ‘systematic and continuous contacts.’  In this case, a Texas court 
was called to address whether jurisdiction could be asserted over a Colombian 
corporation in a wrongful death action.  The corporate defendant bought helicopters 
in Texas.  The sales contract for the helicopter was negotiated in Texas.  The 
defendant’s pilot and manager were also trained in Texas.  The helicopter crashed 
and killed several Americans.233  The issue before the court was whether purchases 
made on a regular basis, but unrelated to the cause of action, were sufficient to subject 
                                                                                                                                            
minimum contacts’). 
228  Ibid 11 (‘the most pressing problem with the current doctrine of general personal jurisdiction 
relates to its inability to produce reasonably foreseeable results’). 
229  Perkins v Benguet Consol Mining Co, 342 US 437 (1952); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v 
Hall, 466 US 408 (1984). 
230  342 US 437 (1952). 
231  Ibid 447-8. 
232  466 US 408 (1984). 
233  Ibid 410-1. 
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a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction.  The court held that although the 
defendant had purchased 80 of its helicopter fleet in Texas over a period of eight 
years and had conducted other commercial transactions in Texas, ‘purchase and 
related trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a state’s assertion of 
jurisdiction.’234  The court stated that ‘mere purchases, even if occurring at regular 
intervals, are not enough to warrant a state’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction over 
a non-resident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase 
transactions.’235 
 
Evaluation 
As far as the objective of finality of litigation is concerned, the minimum contacts test 
provides a broader basis than the presence requirement under the Australian scheme.   
While the presence basis requires that a corporate defendant must be physically 
present or have a representative to carry on business on behalf of the corporation in a 
foreign territory before an Australian court will recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment rendered against that corporate defendant, the minimum contacts test allows 
a court to assume jurisdiction over a corporate defendant as long as there is a 
substantial connection between the corporate defendant and the foreign territory.  
That said, however, the problem with the minimum contacts test is that it may 
generate uncertainty and unpredictability since it operates upon the nature of the 
defendant’s activity in the forum state.  As explained above, there has not been a 
clear indication as to how the minimum contacts test may be approached.  Rather, 
the court has made it clear that ‘[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend rather 
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly 
                                                 
234  Ibid 417. 
235  Ibid 418. 
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administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to 
insure.’236  Moreover, after the decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, 
courts, in determining the minimum connection, must make a case by case factual 
analysis to evaluate not only a defendant’s contacts with a forum state but whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction is based upon an amorphous standard of fairness.  
Accordingly, it is argued that the minimum contacts test which is determined on the 
facts of a case provides no certainty and predictability for parties in transnational 
litigation as well as in recognition and enforcement proceedings.  Although there are 
suggestions that the minimum contacts test which operates upon facts under 
consideration brings fairness to litigants,237 certainty and predictability are important 
factors and should not be undermined in litigation as well as in proceedings for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
  
Another problem with the minimum contacts test is that, by relying on the substantial 
connection between a defendant and a forum state, it may render the test rigid in 
certain circumstances.  For example in Worldwide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson 
considered earlier, while the car collision occurred in Oklahoma State involving a car 
sold by Worldwide Volkswagen, the court was unable to exercise jurisdiction against 
Worldwide Volkswagen since it did not have a connection with Oklahoma State 
satisfying the minimum contacts standard.  This case would probably have been 
decided differently had the minimum contacts test required not only the connection 
between the forum state and the defendant, but also extended the connection to the 
subject matter of the proceeding. 
 
                                                 
236  International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 319 (1945). 
237  See, eg, Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Assessing Minimum Contacts: A Reply to Professors Cameron and 
Johnson’ (1994-5) 28 UC Davis Law Review 863, 867. 
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As noted earlier, the minimum contacts test used by United States courts for the 
verification of the jurisdictional competence of the judgment-rendering court is also 
applied as far as the recognition and enforcement of interstate judgments is concerned.  
Nevertheless, the inquiry of jurisdictional competence at interstate level is more 
restricted.  In order for an interstate judgment to be vulnerable to collateral attack on 
lack of jurisdiction, it must be where the defendant did not litigate the jurisdictional 
issue in the first forum or had no opportunity to do so.238 
 
iii Submission or Consent and Appearance 
Another basis recognised in Australia and the United States for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is the voluntary submission of 
parties to the foreign jurisdiction.  This can be manifested either by parties agreeing 
in advance to accept the jurisdiction of a foreign court or by parties’ appearance in 
foreign proceedings.239 
 
Prior Express Agreement 
A party can submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court by agreeing in advance to 
accept the jurisdiction of that court.  This is normally done through contractual 
arrangements made between the parties designating a specified court to hear any 
dispute that may arise between the parties.240  However, a mere choice of law clause 
by which parties agree that the law of a particular country will govern the contract 
will not be regarded as a submission to courts of that particular country.241  Likewise, 
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submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal, which is implied, will not 
suffice.242   
 
In the United States, submission by forum-selection clause was upheld in the 
landmark decision in M/S Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co,243 where the Supreme 
Court held that ‘in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding 
international trade, ‘[forum-selection] clauses are prima facie valid and should be 
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under 
the circumstances.’244  The recognition of parties’ choice of forum clause has been 
endorsed even in cases where a party to an agreement is in a weaker bargaining 
position.  In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v Shute,245 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that a choice of forum clause appearing on a passenger’s cruise ticket was 
valid as long as the passenger had notice of the forum clause and there was no 
indication that the forum clause was created with a bad faith motive.246 
 
A forum-selection clause is considered as the least disputed ground for a foreign court 
to assume jurisdiction over the parties since it is based on the mutual agreement of the 
parties and a judgment rendered on that basis will be entitled to recognition and 
enforcement in Australia and the United States.  Consequently, submission by a 
forum-selection clause is likely to provide certainty and predictability for parties in 
litigation as well as in the recognition and enforcement proceedings.   
 
Appearance 
                                                 
242  Vogel v R & A Kohnstamm Ltd [1973] 1 QB 133. 
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A party can also submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court by appearance.  Where 
plaintiffs are concerned, the mere commencement of a proceeding in a foreign court is 
a clear indication that the plaintiff has submitted to the jurisdiction of that court.247  
With respect to defendants, whether a defendant’s appearance and participation in a 
foreign proceeding would amount to a submission to the foreign court’s jurisdiction 
will depend on whether the appearance entered is unconditional or conditional.  On 
the one hand, if the defendant made a voluntary appearance in the foreign proceedings 
and argued the merits of the case, an unconditional appearance is said to have been 
established and the defendant is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
foreign court.248  A conditional appearance, on the other hand, refers to situations 
where a defendant appears in a foreign proceeding for the purposes of, for instance, 
contesting the jurisdiction of that court.  If a conditional appearance is entered, the 
defendant cannot be regarded as having submitted to the jurisdiction of that court.249 
 
Complications may arise in respect of the defendant’s conditional appearance for the 
purposes of contesting the jurisdiction of a foreign court.  In the event an entry of 
appearance to contest the jurisdiction of a foreign court was unsuccessful and the 
defendant moved on to argue the merits of the case, a submission to the foreign 
jurisdiction may have been established and the defendant cannot later challenge the 
jurisdictional issue in the enforcement proceedings. 250   What happens if the 
defendant took no further part in the proceedings after failing to contest the 
jurisdiction, 251  or if the defendant entered an appearance not to dispute the 
                                                 
247  Schibsby v Westenholz (1870) LR 6 QB 155, 161. 
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250  However, see Hunt v BP Exploration (Libya), 492 F Supp 885 (1980) where the court was willing 
to re-examine the bases of jurisdiction despite that Hunt had challenged the English court’s 
jurisdiction in the original proceedings.  
251  Harris v Taylor [1915] 2 KB 580 (the defendant who took no further part in the proceedings apart 
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jurisdiction but to invite the court not to exercise jurisdiction, which it had under its 
local law?252  In Australia, the uncertainties concerning a conditional appearance for 
contesting jurisdiction have now been clarified by legislative provisions under the 
FJA.  According to s11 of FJA, which applies to enforcement actions brought at 
common law, a foreign court is not taken to have had jurisdiction to give a judgment 
merely because a defendant entered an appearance or participated in proceedings only 
to such extent as was necessary for the purpose of, including, contesting the 
juridiction of the court or inviting the court in its discretion not to exercise its 
jurisdiction in the proceedings. 253   The United States does not have a rule 
comparable to the one in Australia.  However, it seems that if a defendant takes no 
further part in the proceedings after a conditional appearance to contest the 
jurisdiction has been entered and failed, the jurisdiction may have been established 
and the defendant could not challenge the judgment-rendering court’s jurisdiction in 
subsequent proceedings for enforcement.254 
 
Unlike foreign judgments, the issue of conditional appearance in contesting 
jurisdiction is more settled with respect to interstate judgments in the United States.  
It is noted that all American courts have in place some procedure by which a 
defendant can make a conditional appearance to contest jurisdiction without being 
regarded as a submission.  Generally speaking, a defendant wishing to enter an 
appearance by contesting the jurisdictional competence of the judgment-rendering 
court may lodge the jurisdictional objection at the very outset of the case and not to 
                                                                                                                                            
from a conditional appearance to contest the jurisdiction constituted a submission). 
252  Henry v Geoprosco International Ltd [1976] 1 QB 726 (submission was established despite the 
defendant’s conditional appearance asking the court not to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground of 
forum non conveniens). 
253  Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s11. See also s 7(5) which clarifies from the statutory context. 
254  See, eg, Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp v Instituto Mexicano del Café, 566 F 2d 861 (2d Cir 
1977). 
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seek any affirmative relief from the court.255 
 
iv The Real and Substantial Connection Test 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye 
(hereinafter ‘Morguard’),256 a Canadian court would not recognise and enforce a 
foreign or an interprovincial judgment unless the judgment was rendered on the basis 
of presence or submission.  In other words, the defendant against whom recognition 
or enforcement is sought must either be present in the foreign state or interprovince 
when the cause of action arose or agree to submit to or voluntarily appear in the 
foreign proceedings.257  However, in view of the problems and hardships that these 
requirements had caused for the recognition and enforcement of interprovincial 
judgments within Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada modernised these 
requirements in the landmark decision in Morguard and later extended the rule to 
judgments rendered by foreign nations in Beals v Saldanha258 (hereinafter ‘Beals”). 
 
The Morguard case concerned recognition and enforcement in one provincial court of 
a judgment given by another provincial court.  The facts of the case were that 
Morguard held a mortgage over lands in Alberta.  De Savoye was the mortgagor of 
those lands and resided in British Columbia.  De Savoye later moved to British 
Columbia and defaulted the mortgage.  Morguard commenced an action in Albert 
court on the defaulted mortgage and obtained a judgment against De Savoye.  When 
the action was commenced and the proceeding was served on De Savoye, he did not 
appear in Alberta court to defend the action nor was he contractually bound to the 
                                                 
255  Eugene F Scoles et al, Conflict of Laws (West Group, 3rd ed, 2000) 339. 
256  [1990] 76 DLR (4th) 256. 
257  Ibid 265. 
258  [2003] 3 SCR 416. 
 85 
jurisdiction of the Alberta court.  After having obtained a judgment in the Alberta 
court, Morguard commenced a separate proceeding and sought to have that judgment 
enforced in British Columbia.  The main issue before the court was whether the 
judgment validly given in Alberta against an absent defendant may be recognised and 
enforced in British Columbia where he now resides.259  On appeal from the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the recognition and 
enforcement of the Alberta judgment.  In upholding this decision, the court did not 
rely on the traditional basis of presence and submission as such would render the 
judgment unenforceable.  Instead, the court adopted the real and substantial 
connection test and found that the judgment was rendered under a properly and 
appropriately exercised jurisdiction.260   
 
Under the real and substantial connection test, jurisdiction is properly and 
appropriately exercised if there was a real and substantial connection between the 
territory which rendered the judgment and the subject matter of the proceeding or the 
defendant.  In adopting the test, the court gave consideration to the principles of 
order and fairness for both plaintiffs and defendants and stated that:261 
[I]t may meet the demands of order and fairness to recognise a judgment given in a 
jurisdiction that had the greatest or at least significant contacts with the subject matter of 
the action. But it hardly accords with principles of order and fairness to permit a person 
to sue another in any jurisdiction, without regard to the contacts that jurisdiction may 
have to the defendant or the subject matter of the suit…Thus, fairness to the defendant 
requires that the judgment be issued by a court acting through fair process and with 
properly restrained jurisdiction. 
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Accordingly, the Morguard court established that the determination of the proper 
exercise of jurisdiction by a court would depend upon two principles: there was a 
need for order and fairness and the existence of a real and substantial connection.  In 
Morguard, it was found that there was a real and substantial connection since the 
property in issue was located in Alberta, the contracts relating to the mortgages were 
entered into in Alberta and the parties were residents of Alberta at the time the 
contracts were entered.262 
 
The Morguard court’s adoption of the real and substantial connection test rested in 
part on the federal structure of Canada.  The court found that in order to create a 
single, economically integrated country intended under the Canadian Constitution, 
‘the courts in one province should give full faith and credit, to use the language of the 
United States Constitution, to the judgments given by a court in another province or a 
territory.’263  Moreover, the court recognised that the traditional rules of jurisdiction 
based on presence and submission no longer reflected the needs of international 
business community and a more generous approach to accommodate modern-day 
trade and commerce in the twentieth century was appropriate.  Justice La Forest 
stated:264 
The world has changed since the above rules were developed in 19th centry England. 
Modern means of travel and communications have made many of these 19th century 
concerns appear parochial. The business community operates in a world economy and 
we correctly speak of a world community even in the face of de-centralised political and 
legal power. Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines has 
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now become imperative. Under these circumstances, our approach to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments would appear ripe for reappraisal. Certainly, other 
countries, notably the United States and members of the European Economic 
Community, have adopted more generous rules for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments to the general advantage of litigants. 
 
Since the decision in Morguard, courts have applied the real and substantial 
connection test to cases involving the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
rendered by foreign countries.265  The extended approach has now been affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Beals involving an enforcement action in Ontario of 
a judgment obtained in default in Florida.266  In this case, an Ontario couple sold a 
vacant lot located in Florida to the American purchasers for the sum of $8,000.  
Some months after the transaction was completed, the American purchasers 
discovered that they were building a model home on the lot adjacent to the one they 
had actually purchased.  The buyers alleged the mistake was the fault of the vendors 
and brought a claim in Florida.  After some ten years, a default judgment was 
entered against the Canadian vendors for about $260,000.  However, by the time the 
judgment was brought for enforcement, it had increased to more than $800,000.267   
The matter went up to the Supreme Court of Canada and the majority held that the 
Florida judgment was enforceable in Ontario.  In reaching its decision, the court 
relied on the Morguard reasoning and applied the real and substantial connection test 
formulated in Morguard.  According to the court, ‘the need to accommodate the 
“flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines” is as much an imperative 
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internationally as it is interprovincially.’268  Writing for the majority, Justice Major 
stated:269 
International comity and the prevalence of international cross-border transactions and 
movement call for a modernisation of private international law. The principles set out in 
Morguard…can and should be extended beyond the recognition of interprovincial 
judgments, even though their application may give rise to different considerations 
internationally. Subject to the legislatures adopting a different approach by statute, the 
‘real and substantial conneciton’ test should apply to the law with respect to the 
enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments. 
 
In Beals, the court also considered the issue of whether the existing defences under 
Canadian common law to contest the enforcement of a foreign judgment ought to be 
expanded in order to safeguard the application of the real and substantial connection 
test.  According to the majority of the court, it was held that under the facts of the 
case, it did not see the need to expand the scope nor to create a new defence.  
Moreover, the majority of the court stated that: 
should the evolution of private international law require the creation of a new defence, the 
courts will need to ensure that any new defences continue to be narrow in scope, address 
specific facts and raise issues not covered by the existing defences.270   
 
On the other hand, the minority of the court in Beals was of the view that there should 
be a more flexible approach to the existing defences.271  In particular in LeBel J’s 
dissenting judgment, he stated that ‘liberalising the jurisdiction side of the analysis 
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while retaining narrow strictly construed categories on the defence side is not a 
coherent approach.’272 
 
Evaluation 
For the purposes of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the real 
and substantial connection test has provided Canadian courts with a broader basis than 
the requirements in Australia and the United States.  As noted, the real and 
sbustantial connection test is rested on the basis that Canadian courts will recognise 
and enforce judgments rendered by foreign countries provided that there was a real 
and substantial connection between the judgment-rendering state and the subject 
matter of the proceeding or the defendant.  Thus, in comparison to the Australian 
position, the real and substantial connection test will avoid the Australian requirement 
that a corporate defendant must have some presence inside a foreign territory in order 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.  Similarly, while the United 
States’ minimum contacts test requires a substantial connection between the defendant 
and the forum state, the real and sbustantial connection test has extended the 
connection to the forum state and the subject matter of the action. 
 
Notwithstanding that the real and substantial connection test is flexible and its 
formulation has allowed it to be applied in various circumstances, there are concerns 
that Canadian courts may have gone too far by extending the test to foreign judgments.  
Although under the real and substantial connection test the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments will become easier for foreign claimants, it may 
bring some risk of injustice to Canadian defendants.  For instance, when a foreign 
judgment is recognised and enforced by a Canadian court on the basis of the real and 
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substantial connection test, the party against whom recognition and enforcement is 
sought will be exposed to the procedures of the state where the judgment was 
rendered, and there is no means to ensure that the foreign procedures were carried out 
fairly and justly.273  Also, as LeBel J in his dissenting judgment in Beals said, by 
making recognition and enforcement easier for foreign claimants means that Canadian 
defendants will, from now on, be obliged to participate in foreign lawsuits no matter 
how small the amount of damages in issue might be.274   
 
Another problem with the real and substantial connection test is that the Morguard 
court in its formulation of the test did not elaborate on the nature of the connection 
required.  Rather, a number of decisions subsequent Morguard which applied the 
real and substantial connection test, varied in their consideration of the connecting 
factors.  Some emphasised the connection between the jurisdiction and ‘the action’ 
while some looked at both defendant-related factors and a wide range of contacts.275  
In Hunt v T & N Plc, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that:276 ‘the exact limits of 
what constitutes a reasonable assumption of jurisdiction were not defined, and I add 
that no test can perhaps ever be rigidly applied.’  While the connection relied on 
under the traditional rules are a good place to start, ‘more than this was left to depend 
on the gradual accumulation of connections defined in accordance with the broad 
principles of order and fairness.’ 
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Accordingly, while the real and substantial connection test offers a generous basis and 
will encourage the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the fact that 
there is a lack of a clear indication as to how the test may be applied weakens legal 
certainty and predictability, which are important in litigation as well as in the 
recognition and enforcement proceedings. 
 
v Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In addition to personal jurisdiction, it is also required that a court that rendered the 
judgment must have possessed subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.  
As mentioned earlier, subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear a 
specific kind of claim that is brought before that court.  Whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is to be determined by reference to the law of the 
judgment-rendering state.277  Accordingly, a judgment given by a court that did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction under its own law is a nullity and cannot be 
recognised and enforced.278   
 
For the purposes of recognition and enforcement, subject matter jurisdiction is rarely 
an issue since it is normally presumed by the Australian and United States courts, 
unless challenged by the defendant. 
 
B Final and Conclusive 
In order to be recognised and enforced in Australia and the United States, it is 
required that the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive, regardless of whether 
the recognition and enforcement action is taken at common law or under statutory 
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schemes.279  In other words, the judgment rendered in the foreign proceeding must 
be ‘conclusively, finally and forever established the existence of the debt’ between the 
parties and cannot be altered by the same parties in the same court.280  However, if a 
foreign judgment is subject to any form of review such as an appeal or even if an 
appeal proceeding is pending against that judgment, it is still considered final and 
conclusive as long as it is unalterable in the court that pronounced it.281   
 
Accordingly, for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, a foreign judgment is 
capable of being recognised and enforced despite the fact that it may be rescinded or 
varied in subsequent review proceedings.  However, when a foreign judgment is 
subject to appellate review, a possible course for the judgment-enforcing court to take 
is to order a stay of the proceeding pending the final determination of the appeal.  
The stay of the proceeding will prevent unfairness if the court continues with the 
recognition and enforcement proceedings while the appeal on the judgment is being 
considered.282 
 
Where default judgments are concerned, whereby a defendant has failed to enter an 
appearance or has failed to take a step in relation to the proceeding and has had a 
default judgment entered against him or her, the Australian court has taken the 
approach that a judgment made in default of appearance is considered final and 
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conclusive, unless it is challenged and set aside by courts.283  The position will be 
different if the judgment debtor has a right to have a judgment made by default set 
aside within a set time period, then the judgment cannot be regarded final and 
conclusive until that period has expired.284  In the United States, courts generally 
give the same effect to default judgments as to judgments following proceedings in 
which all parties participated.  However, a state court asked to recognise and enforce 
a default judgment will scrutinise the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court if 
that issue has not been adjudicated or wavied in the judgment-rendering forum.285 
 
C Notice 
It is required in the United States that before a court will recognise and enforce a 
foreign judgment, the court must be satisfied that the defendant against whom 
recognition and enforcement is sought was given a proper notice of the original 
proceedings to defend the claim.  To satisfy this requirement, it is required that the 
service of process not only be in compliance with the foreign country’s local law, but 
also comply with the United States’ notion of due process standards.286  The notion 
of due process herein can be distinguished from the due process standards required for 
the purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction.  The due process standard required 
for personal jurisdiction seeks to ensure a substantial connection between the forum 
state and the defendant whereas in this present account, the due process refers to the 
adequacy of notice upon the defendant and an opportunity to defend the claim.   
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The issue of notice requirement was considered in Mullane v Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co,287 where the court held that notice must be ‘reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to appraised interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’288  Under this principle, 
notice by publication would be insufficient unless the affected person cannot be 
located with reasonable effort.  Similarly, the due process standard would not be 
satisfied if the language of the notice was not translated into the local language of the 
country where service was effected.289  However, if the service of process on a 
defendant is in compliance with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents to which the judgment-rendering state is a party, 
it will generally satisfy the United States’ due process requirement.290 
 
For the purposes of recognition and enforcement, the service of notice is not 
stipulated as a requirement under the Australian scheme even though lack of due 
notice on a defendant may give rise to the natural justice defence considered below.  
This is because under the existing rules of jurisdiction, if a defendant was present in 
the foreign country at the time when the original proceedings were commenced and 
was served with such a proceeding, any form of notice which is in accordance with 
the law of the foreign country will be deemed satisfactory and acceptable to the 
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Australian court.  There is no requirement that the standards effecting the service 
must comply with the Australian requirement. 
 
Insofar as the objective of finality of litigation is concerned, the notice requirement 
may prevent a foreign judgment from being recognised and enforced if the defendant 
against whom recognition and enforcement is sought was not given a proper notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.  However, the purpose of imposing such a 
requirement is to ensure that parties’ rights to be heard in the original proceedings 
were not deprived of and that the judgment was rendered under a fair hearing.  
Accordingly, while the notice requirement may be seen as an impediment for the 
purposes of recognition and enforcement, it is justified on the basis of administration 
of justice to litigants. 
 
D Fixed Debt 
In Australia, another requirement that must be satisfied for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement at common law is that the foreign judgment must be in 
the form of a fixed sum of money.  Accordingly, a judgment which is for an 
unascertainable sum of money will not be capable of being recognised and 
enforced. 291  Also, if a judgment rendered by a court is an order for specific 
performance or an injunction, it will not qualify as a judgment for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement under the common law action. 292  The fixed-debt 
requirement is the direct consequence of the obligation theory examined in chapter 
two, whereby a foreign judgment is analogous as an action of debt arising between 
parties in a private transaction.  However, there are other compelling reasons that the 
                                                 
291  Sadler v Robins (1808) 170 ER 948. 
292  Pham, above n 27, 664. 
 96 
recognition and enforcement of non-money judgments are excluded from common 
law forms of action.  For instance, if a court is asked to recognise and enforce a 
foreign specific order which is non-monetary in nature, in order to determine the 
scope of the order, the court may be required to go behind the judgment and interpret 
and apply the law of the judgment-rendering court.293 
 
In a recent decision in Pro Swing Inc v ELTA Golf Inc (‘Pro Swing’),294 the Supreme 
Court of Canada abandoned the traditional common law rule and gave effect to a 
non-money order preventing infringement of trademark.  The facts of the case were 
that Pro Swing is the owner of the Trident trademark for the golf club heads it 
manufactured and sold.  Pro Swing filed a complaint in Ohio alleging that ELTA 
infringed its trademark by selling goods bearing marks which resembled Trident.  
The matter went up to the Supreme Court of Canada and one of the issues for 
consideration was whether the order, which was non-monetary in nature, could be 
recognised and enforced in Canada.295  The court held that due to technological 
advancement and means of communication that have changed the way in which 
international trade and commerce operates, the time is ripe to revise the traditional 
common law rule by giving effect to non-money judgments.  However, the court 
went on to say that in order to ensure that non-money orders do not disturb the 
structure and integrity of the Canadian legal system, the court asked to recognise and 
enforce a non-money order should be conferred a judicial discretion enabling the 
court to consider relevant factors as to whether to or not to do so.296 
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In view of modern-day trade and commerce, it is argued that the fixed-sum rule is 
outdated for the purposes of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
Due to the advancement of technology and means of communication, non-money 
orders are of as increasing importance in cross-border litigaiton as money judgments.  
For instance, an owner of certain trademark or patent, who has obtained an injunction 
order in one state, may wish to recognise and enforce the order in another state where 
the alleged infringement took place.  Imagine if the owner, having obtained an 
injunction order in one state, is required to commence a new proceeding in the state 
where the alleged infringement took place since by the law of the latter state, there 
cannot be any recognition and enforcement regarding non-money orders.  This will 
be very inconvenient for parties involved in cross-border litigation and may 
jeopardise the rights of the owner whose trademark or patent has been allegedly 
infringed in another state or country. 
 
It is unclear whether Australia and the United States will adopt the approach to the 
extent taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pro Swing.  However, the 
observation that Australian courts have on a number of occasions recognised and 
enforced equitable orders may give some indication that traditional common law 
developed in the 19th century is losing its practicality in meeting the increasing needs 
of modern commercial needs.297 
 
E Fair Procedures Compatible with the United States’ Due Process 
According to the Hilton v Guyot decision, it is also a requirement under the United 
States’ common law that, for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, a foreign 
judgment must have been rendered in a system of civilised jurisprudence.  Similarly, 
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it is required under the statutory schemes that a foreign judgment be refused 
recognition if it was rendered under a judicial system violating the United States’ due 
process of law.298  However, it should be noted that this requirement does not 
encompass the full scope of rights under the United States’ notions of due process 
standards.  Instead, what is required is that the procedures implemented in the 
judgment-rendering court are compatible with the general principles of due process, 
including the defendant’s fundamental rights to, for example: access to counsel; 
impartial tribunals; and judicial review.299  Accordingly, a mere difference of the 
procedures in the foreign state and those in the United States will not prevent a 
foreign judgment from being recognised and enforced in the United States.300   
 
It is argued that this requirement, while imposed as a condition for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement, seeks to protect parties’ rights for a fair hearing before a 
judgment against it is recognised and enforced.  However, in view of the present 
state of judicial systems worldwide, violation of the United States’ notion of due 
process may only be proven in extreme cases where the entire foreign legal system 
lacks adequate due process protections.301 
 
3.3.4 Defences 
A foreign judgment satisfying the above-mentioned requirements is entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in Australia and the United States, unless a defence is 
successfully proven to resist recognition and enforcement.  While the defences are 
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contrary to the objective of finality of litigation since they may prevent a foreign 
judgment from being recognised and enforced, they are important to safeguard against 
potential injustice if a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced.  This is 
especially so since a foreign judgment would have been rendered under a legal system 
in which the substantive and procedural laws would be different from those in 
Australia or the United States asked to recognise and enforce the foreign judgment.  
The defences are therefore in place as a way to ensure that the foreign judgment was 
rendered free from any unfair or unjust means. 
 
This section examines the commonly recognised defences in Australia and the United 
States, including: fraud, denial of natural justice, violation of local public policy and 
conflict of judgments. 
 
A Fraud 
A foreign judgment will be denied recognition and enforcement in Australia and the 
United States if it was obtained by fraudulent means.  The fraud could be on the part 
of the foreign court in which it acted on a bribe or on the part of the claimant in 
misleading the foreign court to give the judgment in his or her favour.302  However, 
from the Australian point of view, it is uncertain as to the standard of requirements to 
establish fraud.  On the one hand, there are decisions following the English 
authorities, stating that the requirements of fraud applying to foreign judgments 
should differ from those applying to domestic judgments.303  On the other hand, the 
decision in Keele v Findley304 decided by the New South Wales Supreme Court 
                                                 
302  Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider [2005] SASC 194, [36]. 
303  See,eg, Close v Arnott (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Graham AJ, No 10107 of 
1996, 21 November 1997); Yoon v Song (2000) 158 FLR 295. 
304 (1990) 21 NSWLR 445. 
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departed from the English authorities and held that the same standard to establish 
fraud should apply regardless of whether it is for a domestic or foreign judgment.  
As such, it is helpful to revisit the English law concerning fraud in recognition and 
enforcement of local and foreign judgments. 
 
Under the English common law, a distinction is drawn between foreign and domestic 
judgments concerning fraud.  In order to set aside a domestic judgment on the 
ground that it was obtained by fraud, the party raising the allegation must be able to 
produce fresh evidence which was unknown and could not have been reasonably 
discovered by the parties at the time of the original proceedings and that the evidence 
was so material that its production would have affected the result.305  In setting aside 
foreign judgments for fraud, however, the English courts have held that it is not 
necessary to show that fresh facts have been found since the judgment was rendered.  
Rather, all that is required is to show that the foreign court was misled into coming to 
a wrong decision by evidence which was false.  The underlying rationale is that:  
no man shall take advantage of his own wrong…[otherwise], where a judgment has 
been obtained in the courts of a foreign country by a fraud and by a wrongful act, 
nevertheless, the person obtaining it can take advantage of that fraud and of that 
wrongful act, and in the courts of this country can enforce the judgment so obtained.306   
Accordingly, the acts of fraud which may resist the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments may include those which were alleged in the original proceedings 
and dismissed by the foreign court307 or where the defendant was aware of the 
fraudulent act and could have raised it in the original proceeding but failed to do so.308  
                                                 
305  See, eg, Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298, 300-1. 
306  Abouloff v Oppenheimer (1882) 10 QBD 295, 300. 
307  See, eg, Ibid, 306; Vadala v Lawes (1890) 26 QBD 310, 316-7. 
308  Syal v Heyward [1948] 2 KB 443; Jet Holdings Inc v Patel [1990] 1 QB 335. Contra House of 
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While in Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco where the House of Lords was invited to review 
the existing scope of fraud to foreign judgments, it re-affirmed the existing principle 
of fraud at common law and held that if the law is in need of reform, it would have to 
be for the legislature to effect it.309 
 
The English rule with respect to fraud in setting aside domestic judgments has been 
followed in Australia.  As established in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5),310 Kirby P set 
out the principle that the party asserting that a judgment was procured by fraud must 
show that ‘there has been a new discovery of something material, in the sense that 
fresh facts have been found which, by themselves or in combination with previously 
known facts, would provide a reason for setting aside the judgment.’311  This is for 
the reason that ‘there is a public interest in finality of litigation.  Parties ought not, by 
proceeding to impugn a judgment, to be permitted to relitigate matters which were the 
subject of the earlier proceedings which gave rise to the judgment.’312   
 
Insofar as foreign judgments are concerned, however, it is uncertain whether the 
English rule represents the law in Australia since the issue has only been dealt with at 
the state court level.  The issue arose in Keele v Findley,313 where the defendants 
were adjudged by the Superior Court of Arizona to be liable to the plaintiffs for 
breach of their obligations under a promissory note.  The plaintiffs sought to have 
the judgment enforced in New South Wales under common law rules.  In the original 
proceeding before the Arizona court, the defendants alleged in fraud defence that they 
                                                                                                                                            
Spring gardens Ltd v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241 where the court held that in the absence of fresh 
evidence, the repeated allegation of fraud represented an abuse of process. 
309  Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 489. 
310  (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. 
311  Ibid 538. 
312  Ibid. 
313  (1990) 21 NSWLR 444. 
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were induced to give the note by the plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentations.  The 
allegation was rejected by the Arizona court.  In the enforcement proceeding, the 
defendants again made the allegations, arguing that the plaintiffs had given perjured 
evidence in Arizona.314  This case was decided by a single judge of the New South 
Wales Supreme Court.  His Honour declined to follow the English decisions 
concerning fraud in setting aside foreign judgments and granted an order for the 
plaintiff to enforce the judgment.  In coming to this decision, the court gave the 
following reasons.315  First, there was no authority in Australia where the point has 
squarely arisen for decision.  Second, there was a respectable line of judicial 
authority in Canada supporting the view that that a foreign judgment can only be 
refused enforcement on the ground of fraud if it was unknown to the party at the time 
of the original trial.  Third, if the English authorities were in error, they should not be 
transplanted into Australia in a matter of such importance in the administration of 
justice.  Fourth, there were criticisms from scholars with respect to the English 
decisions.  Fifth, the historical evolution of the state of the English authorities 
readily explains how the present error came about.  And sixth, in several instances, 
the English judges seem to accept that the same rules should apply to enforcement of 
local and foreign judgments in the face of allegations of fraud.   
 
Despite the Keele v Findley decision, Australian courts continued to follow the 
English rules.  In Yoon v Song there was an enforcement action in the New South 
Wales Supreme Court of a judgment obtained in the Republic of Korea.  The court, 
while acknowledging the various criticisms that have been made with respect to the 
English rule concerning fraud for foreign judgments, was satisfied that ‘it correctly 
                                                 
314  Ibid 445-7. 
315  Ibid 457-8. 
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states the law in relation to foreign judgments and that if such law is to be changed, it 
should be by parliament and not by the courts.’316   
 
It is unclear whether Keele v Findley is a good law in Australia since the matter is yet 
to be determined by the appellate court.  However, some commentators are of the 
view that the Keele v Findley decision adopts the proper approach at least from the 
policy point of view.317  As argued, if the evidence of fraud in setting aside foreign 
judgments is restricted to evidence which could not have been known and reasonably 
discovered by parties at the time of original proceedings, it is consistent with the 
public interests that there be an end to litigation and that matters once adjudicated 
should not be re-opened for examination.  If this were otherwise, it may encourage 
parties not to participate completely in the original proceedings, knowing that the 
same evidence could be raised again in subsequent proceedings.  Consequently, it 
would defeat the public inerest in finality of litigation and shows a lack of equal 
respect for local and foreign judgments.318  There are, however, some who argue that 
allowing a broader basis of fraud for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments plays an appropriate safety-valve.319  The supporting argument is that the 
defendant ought not to be restricted to raise the fraud defence before the court 
                                                 
316  Yoon v Song (2000) 158 FLR 295, 300. See also Close v Arnott (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, Graham AJ, No 10107 of 1996, 21 November 1997). But see Benefit Strategies 
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enunciated by Kirby P in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) concerning setting aside local judgment 
should be applied equally to the enforcement of foreign judgments, was ‘convincingly advocated’ 
by Rogers CJ Comm D in Keele v Findley. 
317  See, eg, Peter Brereton, ‘Refusing to Enforce Foreign Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud’ (1993) 
10 Australian Bar Review 224; C R Einstein and Alexander Phipps, Trends in International 
Commercial Litigation Part I-The Present State of Foreign Judgment Enforcement Law (2005) 
Supreme court of New South Wales [7] 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll.sc.nsf/pages/SCO_einsteinmayjune2005. 
318  Brereton, above n 317, 227; Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 7, 150; Einstein and Phipps, 
above n 317, 7 (‘the judgment of Rogers CJ Comm D was entirely correct in both law and 
principle, commensurate with the public interest in both the finality of litigation and the reciprocal 
enforcement of foreign judgments’). 
319  Daniel S Tan, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-Should Fraud Unravel All?’ (2002) 6 Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1043, 1045. 
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specifically chosen by the plaintiff.  This might be because the judgment-rendering 
court may not be the best qualified to decide whether the judgment was obtained by 
fraud.320  Nevertheless, the argument continues that if the defendant alleged the 
fraud defence in the original proceedings, the defendant will be bound by that finding.  
In other words, there is no possibility for the defendant to have a second bite of the 
cherry.321  In this regard, it seems that this argument supports the notion of finality of 
litigation where the defendant should not be allowed to raise the fraud allegation in 
subsequent proceedings if it had already been determined in original proceedings. 
 
Unlike the position in Australia, the United States is quite clear that there be no 
distinction of local and foreign judgments concerning fraud.  As with setting aside 
local and interstate judgments, foreign judgments can be impeached only upon 
extrinsic fraud.  That is, fraud that deprives a party of adequate opportunity to 
present his claim or defence to the court and that the fraud complained of was not 
involved in, or presented to, the court of first instance either at the original trial or in a 
petition for review.322  Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, referring to matters such as 
perjured testimony or falsified documents which could have been discovered and 
raised in original proceedings, cannot be raised in subsequent proceedings to resist the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.323 
 
In view of the objective of finality of litigation on the one hand and the adequacy of 
protection to safeguard the recognition and enforcement proceedings on the other, it is 
proposed in this dissertaiton that the fraud allegation may be raised at the 
                                                 
320  Ibid 1047. 
321  Ibid 1046. 
322  United States v Throckmorton, 98 US 61, 65-6 (1878); Harrison v Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F 2d 
667, 671 (1st Cir 1929). 
323  Laufer v Westminster Brokers Ltd, 532 A 2d 130 (DC App 1987); MacKay v McAlexander, 268 F 
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judgment-enforcing court if: (a) the evidence was unavailable and unknown to the 
defendant at the time the judgment was rendered; (b) the evidence was raised and 
dealt with at the judgment-rendering court but the party reasonably believes that the 
evidence was not properly dealt with in the first instance; or (c) the party was aware 
of the evidence of fraud but reasonably believes that the judgment-rendering court is 
not the best forum in dealing with the matter.  Also, in order to ensure that the fraud 
allegation was not rasied at the judgment-enforcing court for the purpose of disturbing 
the enforcement proceedings, the judgment-enforcing court should take a cautious 
approach when considering the fraud defence, by taking into account all the 
circumstances. 
 
B Natural Justice 
The recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment can also be refused in 
Australia and the United States on the ground that there was a denial of natural justice 
in the foreign proceedings when the judgment was delivered.  For the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement, the natural justice defence aims to safeguard two 
aspects, namely: the defendant was given due notice and a proper opportunity to be 
heard.324  With respect to due notice, the natural justice defence is established if a 
defendant was not served with a proper notice regarding the proceedings against him 
or her and therefore could not defend the claim.  As far as Australia is concerned, in 
determining whether due notice has been given regard will be given to the notice 
provision of the foreign court.325  For instance, notice not by personal service but in 
accordance with the rules of the foreign court may be held to be consistent with 
affording natural justice even if not in accord with notice provisions of the forum.326  
                                                 
324  Jacobson v Frachon (1927) 138 LTR 386; Boele v Norsemeter AS [2002] NSWCA 363, [24]. 
325  Boele v Norsemeter AS [2002] NSWCA 363, [28]. 
326  Ibid. 
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However, the defendant is not likely to raise the lack of notice defence if he or she 
had agreed in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and was aware 
that proceedings would be conducted without notice being given.327  In the United 
States, whether a defendant is given due notice will be subject to the United States’ 
due process of law.  That is, parties should be served with fair notice in sufficient 
time to prepare themselves upon the issue.  Even if a defendant is served with due 
notice regarding the proceedings, the foreign judgment may be denied recognition and 
enforcement in Australia and the United States if the defendant, while appearing in the 
foreign proceedings, was unfairly prejudiced in presenting his or her case before the 
court.328   
 
There have been occasions that courts had extended the natural justice defence to 
include not only the want of notice and opportunity to be heard but substantial 
injustice.329  The issue of substantial injustice was considered in Adams v Cape 
Industries Plc330 where there was no violation of the primary grounds of natural 
justice as the defendant was given sufficient notice of and an opportunity to attend the 
proceedings.  However, it was found that there was a breach of substantial justice on 
the basis that the foreign judgment in default of appearance by the defendant was 
entered without a hearing or judicial assessment of damages upon the evidence.331  
As such, the court held that the lack of an objective assessment of the evidence, 
though valid in the judgment-rendering state, constituted a violation of the English 
                                                 
327  Jamieson v Robb (1881) VLR 170; Albert Veen Dicey, John Humphrey Carlile Morris and 
Lawrence Antony Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins: The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 
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view of substantial justice.332  In Australia, while there is no case law to indicate that 
the substantial injustice defence is followed as far as money judgments are concerned, 
judgments affecting the status of a person may be denied recognition on the basis of 
substantial injustice defence.333  In the United States, there is no indication that the 
notion of substantial injustice is adopted as a defence to deny the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  However, a state court will refuse to recognise 
and enforce a foreign judgment if the foreign procedures in which the foreign 
judgment was rendered are incompatible with the requirements of due process of law.  
That is, the foreign procedures must be fundamentally fair and do not offend against 
rules of basic fairness.334 
 
As far as substantial injustice defence is concerned, there has not been a confined 
scope but whether a matter constitutes a breach of substantial justice can only be 
determined on the nature of the proceedings under consideration.  Accordingly, the 
substantial injustice defence gives court a broad discretion in its treatment of foreign 
judgments and, as such, may raise a number of concerns.  For instance, given the 
differences of procedures between states or countries, the party against whom 
recognition or enforcement is sought may argue that he or she was unfairly prejudiced 
under the foreign proceeding when the judgment was rendered, while the alleged 
proceeding is valid by the law of the state or country where the judgment-rendering 
court sits.  As a result, the judgment-enforcing court may rely on the substantial 
injustice defence and refuse to recognise or enforce the foreign judgment even if it 
was validly rendered by the judgment-rendering court.  On the other hand, the 
                                                 
332  Ibid 497-500 (Scott J), 563-4 (Slade LJ). 
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substantial injustice defence may be regarded as an additional protection to litigants 
since procedural defects may be broadly defined to include situations other than due 
notice and opportunity to be heard.  This is particularly so given the differences 
between substantive and procedural laws between states and countries.  The 
substantial injustice defence would be an appropriate measure to safeguard any 
difference of law that is considered unjust to the judgment-enforcing court.  That 
said, in order to ensure that the substantial injustice defence is not overly exercised so 
as to create uncertainties for the purposes of the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments and incur unfairness to litigants, it is suggested that the defence 
should be limited.  The substantial injustice defence should be limited to the extent 
that the foreign proceeding in which the foreign judgment was rendered deprived the 
litigants’ rights to a fair hearing. 
 
Another question arising under the natural justice defence is whether a defendant, 
being aware of the procedural irregularity, should seek a remedy to cure the 
procedural defect at the time the judgment was rendered in original proceedings.  
This point was considered in Adams v Cape Industries Plc335 where the court made a 
distinction of natural justice for due notice and opportunity to be heard on the one 
hand and substantial injustice on the other.  According to the court, a defendant is 
not obliged to use any remedy to cure the alleged defect in relation to due notice and 
opportunity to be heard even if there were remedies available to him or her in the 
foreign proceedings. 336   In cases involving allegation of substantial injustice, 
however, the court was of the view that, while the defendant is not obliged to cure the 
defect in original proceedings, it will not disregard the relevance of the possibility that 
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the error may be corrected by the defendant within the procedure of a foreign court.337  
In other words, if the defendant was aware of the procedural error and failed to take 
action to correct that error when there was a chance for him or her to do so, the 
defendant may not later raise the issue of substantial injustice in enforcement 
proceedings.  Whether the English position that procedural defects, which could 
have been raised and dealt with in original proceedings can be pleaded at the 
recognition and enforcement stage will be followed in Australia, is uncertain.  As far 
as advancing the objective of finality of litigation is concerned, it is argued that the 
natural justice defence should be restricted to the extent that a defendant is allowed to 
raise the procedural defect in the recognition and enforcement stage only if that defect 
could not have been reasonably discovered in original proceedings.  In other words, 
if the defendant is aware of the procedural defect and could have cured that defect in 
original proceedings but failed to do so, the defendant may be prevented from raising 
the defence to resist the recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment.  The 
purpose of making this suggestion is that it will encourage parties to participate fully 
in the original proceedings and not to take the judgment-enforcing court as a court of 
review for matters which could have been dealt with in the court of first instance.  
On the other hand, one may question whether the judgment-rendering court is the 
appropriate court to deal with procedural irregularity.  For instance, the defendant, 
while being aware of the procedural irregularity in foreign proceedings, reasonably 
believes that he or she is unfairly prejudiced in presenting his or her case before that 
court because the court did not act impartially.  In this circumstance, it is argued that 
the defendant should be able to withhold the natural justice defence until the 
recognition and enforcement stage despite the procedural irregularity being known to 
the defendant at the time the judgment was rendered. 
                                                 
337  Ibid. 
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As with common law actions, lack of notice to defend the proceedings is a recognised 
defence under the statutory schemes in FJA and UFMJRA.338  However, the statutory 
defence is observed to differ from the common law defence in a number of aspects.  
First, the statutory defence mentions only the service of notice and not the instances 
of an opportunity to be heard or substantial injustice.  Second, the statutory defence 
under the FJA in Australia goes further than common law in that it requires that a 
defendant must receive actual notice of the original proceeding, as opposed to any 
other mode of service.339  In the United States, the lack of a timely and proper notice 
will prevent the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments at common law, 
whereas lack of notice under the statutory scheme is merely a discretionary defence.  
According to Honigberg, the discretionary ground in this sense is said to carry the 
meaning that the notice came too late and thus deprived the defendant of the chance to 
defend the claim, as opposed to the lack of a sufficient notice received by the 
defendant.  The latter would defeat the presumption of personal jurisdiction and lead 
to a denial of recognition.340 
 
C Public Policy 
Another defence which may be raised to resist the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia and the United States is the public policy exception.341  
However, unlike fraud and the natural justice defence, which are concerned with the 
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procedural fairness of the foreign proceedings, the public policy exception is 
concerned with the likely effect of a decision in another state or country. 
 
Under the public policy defence, a judgment-enforcing court will not recognise and 
enforce a foreign judgment if to do so would be contrary to the public policy of the 
state where recognition and enforcement is sought.  The public policy defence may 
arise in a number of situations.  For instance, if a judgment was found on the law or 
practice of the judgment-rendering state which is contrary to the public policy of the 
judgment-enforcing state, or the manner upon which the judgment is obtained is 
unacceptable and violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing state, the 
judgment-enforcing court may refuse to recognise and enforce the foreign judgment 
on the public policy basis.342  An example a successful public policy defence is 
found in Re Macartney where the Maltese judgment that ordered a defendant to pay 
maintenance to a child beyond the period of the child’s minority was held contrary to 
English public policy.343  In contrast, in De Santis v Russo,344 the applicant sought 
to set aside the registration of an Italian judgment concerning child maintenance 
obligations on public policy ground was denied on the basis that the Italian judgment 
did not offend the essential principles of justice and morality, or would lead to an 
unacceptably unjust result.345  Another decision in which a foreign judgment was 
refused recognition and enforcement on public policy ground is the Israel Discount 
Bank of New York v Hadjipateras where it was alleged that at the time of execution of 
guarantees, the defendant was under undue influence and therefore, the judgment so 
obtained should not be recognised.346  The court held that where a foreign judgment 
                                                 
342 See, eg, Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd (2008) 21 VR 241, [22]. 
343  Re Macartney [1921] 1 Ch 522. 
344 (2001) 2 Fam LR 414. 
345 Ibid, [22]. 
346  [1984] 1 WLR 137, 140.  
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was based on an agreement obtained by undue influence, English courts were justified 
in refusing to enforce the judgment, provided however, that the allegation of undue 
influence could not have been raised at the foreign proceedings when the judgment 
was rendered.347  
 
However, the examples of cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph which may 
invoke the public policy defence in no way suggest that public policy can be 
universally defined and identified.  To the contrary, commentators have noted that 
the public policy concept lacks a well-defined scope since it varies from time to time 
and from country to country, depending on the political, sociological and economical 
status of the country at a particular time.348  As a result, what might be considered as 
an important public policy in one state may be perceived differently by another.   
 
While the public policy defence is discretionary in nature, the application must be 
based on proper balance.  On the one hand, the public policy defence should be used 
as a safety valve to safeguard rights and interests fundamental to judgment-enforcing 
states.  On the other hand, given the nature of the public policy defence which varies 
from state to state, there should be bounds imposed upon the defence so that it would 
not create unnecessary obstacles for the purposes of the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments.  In Australia, the inherent volataility of the notion of public 
policy and the respect for other sovereign states have led an Australian court to state 
that public policy must be of a higher order to establish a defence, involving 
‘questions of moral and ethical policy; fairness of procedure, and illegality, of a 
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fundamental nature.’349  Accordingly, the mere difference of the law of the foreign 
jurisdiction from the applicable Australan law on a similar set of facts is insufficient 
to invoke this defence.  In Stern v National Australian Bank, it was held that there 
was no violation of Australian public policy to enforce a Californian judgment merely 
because the Californian proceedings differed from the Australian law by barring the 
defendant from raising a counterclaim.350  The decision in Stern had support and was 
followed in subsequent cases.  In a recent decision in Jenton Overseas Investment 
Pte Ltd v Townsing,351 the court held that for the public policy ground contained in 
section 7 of the FJA to be raised, enforcement of the foreign judgment would have to 
‘offend some principle of Australian public policy so sacrosanct as to require its 
maintenance at all costs.’352   
 
As with the Australian approach, the United States courts have narrowly construed the 
public policy exception.  As Cardozo J stated in Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New 
York:353 
We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we 
deal with it otherwise at home…The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign 
right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. 
They do not close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental principle of 
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep rooted tradition of the 
common weal. 
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A similar principle is observed where a foreign judgment will be denied recognition in 
the United States on public policy ground if it:  
‘injures the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the 
administration of law, or to determine the sense of security for individual rights, 
whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel.’354   
Accordingly, the mere difference of a foreign judgment from local public policy does 
not justify a denial of recognition.  Rather, it must be a judgment that affects the 
fundamental interest of the recognition forum.355   
 
In light of the inherent nature of the public policy defence on the one hand and the 
notion of finality of litigation on the other, it is suggested that the public policy 
defence should not be interpreted to the extent that it undermines the effect of the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Along this line, the public policy 
defence should only be allowed in circumstances where there would be violation of 
basic rights and interests fundamental to litigants and judgment-enforcing states. 
 
D Incompatible Judgments 
This defence will arise and resist the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in Australia and the United States if the foreign judgment is in conflict 
with another foreign judgment or with an earlier judgment of the forum state where 
recognition is sought on the same cause of action.  Even though the application of 
this defence will prevent a foreign judgment from being recognised and enforced, it 
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will have the effect of discouraging parties from commencing the same proceedings in 
multiple states. 
 
In situations where a foreign judgment is in conflict with a judgment of the forum 
state where recognition is sought, the recognition of the foreign judgment will 
normally be denied.356  In the event a foreign judgment is in conflict with another 
foreign judgment on the same cause of action, the position in Australia is that courts 
will generally give effect to the judgment earlier in time.  This position follows the 
English decisions.  In Showlag v Mansour,357 it involved two foreign judgments 
granted by courts in England and in Egypt on the same matter.  The English 
judgment was granted on 5 December 1990 in favour of Showlag.  On 23 May 1991, 
an Egyptian court did not recognise Showlag’s claim and entered a judgment in 
favour of Mansour.  Proceedings were brought in Jersey to enforce both judgments.  
It was held that:  
where there are two competing foreign judgments each of which is pronounced by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and is final and not open to impeachment on any ground 
then the earlier of them in time must be recognised and given effect to the exclusion of 
the later.358   
This first-in-time-rule is said to rest on the basis that it will deter post-judgment forum 
shopping and overturn an earlier decision. 
 
In the United States, if a foreign judgment for recognition and enforcement is in 
conflict with another foreign judgment, the general approach is that courts will give 
effect to the second judgment, on the basis that the effect of the first judgment has 
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been determined by the second suit.359  However, it has also been observed that 
courts in the United States may recognise the earlier judgment or neither one.360  
Hence, the question as to which of the two conflicting foreign judgments will be 
given preference by courts in the United States is not entirely clear.361 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the recognition and enforcement regimes in Australia and the 
United States for judgments rendered by courts interstate and in a foreign country.  It 
draws the conclusion that, in order to maintain a single and integrated nation, there are 
constitutional and legislative requirements authorising Australian and United States’ 
courts to recognise and enforce interstate judgments.  Under the Service and 
Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) which governs the recognition and enforcement 
of interstate judgments in Australia, an interstate judgment is enforced in another state 
upon the mere filing of the judgment with an appropriate court.  Moreover, an 
interstate judgment registered for the purpose of enforcement is not open to any form 
of review and must be enforced by another state as long as it is enforceable in the 
state where it was originally given.  In the United States, the Uniform Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments Act 1964 provides an enforcement scheme under which an 
interstate judgment may be registered by a court in the state where enforcement is 
sought.  However, the registration of the interstate judgment may be set aside under 
a number of grounds, including the jurisdictional competence of the court which 
                                                 
359  Ackerman v Ackerman, 517 F Supp 614, 625 (SDNY 1981) (The court held that the English 
judgment rendered second superseded the prior California judgment on the bases of comity and 
New York last-in-time rule). 
360  Byblos Bank Europe v Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 819 NYS 2d 412 (2006) (the court did not 
exercise the ‘last-in-time’ rule); Restatement (Third) s 482 cmt g. 
361  Andreas F Lowenfeld and Linda J Silberman, ‘United States of America’ in Charles Platto and 
William G Horton (eds), Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Worldwide (Graham & Trotman and 
International Bar Association, 1993) 123, 129; Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act (1962) s 4(b)(4). 
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rendered the judgment and fraud.  This is for the reason that given the degree of 
variation of laws among the states, a state court asked to enforce an interstate 
judgment will review the judgment so as to ensure that the judgment was obtained 
fairly and appropriately. 
 
In contrast, if the recognition and enforcement action in Australia or the United States 
involves a judgment rendered by a foreign country, the Australian or United States 
court will not recognise and enforce the foreign judgment unless it has satisfied a 
number of requirements and does not fall under any of the defences to justify its 
non-recognition and non-enforcement.  While the underlying purpose of the 
requirements and defences is to maintain the administration of justice which is 
important especially given the significant differences of substantive and procedural 
laws between the country which rendered the judgment and those in Australia or the 
United States.  It is argued that in light of modern-day trade and commerce, the 
requirements and defences should not be imposed and construed in a way so as to 
cause hardship for the recognition and enforcement proceedings. 
 
As far as the requirements that must be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments are concerned, the requirement of underlying 
jurisdiction in Australia and the United States is problematic.  In particular, it is 
argued that the presence requirement in Australia whereby a company against whom 
recognition and enforcement is sought must have some presence in a foreign state to 
be subject to the jurisdiction of that state is too narrow since, due to technological 
advancement, a company may conduct business in a foreign state without having any 
presence in that state.  Accordingly, a foreign judgment rendered against a company 
which did not have some presence in the foreign state, such as by maintaining a 
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branch office or having a representative to carry on business on its behalf, will be 
denied recognition and enforcement in Australia if the company did not submit to the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court.  In the United States, if a state court asked to 
recognise and enforce an interstate or a foreign judgment is satisfied that there was a 
minimum contact between the judgment-rendering state and the defendant, the 
judgment rendered on that basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced.  However, 
the problem with the minimum contact requirement is that, firstly, the requirement of 
the connection between the state purporting to exercise jurisdiction and the defendant 
may result in situations where an interstate or a foreign judgment is denied 
recognition and enforcement despite that the forum court that rendered the judgment 
has had a substantial connection with the subject matter of the proceeding and is the 
appropriate court for hearing the matter.  And secondly, the minimum contacts test 
may create uncertainty and unpredictability in the recognition and enforcement 
proceedings since it is a fact-driven basis and lacks a well-defined scope. 
 
In contrast to the requirements in Australia and the United States, the real and 
substantial connection test adopted by the Canadian courts is generous, under which a 
foreign judgment is entitled to be recognised and enforced in Canada as long as it was 
rendered on the jurisdictional basis that there was a real and substantial connection 
between the foreign territory which rendered the judgment and the subject matter of 
the proceeding or the defendant.  That said however, the flexibility of the real and 
substantial connection test is likely to create uncertainty and unpredictability since 
there has not been a clear indication from courts regarding the application of the test.  
Also, given the application of the real and substantial connection test will render the 
recognition and enforcement proceedings easier for foreign claimants, there are 
concerns over the adequacy of protection to parties against whom recognition and 
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enforcement is sought.     
 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia and the United 
States is confined to a number of defences, including fraud, breach of natural justice, 
violation of public policy, and conflict of judgments.  An establishment of any of the 
defences will resist the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia 
or the United States.  The defences of fraud and natural justice are concerned with 
the procedural fairness of foreign proceedings where judgments were rendered, 
whereas public policy and conflict of judgments are concerned with the likely effect 
of a judgment in a foreign state.  While these defences are impediments as far as the 
objective of finality of litigation is concerned and may prevent a foreign judgment 
from being recognised and enforced, the purpose of the defences is to safeguard the 
recognition and enforcement proceedings so that there would be no unfairness to 
litigants and judgment-enforcing states if a foreign judgment is recognised and 
enforced in Australia or the United States.   
  
In respect of the statutory schemes governing the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia and the United States, while they streamline the 
common law action that instead of commencing a new proceeding, a foreign 
judgment is capable of being enforced upon the registration of the judgment under an 
applicable statutory scheme, there are certain drawbacks.  As observed in this 
chapter, the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) in Australia applies to foreign 
judgments upon which there are reciprocal arrangements made between Australia and 
foreign jurisdictions.  While by operating upon reciprocity will ensure the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it has rendered the FJA limited in 
geographical application and does not include some of Australia’s important trading 
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partners.  In the United States, there is currently no national approach concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, since the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act 1964 has not been uniformally adopted by states 
and, with states that have adopted the Act, there are variations of the provisions of the 
Act.  Consequently, the recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered by a 
foreign nation which does not have reciprocity with a state in the United Stats may be 
denied in that state where reciprocity is imposed as mandatory requirement for the 
purposes of recognition and enforcement.  
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Chapter Four  
The Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in the 
European Community 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the Brussels I Regulation which governs the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments among European Community Member States. 362  
Following a general background of the Brussels I Regulation in Part Two of this 
chapter, Part Three and Part Four consider the provisions under the Brussels I 
Regulation.  The examination includes the provisions specifying the rules of 
jurisdiction upon which a court in a Member State must exercise when rendering a 
judgment and the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of resulting 
judgments. 
 
This chapter concludes that the Brussels I Regulation has established a scheme 
effective for the purposes of recognition and enforcement since, under the Brussels I 
Regulation, there is only a minimal requirement that must be satisfied for recognition 
and enforcement.  Moreover, a judgment that is rendered by a court in a Member 
State and based on the rules of jurisdiction set forth in the Brussels I Regulation is 
entitled to be recognised and enforced in another Member State without further 
review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  However, there are concerns as to the 
adequacy of protection available under the Brussels I Regulation to safeguard the 
                                                 
362  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [2002] OJ L 12/1 
(hereinafter ‘Brussels I Regulation’). 
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judgment-enforcing Member States, as well as those against whom recognition or 
enforcement is sought. 
 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation 
In 1957, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community363 was signed 
among the six Member States of the European Economic Community (‘EEC’)364 for 
the purpose of establishing within the EEC a common market for the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital.365  In order to achieve the purpose, it was 
required that Member States engage in further negotiations with a view to securing, 
for the benefit of their nationals, the ‘simplifications of the formalities governing the 
reciprocal and enforcement of judicial decisions and of arbitral awards.’ 366  
Accordingly, the Member States went into negotiation and the result was a convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.  The convention was adopted by the EEC Member States in 
1968 and came into force in 1973, becoming known as the Brussels Convention.367 
 
The purpose of creating the Brussels Convention was to facilitate the free movement 
of judicial decisions among the EEC Member States.  This was considered as an 
important requirement for the purpose of establishing a market for the free movement 
of goods, persons, service and capital.  Another reason that was observed to have 
                                                 
363  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature 25 March 1957, 298 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1958) (‘EEC Treaty’). 
364  The European Economic Community was created upon the signing of the EEC Treaty. The 
Member States of the EEC included: France; Belgium; Luxembourg; Western Germany; the 
Netherlands; and Italy. 
365  EEC Treaty Preambles and Pt Two (Bases of the Community). 
366  Ibid art 220. 
367  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
opened for signature 27 September 1968, 1262 UNTS 153 (entered into force 1 February 1973) 
(hereinafter ‘Brussels Convention’). 
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prompted the need for the unification of the means by which judgments were 
recognised and enforced among the EEC Member States was that prior to the Brussels 
Convention coming into effect, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
among the Member States was governed under the system whereby a court in one 
Member State asked to recognise and enforce a judgment rendered by another 
Member State would not do so unless the judgment-rendering court had jurisdiction.  
In determining whether the judgment-rendering court had jurisdiction, however, 
regard was to be given to the law of the judgment-enforcing Member State.  The 
problem with this system is that given the differences in rules of jurisdiction among 
the Member States, the recognition and enforcement of a Member State judgment 
which may be subject to review under different rules of jurisdiction may hamper the 
free movement of judgments within the EEC.368 
 
Despite the relative success of the Brussels Convention facilitating the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments among the European Community Member States, the 
European Union adopted the so called Brussels I Regulation which came into effect 
on 1 March 2002 and supplanted the Brussels Convention.  The advantage of the 
Brussels I Regulation is that it will take direct effect in the Member States of the 
European Union without the need for implementation as required under the Brussels 
Convention.  The Brussels I Regulation applies among the 27 Member States of the 
European Union369 with the exception of Denmark.370  While Denmark has opted 
                                                 
368  Brussels I Regulation Recital (2) (‘Certain differences between national rules governing 
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market’). See 
also Kathryn A Russell, ‘Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels 
System as an Impetus for United States Action’ (1993) 19 Syracuse Journal of International Law 
and Commerce 57, 59-63. 
369  The current Member States of the EU include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
370  Brussels I Regulation art 1(3). 
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out of the operation of the Brussels I Regulation, the European Community and 
Denmark have concluded a special agreement extending the provisions of the 
Brussels I Regulation to Denmark.371   
 
In order to achieve a uniform and consistent application of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation, Member States have agreed that the European 
Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) be responsible for the interpretation of the provisions.372  
Accordingly, the ECJ would interpret particular provisions under the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation and the interpretation would be binding on both the 
court which made the reference as well as courts of all other Member States if the 
application of the same provisions arises subsequently.  However, it should be noted 
that there are limitations imposed upon what courts in a Member State may refer 
questions to the ECJ for interpretation and ruling.  Where the Brussels Convention is 
concerned, the referral right is limited to the highest court of a Member State and 
courts sitting in an appellate capacity.  In terms of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
requirement is stricter, which is open to the court of a final appeal in a Member 
State.373  Moreover, the court that is permitted to make a reference concerning the 
provisions under the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation may do so only if a 
reference to the ECJ is necessary to enable it to make its decision.374 
 
                                                 
371  Agreement between the European Community and Kingdom of Denmark on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed 19 October 
2005, [2005] OJ L299/62 (entered into force 1 July 2007). 
372  Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed 3 June 
1971, [1990] OJ C189/25, reprinted in 29 ILM 1439 art 1 (‘Protocol of 3 June 1971’); Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [1992] OJ C 224/6 
(entered into force 1 November 1993) (‘EC Treaty’) art 234. 
373  Protocol of 3 June 1971 art 2; EC Treaty art 234 (where any such question is raised in a case 
pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decision there is no judicial 
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice). 
374  Protocol of 3 June 1971 art 3; EC Treaty art 234. 
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4.2.2 Lugano Convention 
After the Brussels Convention came into effect, several member states of the 
European Free Trade Associations (‘EFTA’) expressed their interest in taking action to 
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters.375  However, given the difficulties of extending the Brussels Convention to 
EFTA Member States, particularly in asking the EFTA Member States to submit to the 
interpretative power of the ECJ, which is an institution of the European Community, a 
new convention parallel to the provisions of the Brussels Convention was suggested 
by the European Commission.376  As a result, the Lugano Convention, substantially 
similar to the Brussels Convention, was concluded in 1988, facilitating the recognition 
and enforcement proceedings within the EFTA as well as between the EC and EFTA 
Member States.377 
  
After the Brussels Convention was replaced by the Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano 
Convention was revised and adopted in 2007 in order to be more in line with the 
Brussels I Regulation.378  The New Lugano Convention has been ratified by the 
European Community, Denmark and Norway.  The ratification of Iceland and 
Switzerland are still outstanding at the time of writing.  Given that the Lugano 
Convention is modeled on and is substantially the same as the Brussels 
                                                 
375  The Member States of EFTA before 1995 included: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EEC and ceased to be EFTA 
members. Liechtenstein joined EFTA in 1991. However, Liechtenstein is not a Lugano Convention 
contracting state. 
376  Russell, above n 368, 67. 
377  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
opened for signature 16 September 1988, 28 ILM 620 (entered into force 1 January 1992) 
(‘Lugano Convention’).  If a state is an EC Member State which is also a contracting state to the 
Lugano Convention, the court of that state must apply the Lugano Convention where either the 
judgment-granting state or the judgment-enforcing state is a Lugano only country for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. See Lugano Convention art 64(2)(c). 
378  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, signed 30 October 2007, [2007] OJ L 339/3 (entered into force 1 January 
2010) (‘New Lugano Convention’). 
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Convention/Brussels I Regulation, this dissertation primarily refers to the provisions 
of the latter, unless reference to the provisions of the former is specifically made. 
 
4.3 Brussels I Regulation 
4.3.1 Overview 
The Brussels I Regulation, closely resembling the Brussels Convention, is designed to 
continue and enhance the purposes and objectives of the latter.  As stated in the 
Recitals, the long-standing aims have been to: 
‘unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to 
simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of 
judgments from Member States’ and to attain the objective of ‘free movement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters.’379 
 
The Brussels I Regulation comprises five chapters.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, two chapters are particularly important, namely, the rules of jurisdiction 
contained in Chapter II and the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments contained in Chapter III.  Chapter II sets forth the basis of jurisdiction 
that a court in one Member State must exercise when rendering a judgment and 
Chapter III regulates the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of resulting 
judgments among the Member States.   
 
Accordingly, the Brussels I Regulation is presented as what is known as a double 
convention, which regulates not only the procedures for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments; it also unifies the rules of jurisdiction a court may exercise 
when giving its judgment.  The advantage of unifying the rules of jurisdiction is that, 
                                                 
379  Brussels I Regulation Recitals (2), (6). 
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for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, a judgment given by a court in one 
Member State, based upon any of the rules of jurisdiction, is entitled to be recognised 
and enforced in another Member State without further review of its underlying basis, 
unless in certain circumstances specified under the Brussels I Regulation.380  In this 
respect, the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation have created a scheme 
comparable to the schemes for the enforcement of interstate judgments in Australia 
and the United States examined in chapter three, whereby a court asked to enforce an 
interstate judgment cannot review the underlying jurisdictional basis except in certain 
circumstances under the United States’ scheme.  
 
4.3.2 Recognition and Enforcement 
Under the application of the Brussels I Regulation, there are two requirements that 
must be satisfied before a court in a Member State will recognise a judgment, namely, 
the judgment is granted by a Member State and is given in respect of civil and 
commercial matters defined under the Brussels I Regulation.381  Once the judgment 
has been recognised, it may be enforced in a Member State on the condition that it is 
enforceable in the Member State where it was originally given.382  Accordingly, a 
party seeking to recognise and enforce a judgment under the Brussels I Regulation 
must satisfy only minimal conditions.  In contrast to the positions in Australia and 
the United States, there are a number of requirements that must be satisfied before 
courts in Australia or the United States will recognise and enforce foreign judgments.   
 
A Recognition 
i A Judgment Granted by a Member State 
                                                 
380  Brussels I Regulation art 35(3). 
381  Ibid arts 32 and 1. 
382  Ibid art 38. 
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In order for a judgment to qualify for the recognition and enforcement purposes under 
the Brussels I Regulation, it must be a judgment granted by a court or tribunal of a 
Member State. 383  In other words, the Brussels I Regulation will not apply to 
judgments granted by a court in a non-Member State.384  In contrast to the Brussels I 
Regulation which is confined to a certain region, the Australian or United States’ 
scheme for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is applicable to 
judgments worldwide, except for the FJA which is confined to courts that have had 
reciprocal arrangements with Australian courts. 
 
Similarly, if a judgment was granted by a Member State but involved no foreign 
element, it will not qualify as a judgment capable of being recognised and enforced 
under the Brussels I Regulation.  In other words, there must be international 
recognition and enforcement of a judgment.  Thus, a judgment given by a court in 
Northern Ireland or Scotland for recognition and enforcement in an English court 
involves no foreign element and will not qualify as a judgment for the purposes of the 
Brussels I Regulation.385   
 
Also, the Brussels I Regulation will not apply in circumstances where there is a 
double execution of a judgment.  As the ECJ ruled in Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco (No 
2),386 if a judgment given by a Member State is recognised and declared enforceable 
in another Member State, the enforcement decision on that judgment cannot itself be 
recognised and declared enforceable in a third Member State.  Instead, in order to 
recognise and enforce the judgment in a third Member State, the judgment holder 
                                                 
383  Ibid art 32. 
384  See, eg, Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1994] QB 509, 526. 
385  Fawcett, Carruthers and North, Cheshire, North and Fawcett-Private International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 14th ed, 2008) 214, 600; Jonathan Hill, International Commercial Disputes in 
English Courts (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 2005) 55 [3.3.2]. 
386  [1994] QB 509. 
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must seek the recognition and enforcement of the original judgment. 387   This 
principle, which prevents double execution of a Member State judgment, applies 
equally in situations involving the recognition and enforcement of a judgment granted 
by a non-Member State.388 
 
ii Civil and Commercial Matters 
Despite the type of judgments capable of being recognised and enforced under the 
Brussels I Regulation covers a broad basis, including money judgments as well as 
non-money judgments such as decrees or orders, 389  the judgments entitled to 
recognition and enforcement must fall within the material scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation.  That is, the judgment must concern civil and commercial matters, 
irrespective of the nature of the court or tribunal which hears the case.390  As such, it 
is irrelevant whether the court in question is a criminal or administrative court, as long 
as the cause of action arises from a civil or commercial matter.  In comparison to the 
Brussels I Regulation, the FJA in Australia applies to the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments made by a court in civil proceedings, as well as judgments made by a 
court in criminal proceedings, as long as the proceedings are a claim for a sum of 
money in respect of compensation or damages to an injured party.391  
 
Although the expression ‘civil and commercial’ is an established term in the civil law 
tradition, meaning an ordinary private law matter rather than a criminal or public law 
matter, there has been a lack of uniform interpretation concerning the term among the 
                                                 
387  Ibid 522-3. 
388  Ibid. 
389  Brussels I Regulation art 32. 
390  Ibid art 1(1); Mortensen, above n 90, 253-4 (‘Presumably, the conventions only apply to civil and 
commercial matters because judgments in these proceedings are incidents of the trading and 
commercial concerns that lie at the heart of the single European market’). 
391 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), sec. 3. 
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Member States for the purposes of the Brussels Convention.  Accordingly, the ECJ 
was firstly called in LTU v Eurocontrol to make a ruling.392  In this case, Eurocontrol 
was an international public organisation providing certain air navigation safety 
services in Western Europe.  It brought a suit against LTU which was a German air 
transport firm for the recovery of unpaid charges for the use of Eurocontrol services.  
The Belgium court ruled in favor of Eurocontrol.  Eurocontrol then sought to enforce 
the Belgian judgment in Germany.  The German court, uncertain as to whether the 
matter was commercial and fell within the scope of the Brussels Convention, referred 
the question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.393  The ECJ ruled that the term 
‘civil and commercial’ should be afforded an autonomous and independent 
Community definition, meaning it is not for the judgment-rendering court or the 
judgment-enforcing court to determine the scope according to their legal systems.  
Rather, references must be made, ‘first, to the objectives and scheme of the 
Convention and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the 
national legal systems.’394  Accordingly, the court ruled that a judgment given in a 
dispute between a public authority, which acted in the exercise of its public authority 
power, and a private individual is not regarded as a civil and commercial matter.395  
In this case, the ECJ found that Eurocontrol was acting in its capacity as a public 
authority and therefore the matter was not qualified as a commercial matter under the 
Brussels Convention.  The matter would otherwise fall under the scope if 
Eurocontrol was acting in a private capacity.396 
 
                                                 
392  LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co KG v Eurocontrol (C-29/76) [1976] ECR I-1541. 
393  Ibid I-1542-43. 
394  Ibid I-1551. 
395  Ibid I-1552. 
396  Ibid. But see Sonntag v Waidmann (C-172/91) [1993] ECR I-1963, 1977 [22] (the act of a teacher 
in a state school supervising a pupil who was killed in an accident during a school trip was 
considered as a civil matter falling under the Brussels Convention, since the conduct of the teacher 
did not involve the exercise of powers going beyond those applicable between private individuals).  
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As mentioned earlier, the term ‘civil and commercial’ refers to an ordinary private law 
matter.  Thus, any public law matter such as revenue, customs and administrative 
matters are excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.397  The reason 
behind the exclusion is apparent from the objectives of the establishment of the 
European Economic Community, which in part was to transform the conditions of 
trade and manufacture within the territory of the community.398  This objective is 
economically focused upon what is considered an important aspect for the operation 
of the common market.  On this basis, the scope of the Brussels I Regulation is 
confined to civil and commercial matters so as to promote the harmonious 
development of economic activities among Member States. 
 
However, not all civil and commercial matters would fall under the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation.  As stipulated, Article 1(2) of the Brussels I Regulation 
excludes matters concerning:399 (a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, 
rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; (b) 
bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other 
legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings; (c) 
social security; and (d) arbitration.  The main reason of excluding these matters, as 
noted in Jenard report,400 is the disparity of the rules among Member States, since in 
general, the intention of the parties cannot regulate these matters independently of 
considerations of public policy.  Thus, given the purpose of the Brussels I Regulation 
is to encourage the free movement of judgments, it excludes these matters which, if 
included, may undermine such an objective. 
                                                 
397  Brussels I Regulation art 1(1). 
398 EEC Treaty, art 2. 
399  Ibid 1(2). 
400 Jenard, P., Report by Mr. P Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mtters Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 59 5/Mar/1979. 
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It should be noted that whether a matter falls under these exceptions will depend on 
whether it constitutes a principal subject matter or a subsidiary matter either in the 
main or preliminary proceedings.  A matter which constitutes a principal subject 
matter will fall outside of the scope of the Brussels I Regulation whereas a subsidiary 
matter will not.401  One thing to be noted of these exclusions is that they are listed 
exclusively rather than permissively.  The drafters of the Brussels Convention 
intended that matters not falling under any of the exclusions should come within the 
scope, so that the reach of the Brussels Convention is given the greatest possible 
extent.402  Therefore, if a judgment given in a Member State is within the civil and 
commercial scope and the subject matter does not fall under any of the exceptions, the 
judgment should be recognised in other Member States, unless any of the defences are 
successfully established. 
 
Although it is not stated in explicit terms, it seems that the issue of whether a matter 
falls under the scope of the Brussels I Regulation can arise both at the time of trial as 
well as during the recognition and enforcement proceedings.  This means that the 
court asked to recognise and enforce a judgment, is not bound by the decision of the 
judgment-rendering court that the matter comes within the perimeter of the Brussels I 
Regulation.  Rather, the judgment-enforcing court may, if necessary, refer any 
question of interpretation concerning the scope of the matter to the ECJ.403 
 
                                                 
401  See,eg, Marc Rich v Impianti (The Atlantic Emperor) (C-190/89) [1990] ECR I-3855, [33]. 
402  Robert C Reuland, ‘The Recognition and Judgments in the European Community: The 
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention’ (1993) 14(4) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 559, 582. 
403  See, eg, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co KG v Eurocontrol (C-29/76) [1976] ECR 
I-1541 where the court in which recognition and enforcement was sought made an enquiry to the 
ECJ. See also Hill, above n 385, 411; Fawcett, Carruthers and North, above n 385, 601. 
 133 
B Enforcement 
The Brussels I Regulation contains a set of provisions governing the procedures for 
the enforcement of Member State judgments.404  As the ECJ ruled in De Wolf v Cox, 
the procedures contained in the Brussels I Regulation must be used over any national 
rules for the enforcement of judgments.  In other words, the party in whose favour a 
judgment has been obtained is prevented from bringing a new action before a court in 
another Member State for a judgment in the same terms. 405  Accordingly, the 
Brussels I Regulation rules out the possibility of re-litigating a matter having been 
tried once.  While this preclusion will encourage parties to participate fully in the 
original proceedings since the same matter cannot be re-litigated in another 
proceeding, one may argue that there are circumstances in which a new action would 
be justified especially if the original court which tried the matter was not the best 
forum to do so.  In Australia and the United States, a judgment holder having 
obtained a foreign judgment may elect to pursue a common law action or if applicable, 
apply under the FJA or UFMJRA for the recognition and enforcement purposes.  
Thus, unlike the Brussels I Regulation which prevents re-litigation of the same matter, 
the national schemes in Australia and the United States impose no such restriction.  
However, it appears that where a statutory scheme is applicable, judgment holders 
tend to puruse the recognition and enforcement actions in Australia or the United 
States by statutory means without re-litigating the same afresh. 
 
A party may apply for the enforcement of a Member State judgment provided that the 
judgment is capable of being recognised under the Brussels I Regulation and is 
enforceable in the Member State which granted the judgment.406  For the purpose of 
                                                 
404  Brussels I Regulation arts 38-52. 
405  De Wolf v Cox (C-42/76) [1976] ECR 1759. 
406  Brussels I Regulation art 38(1). 
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enforcement, the application for a declaration of enforceability on the judgment is to 
be made ex parte.  That is, the judgment is declared enforceable automatically after 
purely formal checks of the documents produced.  The party against whom 
enforcement is sought has no right to make any objection or to be heard at this stage 
of the enforcement application.407  The underlying rationale is that the judgment 
debtor would not have the chance to remove the assets from the Member State where 
enforcement is sought if he or she was aware of the enforcement application.408 
 
Once the declaration of enforceability has been granted, the party against whom 
enforcement is sought may resist enforcement.  This can be done by way of an 
ordinary appeal on any of the grounds considered in section C below.409  The term 
ordinary appeal was given an independent Community definition, meaning that the 
subject of an appeal may lead to the annulment or amendment of the judgment in 
question.410  The judgment that has been made on the hearing of the first appeal may 
itself be further appealed, but only on a point of law.411  In the event an appeal has 
been lodged, the court has discretion to stay the enforcement proceedings pending the 
outcome of the appeal.412 
 
It follows that there are certain procedures that must be complied with before a 
judgment can be enforced under the Brussels I Regulation, including that the 
application for a declaration of enforceability and that the application is not set aside 
                                                 
407  Ibid art 41.  
408  See, eg, Fawcett, Carruthers and North, above n 385, 606. 
409  Brussels I Regulation arts 43(1), 43(5) (the judgment debtor has a month from the service of the 
declaration of enforceability, or two months where notice was served if not domiciled within the 
jurisdiction, to make an appeal). 
410  Industrial Diamond Supplies v Riva (C-43/77) [1977] ECR 2175, [28], [34]. 
411  Brussels I Regulation art 44; Annex IV. Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 134; Hill, above n 385, 438-9 [13.4.11]-[13.4.14]. 
412  Brussels I Regulation arts 37(1), 46(1). 
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on any of the exceptions.  However, in view of the possibility of delays and expenses 
that may have been incurred for the purposes of recognition and enforcement under 
the Brussels I Regulation,413 there have been suggestions that these intermediate 
procedures be abolished so that judicial decisions will not be treated differently or be 
subject to additional procedures because they were handed down in another Member 
State.414   
 
In a Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member-States, it 
mentions reducing the existing grounds of non-recognition by abolishing Article 35 
which requires a judgment-enforcing state to review the underlying jurisdictional 
basis in certain circumstances. 415   In addition, there are suggestions that the 
reviewing procedures currently required under the Brussels I Regulation be replaced 
with a co-ordinated review procedure in judgment-granting and judgment-enforcing 
states.  That is, the judgment-granting state will be the one carrying out the review of 
judgment and if there is no sufficient redress in that state, the judgment debtor may 
request a review in the judgment-enforcing state.416  While these recommendations 
will streamline the existing proceedings and provide a rapid procedure for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments under the Brussels I Regulation, questions 
remain as to the adequacy of protection to safeguard the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.  For instance, is it appropriate for the judgment-granting court to play 
                                                 
413  See, eg, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Report from the Commissioner to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
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415  Burkhard Hess, Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation 
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the role of reviewing its own judgment?  If so, should the judgment-granting court 
apply its own local law or the law of the judgment-enforcing state when conducting 
the review?  
 
C Defences 
A judgment granted by a Member State and falls under the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another Member State, unless 
any of the defences is proven.  The establishment of any of the defences will prevent 
a judgment from being recognised and enforced in a Member State.  The purpose of 
the defences to resist recognition and enforcement is that the Brussels I Regulation 
applies to a group of sovereign entities whose substantive and procedural laws are 
different from each other.  Accordingly, despite the purpose of the Brussels I 
Regulation being to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments among 
the Member States, there should be protection available to safeguard the recognition 
and enforcement proceedings so that there would be no injustice or unfairness to 
litigants and judgment-enforcing Member States if a Member State judgment is 
recognised and enforced. 
 
The defences contained in the Brussels I Regulation include:417 public policy or fraud; 
lack of sufficient notice of the originating process to the defendant upon default 
appearance; incompatible judgments; jurisdictional error; and judgments to which 
Article 72 of the Brussels I Regulation applies.  To some extent, the defences are 
similar to those in Australia and the United States justifying the non-recognition and 
non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  However, given the underlying objective of 
the Brussels I Regulation is to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the free 
                                                 
417  Ibid arts 34(1)-(4), 35(1), 72. 
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movement of judgments among the Member States, a narrow application of these 
defences is observed.  As such, this raises the question whether adequate protection 
is afforded to parties against whom recognition or enforcement is sought, as well as 
the judgment-enforcing Member States. 
 
i Public Policy or Fraud 
Articles 34 and 45 of the Brussels I Regulation stipulate that a judgment manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the Member State where recognition or enforcement is 
sought will be denied such an effect.418  However, while the application of the public 
policy defence is generally at the discretion of the judgment-enforcing court, as with 
the positions in Australia and the United States examined in Chapter Three, the public 
policy clause within the framework of the Brussels I Regulation must be given a 
meaning consistent with the underlying objectives of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
The issue of public policy defence arose in Krombach v Bamberski (‘Krombach’)419 
where the ECJ ruled that the defence must be narrowly construed and that the limit of 
the defence is a matter for interpretation of the Brussels Convention to be determined 
by the ECJ.  The facts of this case were that Krombach, a German national, was 
charged under French law of manslaughter by causing the death of a 14 year-old 
French girl who died after receiving an injection from Krombach.  In the course of 
the proceedings, Bamberski sought damages from Krombach for pain and suffering.  
The French Criminal Court awarded judgments in favour of Bamberski.  This was 
granted as Krombach did not appear in court personally and his legal representative’s 
attempted appearance on his behalf was rejected pursuant to the relevant French 
                                                 
418  Ibid arts 34(1), 45(1). 
419  (C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935. 
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law.420  In referring the case to the ECJ for preliminary ruling, the court ruled that 
recourse to the public policy clause can be envisaged only where the recognition or 
enforcement of the judgment delivered in another Member State would be ‘at variance 
to an unacceptable degree’ with the legal order of the Member State in which 
recognition or enforcement is sought.421  In other words, there must be a manifest 
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential to the Member State in which recognition 
or enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that 
legal order to invoke this public policy defence.422  In this case, the ECJ referred to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and ruled that the right of every person 
charged with an offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer is one of the 
fundamental elements in a fair trial.  Thus, the judgment rendered by the French 
court in denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial was a fundamental breach under 
the European Convention on Human Rights and justified the use of the public policy 
defence.423 
 
After the Krombach decision, there are speculations that the fact that the ECJ took 
into account the content of the European Convention on Human Rights when defining 
the public policy clause may imply that this defence will be construed in relation to 
fundamental human rights and restricted to other grounds.424  If this is the case, it 
will restrict the application of the public policy defence only in exceptional 
circumstances where there is a breach of a fundamental human right.  On the other 
hand, however, there are concerns over this narrow interpretation.  As stated 
previously, public policy defence offers protection to a state or country whereby a 
                                                 
420  Ibid [12]-[17]. 
421  Ibid [37]. 
422  Ibid. 
423  Ibid [38]-[39]. 
424  See, eg, Oelmann, above n 348, 88. 
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court may refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if to do so would 
violate fundamental interests and values of that state or country.  However, by 
confining the scope of the public policy clause to the European Human Rights 
Convention, there appears to be an imposition of a European instead of a national 
value.  As argued, this shift from a national to European approach is likely to leave 
less room for national courts to define public policy exclusive to a nation and give 
way to European parameters.425 
 
Under the narrow interpretation of the public policy clause, the mere difference 
between the legal rules applied by the judgment-rendering court and that which would 
have been applied by the judgment-enforcing court is not a sufficient ground to justify 
this defence. 426   Nor is the defence available if the judgment-rendering court 
misapplied the European Union law in giving the judgment.427  Also, the public 
policy defence cannot be used as a defence for the purpose of reviewing the 
jurisdiction of the court of a Member State that gave the judgment.428  This is so 
even if the jurisdiction upon which the judgment is based is pursuant to the national 
law of a Member State in cases where the defendant is domiciled in a non-Member 
State and the jurisdictional basis is considered unreasonable to the non-Member State.  
The public policy defence is therefore construed narrowly in such a way that recourse 
to this defence is precluded when other defences could have been applied.429 
 
Despite the Brussels I Regulation making no reference to the defence of fraud, the 
public policy exception may, in certain circumstances, be used as a justification if 
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allegation of fraud was pleaded at the recognition and enforcement stage. 430  
However, unlike the Australian position which followed the English authorities that a 
party may raise the defence of fraud at the recognition and enforcement stage even if 
it has or could have been dealt with in the original proceedings, the defence of fraud 
under the Brussels I Regulation is construed narrowly.  The ECJ in Interdesco SA v 
Nullifire Ltd431 ruled that where a judgment is challenged on the ground that the 
foreign court has been fraudulently deceived, the court should first consider whether a 
remedy lies in such a case in the foreign jurisdiction in question.  If so, it will 
normally be appropriate to leave the defendant to pursue his or her remedy in that 
jurisdiction.432   
 
Accordingly, it has been observed that, as a general rule, the defence of fraud may 
only be invoked under the Brussels I Regulation if the evidence of fraud was 
unknown and unavailable in the original proceeding when the judgment was rendered, 
and the evidence of fraud only arose at such a late stage that the only time to raise the 
defence was at the recognition and enforcement stage.433  The Brussels I Regulation 
has therefore taken a cautious approach with respect to the fraud defence and such 
will change the legal position in England concerning fraud insofar as the Brussels I 
Regulation is applicable.  The approach under the Brussels I Regulation with respect 
to fraud defence has the effect of being consistent as far as the objective of finality of 
litigation is concerned.  However, by setting a standard which is so high for a party 
raising the defence to establish, it is arguable whether such an approach has afforded 
adequate protection to litigants. 
                                                 
430  See Interdesco SA v Nullifire Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 180. 
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432  Ibid 188. 
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ii Lack of Notice to Defend the Proceedings 
By the application of the Brussels I Regulation, a court in a Member State may refuse 
to recognise and enforce a judgment given by another Member State if, in appearance 
by default, the defendant was not given a sufficient notice of the original 
proceedings.434  Accordingly, the purpose of this defence is to safeguard against 
procedural irregularities and ensure that the defendant is given a fair trial before a 
judgment against him or her can be recognised and enforced in another Member State.  
As Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation states:  
where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the 
document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient 
time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant 
failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for 
him to do so. 
 
This defence applies only when the defendant is in default of appearance.  It cannot 
be relied upon if the defendant had voluntarily appeared and taken part in the 
proceedings, whether on the merits or merely to contest the jurisdiction of the 
court.435  Also, in order to establish this defence, the defendant only needs to show 
that there was no notice served on him or her.436  The Brussels I Regulation has 
modified this part of the defence which was strictly required under the Brussels 
Convention that the defendant be ‘duly served.’437  The purpose of the modification 
is that the more important question is whether the notice was served on the defendant 
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in sufficient time and in such a way to enable him or her to arrange for the defence.   
 
Therefore, an important factor under this defence is that the defendant must be served 
with the notice ‘in sufficient time.’  The time in question is the time from the date the 
service is affected to the time before a judgment in default is issued by the state 
granting the judgment.438  While a court in determining the sufficiency of time may 
do so by referring to the procedural law of the judgment-granting state,439 the ECJ 
ruled in Debaecker v Bouwman that the court asked to recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment might take into account all the facts of the case in point, including 
exceptional circumstances which occur after service was effected.440  In Debaecker v 
Bouwman, it was held that the fact that the defendant’s new address became known to 
the plaintiff after the service was effected were relevant factors in assessing whether 
service was effected in sufficient time.441  Another factor which may be relied upon 
to raise this defence is if the notice was not served on the defendant ‘in such a way’ as 
to enable him or her to arrange for the defence.  This factor is primarily concerned 
with the manner in which service was effected and whether service was properly 
effected may be determined by the judgment-enforcing court in taking into account all 
the surrounding circumstances, such as whether translations for the documents are 
required.442  To some extent, the notice requirement stipulated under the Brussels I 
Regulation is similar to the requirement under the United States’ national scheme for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  As noted in Chapter Three, a 
United States’ court will recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if the party against 
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whom recognition and enforcement is sought was served with a proper notice in 
compliance with the United States’ notion of due process standards.  This requires 
that a party must be given adequate notice of proceedings and an opportunity to 
defend the claim. 
 
Under the Brussels I Regulation, a defendant may rely on this defence if he or she was 
not served in sufficient time and in such a way to enable him or her to arrange for the 
defence.  However, the defence may be qualified if, after the judgment has been 
made, the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment with 
respect to any procedural irregularity in the country of origin when it was possible for 
him to do so.443  In other words, if a defendant failed to bring an appeal or to apply 
to have the judgment set aside on grounds of procedural irregularity while he or she 
was able to do so in the original proceedings, the defendant cannot subsequently raise 
the defence to prevent the judgment from being recognised and enforced.  Similarly, 
if a defendant has made an unsuccessful challenge on the procedural irregularities in 
the country of origin, he or she is not able to raise the defence in the recognition and 
enforcement proceedings.444  The purpose of this proviso is to encourage litigants to 
participate fully in original proceedings and not to treat the judgment-enforcing court 
as a court of appeal for matters that could have been dealt with in the court of origin.  
However, the concern with this restriction is whether the judgment-rendering court is 
the best forum to deal with procedural irregularities since there may be circumstances 
in which the defendant reasonably believes that, under the system of the 
judgment-rendering court, he or she is unfairly prejudiced in presenting his or her case 
before that court.  In this circumstance, it may be in the defendant’s best interest to 
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withhold the allegation of procedural irregularity until the recognition and 
enforcement proceedings. 
 
iii Incompatible Judgments 
Under the application of the Brussels I Regulation, a judgment given by a court in a 
Member State will be refused recognition and enforcement in another Member State if 
it is: (a) irreconcilable with another judgment given in a dispute which is between the 
same parties and given in the Member State where recognition is sought;445 or (b) 
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third 
State, involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, and which 
fulfills the conditions necessary for its recognition in the State that gave the 
judgment.446  While this defence will prevent a judgment from being recognised and 
enforced in a Member State and is inconsistent with the objective of the Brussels I 
Regulation, it has the effect of preventing parallel litigation involving the same issue 
that is conducted in courts of different Member States or countries. 
 
In order to determine whether two judgments are irreconcilable for the purpose of this 
defence, the ECJ ruled in Hoffman v Krieg that judgments are irreconcilable if they 
entail legal consequences that are mutually exclusive.447  In this case, a German 
judgment which ordered a husband to pay maintenance to his wife as part of his 
conjugal obligation, was found to be irreconcilable with a subsequent Dutch judgment 
pronouncing a divorce. 
 
Under the first instance where a judgment given by a court in a Member State is 
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incompatible with a local judgment of the Member State where recognition is sought, 
the local judgment given in the recognising Member State will take priority.  This is 
regardless of whether the local judgment was handed down earlier or later than the 
judgment for recognition, as long as it is between the same parties.448  The order of 
the judgment given, however, becomes relevant in the second instance.  In the event 
where there is an irreconcilability between a judgment given in a Member State and 
an earlier foreign judgment, whether it was granted by another Member State or a 
non-Member State, the foreign judgment granted earlier-in-time will be given priority.  
However, this is confined to cases where the judgments involve the same cause of 
action and are between the same parties, and where the judgment fulfils the grounds 
of recognition of the recognising state.449  In this regard, the Brussels I Regulation 
takes the same approach as the Australian scheme favouring the first-in-time rule, on 
the reasoning that the first-in-time rule would eliminate the chances for the plaintiff to 
begin a second proceeding. 
 
iv Jurisdictional Error 
As mentioned before, the Brussels I Regulation is presented in the form of a double 
convention that regulates the rules of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of resulting judgments.  Accordingly, a court in a Member State asked to recognise 
and enforce a judgment given by another Member State is not entitled to examine the 
jurisdictional competence of the judgment-rendering court.450 
 
There are, however, certain exceptions to this general principle.  The assumption of 
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jurisdiction by a court in a Member State may, in certain circumstances, be subject to 
review at the judgment recognition and enforcement stage.  This may occur if the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the original court is contrary to the jurisdiction 
prescribed for matters of insurance contracts, consumer contracts or exclusive 
jurisdiction to be considered further below.451  A review of judgments concerning 
these matters is justified on the basis that they depart from normal rules of jurisdiction 
and different interpretation of these provisions may result between judgment-granting 
and judgment-enforcing states.452  However, in order to ensure that the reviewing 
process would not disturb the objective of the Brussels I Regulation in facilitating the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments among the Member States, the Brussels I 
Regulation stipulates that the judgment-enforcing court is bound by the findings of 
facts concluded by the judgment-rendering court and only examines whether the rules 
of jurisdiction were correctly applied by the judgment-rendering court.453 
 
v Judgments to which Article 72 Applies 
Another ground upon which a judgment for the recognition and enforcement under 
the Brussels I Regulation may be refused is if the judgment falls under the scope of 
Article 72.454  Article 72 honours the effect of any agreement concluded pursuant to 
Article 59 of the Brussels Convention, by which a Brussels Convention Contracting 
State undertook not to recognise and enforce judgments given by other Contracting 
States against defendants in a third country if the underlying jurisdictional bases of 
judgments were pursuant to the national law of Contracting States specified in Article 
3 of the Brussels Convention.455 
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Accordingly, Article 59 provides a way out for a third country, that a Brussels 
Convention Contracting State will not enforce judgments rendered against nationals of 
that third country, if the judgments were based on certain jurisdictional grounds.  
The United Kingdom has entered into an agreement with Australia incorporating the 
obligation under Article 59.456  On the other hand, the United States’ attempted effort 
in negotiation with the United Kingdom for a bilateral agreement on the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgment incorporating the obligation under 
Article 59 of the Brussels Convention failed despite the similarities between these two 
countries.  The reason which had caused the failure of negotiation was principally 
because the British feared the American outrageous jury awards on product liability 
cases and treble damages in anti-trust suits.457 
 
4.3.3 Jurisdiction 
As mentioned before, the Brussels I Regulation has created a scheme setting forth the 
rules of jurisdiction that a court in a Member State must exercise when rendering a 
judgment and the conditions upon which the resulting judgments are to be recognised 
and enforced among the Member States.  Under this structure, a judgment rendered 
in one Member State and is based on any of the jurisdictional grounds is entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in another Member State without further review of its 
underlying basis except in certain circumstances specified in the Brussels I Regulation.  
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Thus, given the close relationship of the rules of jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, this section provides a brief account of the rules of 
regulated under Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation.   
 
A Domicile 
Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation states that persons domiciled in a Member State 
shall, whatever the nationality, be sued in the courts of that State alone. 458  
Accordingly, the nationality of an individual is not regarded as a valid jurisdictional 
basis under the Brussels I Regulation since, in comparison to nationality, domicile 
would import a more permanent physical connection with a country and a person can 
only have a domicile at a time.459  Also, it has been established that the relevant time 
in determining the domicile of a defendant is when the original proceeding is initiated, 
not at the time when it is served on the defendant.460  However, in order to determine 
whether a defendant is domiciled in a Member State, a different test applies as to a 
natural person and an organisation. 
 
i Natural Person 
If the defendant is a natural person, the court of a Member State seised of the matter 
should apply its own national law to determine whether or not the defendant is 
domiciled in that State.461  In the event the court establishes that the defendant is not 
domiciled in the State seised of the matter, in order to determine whether the 
defendant is a domiciliary of another Member State, the court should apply the laws 
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of the latter State.462   
 
Despite the fact that the term domicile is to be defined according to the law of each 
Member State, its meaning for the purpose of the Brussels I Regulation is closer to the 
continental usage than common law.  Domicile in the common law sense may be 
translated as one’s permanent home. 463   Under the civil law tradition, the 
understanding of domicile is more to do with the concept of habitual residence.  For 
instance, an individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom if he or she is resident in 
the United Kingdom, and this residence indicates that he or she has a substantial 
connection with the United Kingdom.  The residence will normally be presumed if 
he or she has been resident in the United Kingdom for the last three months.464 
 
ii Corporations and Associations 
Instead of referring to the law of each Member State, whether a company or an 
association is domiciled in a Member State is given a uniform definition under the 
Brussels I Regulation.  As stipulated, a company or an association is domiciled at the 
place where it has its statutory seat; central administration; or principal place of 
business.465  This definition is absent in the Brussels Convention, under which a 
company’s domicile is to be determined by reference to the law of the court seised.466 
  
The notion of ‘statutory seat’ is well known in civil law tradition; however, it is 
unfamiliar to the common law countries.  Thus, for the purpose of the United 
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Kingdom and Ireland, the Brussels I Regulation further stipulates that ‘statutory seat’ 
is to mean ‘the registered office or, where there is no such office anywhere, the place 
of incorporation or, where there is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of 
which the formation took place.’467  As to the term ‘central administration’ and 
‘principal place of business,’ they are both given an autonomous meaning, whereby in 
determining the domicile of a company, reference should be made by looking at 
where important personnel such as the chief executive officer and various department 
heads are located.468 
 
iii Comparison to Australia and United States 
In comparison to the civil law tradition, domicile has not received much support in 
common law jurisdictions in Australia and the United States for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Instead, as examined in Chapter 
Three, presence and in-state service have a wider acceptance for personal jurisdiction 
in Australia and the United States.  As far as natural persons are concerned, while 
domicile emphasises on the defendant’s relationship with the forum state for a period 
of time, the defendant’s temporary stay in a forum state and being served with an 
initiating proceeding is sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction under the 
presence and in-state service requirements.  On the other hand, the scope of domicile 
for corporations under the Brussels I Regulation seems to be narrower than the 
Australian and United States’ requirements.  The former is limited to the place of 
incorporation, central administration or principal place of business, whereas the latter 
may be extended to the defendant’s doing business in a forum state even if the activity 
is unrelated to the underlying claim. 
                                                 
467  Brussels I Regulation art 60(2). 
468  King v Crown Energy Trading AG [2003] IL Pr 28, [8]-[9]. 
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B Jurisdiction other than Domicile 
The Brussels I Regulation specifies a number of jurisdictional grounds that a court in 
a Member State may exercise when purporting to exercise jurisdiction against a 
defendant, irrespective of the defendant’s domicile.  These include: exclusive 
jurisdiction, submission, special jurisdiction and jurisdiction over insurance, 
consumer and employment contracts. 
 
i Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation stipulates that a court in a Member State has 
exclusive jurisdiction over a defendant, irrespective of domicile.469  This occurs if 
the principal subject-matter of the dispute falls under the scope of Article 22 and the 
court in a Member State where the principal subject-matter arises or is located will 
have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.470  It should be noted that the exclusive 
jurisdiction provided under this Article is mandatory and will take priority over other 
grounds available under the Brussels I Regulation.  However, since the exercise of 
exclusive jurisdiction will result in depriving the parties of their choice of forum and, 
in certain cases, may be exercised against defendants from non-Member States, the 
ECJ has ruled that the scope of exclusive jurisdiction must not be given a wider 
interpretation than is required by its objective.471 
 
There are five grounds that a court in a Member State will have exclusive jurisdiction 
                                                 
469  Brussels I Regulation art 22. 
470  Elisabeth Hacker v Euro-Relais GmbH (C-280/90) [1992] ECR I-1111 (While the contract 
concluded between the parties was described as a tenancy agreement, it was found that the contract 
concerned a ranged of services which fell outside the scope of exclusive jurisdiction). See also 
Sanders v Vander Putte (C-73/77) [1977] ECR 2383. 
471  Mario Reichert v Dresdner Bank (C-261/90) [1976] ECR I-2149, 2182 [25]. 
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over a matter, which are related to proceedings concerning: 472  (1) immovable 
property, (2) certain company law matters, (3) entries in public registers, (4) 
intellectual property rights, and (5) the enforcement of judgments.  The exclusive 
jurisdiction concerning immovable property under paragraph (1) is comparable with 
the rights in rem at common law, whereby the court of a state where the property is 
situated will have jurisdiction over the matter.473  With respect to the enforcement of 
judgments under paragraph (5), a court in a Member State where the judgment has 
been or is to be enforced will have exclusive jurisdiction.  Accordingly, this 
paragraph (5) applies in relation to proceedings which are concerned with the 
enforcement of judgments already delivered.474  It gives a court of a Member State 
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings relating to ‘recourse to force, constraint or 
distraint on movable or immovable property in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of judgments and authentic instruments.’475 
 
ii Submission 
The Brussels I Regulation stipulates that a court in a Member State will be conferred 
jurisdiction if parties have agreed in advance to submit to or voluntarily appeared in 
the court of that Member State.476   
 
Agreement 
There is a distinction that should be mentioned at the outset when parties are 
conferring jurisdiction by way of agreement.  On the one hand, if one or more of the 
                                                 
472  Brussels I Regulation arts 22 (1)-(5). 
473  See, eg, Davies, Bell and Brereton, above n 459, 817 (Judgments in rem may be defined as the 
judicial determination of the existence of rights over property); Robert B von Mehren and Michael 
E Patterson, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States’ 
(1974) 6 Law and Policy in International Business 37, 50. 
474  Mario Reichert v Dresdner Bank (C-261/90) [1976] ECR I-2149, 2182 [26]. 
475  Ibid 2182-83 [27]. 
476  Brussels I Regulation arts 23, 24. 
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parties to the agreement is domiciled in a Member State, the court chosen by the 
parties should have exclusive jurisdiction, unless the parties agree otherwise.477  This 
means that the court designated by parties to hear the dispute is given exclusive 
jurisdiction precluding other courts that would have had jurisdiction pursuant to other 
grounds under the Brussels I Regulation.478  On the other hand, if neither party to the 
agreement is domiciled in a Member State, although the court chosen by the parties 
has no exclusive jurisdiction, the courts of other Member States have no jurisdiction 
over the dispute unless the court chosen has declined to adjudicate the matter.479  
Accordingly, the clause gives a different effect, depending on whether the parties to 
the agreements are domiciliaries of Member States or non-Member States. 
 
Insofar as the formality of the agreement is concerned, in order to confer jurisdiction 
by way of agreement under Article 23, the agreement must be ‘in writing or evidenced 
in writing.’480  To satisfy this requirement, it is sufficient if a written contract 
containing a choice of jurisdiction clause is signed by both parties.481  However, the 
mere printing of a set of general conditions containing a choice of jurisdiction clause 
on the back of a written and signed document may not satisfy this requirement since 
the conditions may go unnoticed by the other party, unless the document signed by the 
parties includes an express reference to those general conditions. 482   Also, an 
agreement between parties may be valid in conferring jurisdiction if the jurisdiction 
clause was agreed orally and a written confirmation was received by the party without 
                                                 
477  Brussels I Regulation art 23(1). The presumption of exclusivity under the Brussels I Regulation is 
in contrast to the position in Australia and the United States where jurisdiction of a designated 
court is often non-exclusive unless it is indicated by the parties to be otherwise. 
478  Kurz v Stella Musical GmbH [1992] Ch 196. 
479  Brussels I Regulation art 23(3). 
480  Ibid art 23(1)(a). 
481  Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani v RUWA (C-24/76) [1976] ECR I-1831. 
482  Ibid 1841 [9]. 
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raising any objection.483   
 
In the absence of an express written agreement, Article 23 may still be effective in 
conferring jurisdiction provided that the act of the parties was done in a form which 
either conforms to: (i) the practices established between the parties; or (ii) trade 
usages widely known in international trade or commerce and ‘regularly observed by, 
parties to the contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce 
concerned.’484  As far as the second ground is concerned, this was drawn up and 
included in the Brussels Convention for the purposes of convenience and 
effectiveness in international trade.485  However, the ECJ ruled that the interpretation 
of this sub-clause must necessarily and rigorously be strict so that the actual or 
presumptive awareness of such practice on the part of the parties to a contract is not 
lost.486 
 
Appearance 
A court in a Member State may also be conferred jurisdiction if the party against 
whom litigation is sought entered an appearance before that court.487  However, as 
with the positions in Australia and the United States, the appearance of the party 
would not amount to a submission if it was merely to contest the jurisdiction of that 
court.488  What if, at the time of contesting the court’s jurisdiction, the party argues 
in the alternative on the merits?  This issue was examined in Elefanten Schuh v 
                                                 
483  Berghoefer GmbH and Co Kg v ASA SA (C-221/84) [1985] ECR 2699. 
484  Brussels I Regulation arts 23(1)(b)-(c).  
485  Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL (C-106/95) [1999] 
ECR I-911, [23]. 
486  Ibid [25], [22]-[24] (the ECR also laid down three guidelines for the interpretation of this clause). 
487  Brussels I Regulation art 24. 
488  Ibid. 
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Jacqmain489 where Jacqmain, a resident of Belgium, was employed as a sales agent 
by Elefanten Schuh which has its registered office in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  After being dismissed by Elefanten Schuh without notice, Jacqmain 
brought a claim against Elefanten Schuh before the court in Belgium.  Elefanten 
Schuh stated its case as to the substance of the claim before the court in Belgium and 
later filed a document challenging the jurisdiction of that court.490  The ECJ gave its 
ruling that in order to determine whether the defendant enters an appearance for the 
purpose of merely contesting the jurisdiction of the court, it must be from the relevant 
time of the defendant’s first defence addressed to the court.491  That is, if the 
defendant’s challenge to jurisdiction is not preliminary to any defence as to the 
substance, the defendant may be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of that 
court.492 
 
iii Special Jurisdiction 
Unlike exclusive jurisdiction and jurisdiction by submission, this category of 
jurisdiction only extends to persons domiciled in Member States.  Article 3(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation provides that persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued 
in the courts of another Member State by virtue of the special jurisdiction.493  
Accordingly, this Article provides an alternative basis to the plaintiff of suing the 
defendant in the Member State of his or her domicile pursuant to Article 2 or by 
relying on one of the special jurisdictions.  The justification of this category of 
jurisdiction is the close connection between the cause of action and the court upon 
which jurisdiction is conferred.  In other words, the administration of justice may be 
                                                 
489  (C-150/80) [1981] ECR 1671. 
490  Ibid [1]. 
491  Ibid [15]. 
492  Ibid [16]. 
493  Brussels I Regulation art 3(1).  
 156 
served better in certain cases where the court closely related to the dispute is more 
appropriate to adjudicate the matter.494  The special jurisdiction which takes on the 
claim and forum state nexus has no support in the United States since, as examined in 
Chapter Three, any form of contact lacking the connection between the defendant and 
the forum state will violate the United States’ notion of due process standards.  There 
is a long list of matters falling under the special jurisdiction category.495  For the 
purposes of discussion, this section looks at matters relating to contract, tort, and 
ancillary jurisdiction. 
 
Contract 
In matters relating to commercial contracts, the defendant may, other than in his or 
her domicile, also be sued in the courts in the place of performance of the obligation 
in question.496  The phrase ‘place of performance,’ identified by reference to national 
law under the Brussels Convention, is given an autonomous definition under the 
Brussels I Regulation.  The Brussels I Regulation provides that, in the case of the 
sale of goods, the place of performance of the obligation in question is the place in a 
Member State where the goods were delivered or should have been delivered.497  
Where proceedings relate to a contract for the provision of services, the place of 
performance is the place in a Member State where the services were or should have 
been provided.498  Where a contract does not fall under the sale of goods or the 
provision of services, the place of performance is to be determined by the locus of the 
                                                 
494  Ibid Recitals (11)-(12). 
495  Ibid contract (art 5(1)); maintenance (art 5(2)); tort (art 5(3)); civil claims in criminal proceedings 
(art 5(4)); branch, agency or other establishment (art 5(5)); trusts (art 5(6)); salvage (art 5(7)); 
multiple-party cases and counterclaims (art 6). 
496  Ibid art 5(1)(a).  
497  Ibid art 5(1)(b). 
498  Ibid. 
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primary obligation upon which the plaintiff brings the claim.499 
 
Tort 
In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, a person who is domiciled in a 
Member State may be sued in another Member State in the courts of the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur.500  As to the meaning of ‘the place where 
the harmful event occurred,’ the ECJ gave its ruling in Bier BV v Mines de Potasse 
D’Alsace SA and held that this phrase is intended to cover both the place where the 
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it.  However, if the place of 
the harmful act and the place of the resulting damage are not identical, the plaintiff 
has the option of suing in either place.501 
 
In a comparative study of the rules of personal jurisdiction between the United States 
and the Brussels Convention, Professor Borchers argues that the basis for tort under 
the Brussels Convention provides a preferable approach than the minimum contacts 
requirement in the United States.502  In drawing this conclusion, Professor Borchers 
considered the case World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson503 examined in Chapter 
Three.  In this case, the Oklahoma state court was unable to exercise jurisdiction 
over World-Wide Volkswagen in connection with a car accident that occurred in 
Oklahoma state involving one of World-wide Volkswagen’s cars, since there was a 
lack of a purposeful connection of World-Wide Volkswagen to the forum state.  The 
facts of the case indicate that World-Wide Volkswagen was a corporation based in 
                                                 
499  Ibid art 5(1)(c). 
500  Ibid art 5(3). 
501  [1978] QB 708, 731. 
502  Patrick J Borchers, ‘Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European 
Community: Lessons for American Reform’ (1992) 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 121, 
143-6. 
503  444 US 286 (1980). 
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New York and did no selling business in Oklahoma.  The car was bought and sold in 
New York and involved in a rear-end collision while being driven through the 
Oklahoma state.  Despite the fact that the accident occurred in Oklahoma state, the 
plaintiffs were unable to bring actions against the defendant in that state.  This case 
would have been decided differently had the matter arisen within the framework of 
the Brussels I Regulation, under which the fact that the car accident occurred in 
Oklahoma state would have given rise to jurisdiction over World-Wide Volkswagen 
since the tortious action and the place of injury occurred in that state. 
 
Ancillary Jurisdiction 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation provides the ancillary basis of jurisdiction 
upon which:  
a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued where he is one of a member 
of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided 
the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together.504   
The ancillary basis therefore takes into account the practical consideration that parties 
relating to the same matter may be dealt with in one proceeding so as to ‘avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from the separate proceedings.’505   
 
The ancillary basis provided under the Brussels I Regulation has no counterpart in 
Australia and the United States.  For instance in Asahi Metal Indus Co v Superior 
Court mentioned in chapter three, while the Taiwanese company filed an action 
joining Asahi as a third-party defendant, the California court could not exercise 
                                                 
504  Brussels I Regulation art 6(1). 
505  Ibid. 
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jurisdiction against Asahi on the basis that there was no sufficient connection between 
the forum state and Asahi.506  Instead, it was ruled in this case that the contacts of a 
third-party defendant had to be evaluated separately from the defendant in the 
underlying action.  Accordingly, for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, if 
a judgment was rendered against a defendant on the ancillary basis in a state, the 
judgment may be denied recognition and enforcement in Australia and the United 
States if the defendant was not present in the foreign state and served with original 
proceedings or there was no substantial connection between the defendant and the 
foreign state. 
 
iv Insurance, Consumer and Employment Contracts 
This category of jurisdiction provides special protection to parties involved in 
insurance, consumer and employment contracts.507  Particularly, special protection is 
given to the policyholder, consumer or employee (‘weaker party’) who is generally 
regarded as in a weaker bargaining position in those contracts than the insurer, 
supplier or employer.  Under these special jurisdictional principles, a weaker party 
has the option of places in which to sue the insurer, supplier or employer (‘defendant’), 
including: at the policyholder’s or consumer’s own domicile or the place where the 
employee habitually works; at the defendant’s domicile or if the defendant is not 
domiciled in a Member State but has a branch, agency or establishment, the place 
where the branch, agency or establishment is located.508  However, in the event an 
action is to be brought by the defendant against the weaker party, the defendant can 
only sue the weaker party in the Member State where he or she is domiciled.509 
                                                 
506  480 US 120 (1987). 
507  Brussels I Regulation arts 8-14 (insurance), 15-17 (consumer) and 18-21 (employment). 
508  Ibid arts 9, 15-16, 18-19. 
509  Ibid arts 12(1), 16(2), 20(1). 
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Unlike the Brussels I Regulation, there is no special jurisdictional privilege provided 
to parties in insurance, consumer and employment contracts in Australia and the 
United States for the purposes of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
Accordingly, if a consumer brings a claim against say, an Australian corporation in a 
foreign state, and has successfully obtained a judgment against that corporation, the 
judgment may be denied recognition and enforcement in Australia if the defendant 
was not present in that state nor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of that state. 
 
C Jurisdiction against Non-Member States 
Under the application of the Brussels I Regulation, a judgment given by a court in a 
Member State is entitled to be recognised and enforced in a court in another Member 
State, irrespective of whether the judgment is rendered against a domiciliary of a 
Member State or a non-Member State.  As a result, the Brussels I Regulation has 
created discriminatory treatment with respect to the use of jurisdiction against 
domiciliaries of non-Member States.  That is, if a defendant is domiciled in a 
non-Member State (ie Australia or United States) and is brought before a court in a 
Member State, other than exclusive jurisdiction which will take priority over all other 
grounds, the court attempting to exercise jurisdiction against the defendant must refer 
to the national law of the Member State where the defendant is being sued.510  This 
use of national rules of jurisdiction is, however, prohibited when domiciliaries of 
Member States are concerned.  In particular, the Brussels I Regulation specifies that 
the rules of jurisdiction set forth in Annex I should not be applicable as against 
defendants domiciled in Member States.511  Accordingly, if a defendant domiciled, 
                                                 
510  Ibid art 4. 
511  Ibid art 3(2); Annex I (examples of such include local nationality under Article 14 of the French 
Civil Code, the presence of assets under Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, and the 
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say in Australia, is sued in a Member State, the defendant may be subject to the 
national rules of jurisdiction, such as the asset or nationality based jurisdiction, which 
are considered unreasonable from the Australian point of view. 
 
Consequently, a judgment rendered against a defendant of a non-Member State is 
entitled to be recognised and enforced in a court in another Member State despite it 
being rendered pursuant to the national rules of jurisdiction.  Moreover, the 
judgment debtor against whom enforcement is sought has no right to question the 
underlying basis unless in certain circumstances specified under the Brussels I 
Regulation.  As such, the Brussels I Regulation has often been the subject of 
criticism especially from non-Member States, since the non-availability of 
jurisdictional safeguard to domiciliaries of non-Member States fails to provide a sense 
of fairness to litigants and may create a disharmony among the community of 
nations.512 
 
D Lis Alibi Pendens 
Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation incorporates the doctrine known as lis alibi 
pendens to prevent situations such as forum shopping and concurrent proceedings 
brought in different Member States.  Article 27 provides that where proceedings 
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the 
courts of different Member States, the court of the Member State first seised of the 
                                                                                                                                            
temporary presence in the United Kingdom). 
512  See, eg, Fawcett, Carruthers and North, above n 385, 597-8; Hill, above n 385, 414-6; Timothy 
McEvoy, ‘The Implications for Australia of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 
576, 581 (the Brussels regime works to impede legal collaboration and the development of mutual 
respect between European legal systems and those which operate in the rest of the world). 
However, commentators have indicated that so far there is no such case in the 20 years since the 
Brussels Convention entered into effect, and it is unlikely that any of such case will arise in the 
future. See, eg, Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Thoughts about a Multinational Judgments Convention: A 
Reaction to the von Mehren Report’ (1994) 57(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 289, 303. 
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matter will take priority and any court other than the court first seised should decline 
jurisdiction once the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 513  
Accordingly, the article aims to provide certainty in litigation proceedings, where it 
allows no discretion but the court first seised must take jurisdiction over the matter. 
 
Lis alibi pendens is often contrasted to forum non conveniens which is a jurisdictional 
principle commonly known in the common law tradition.  Unlike the doctrine of lis 
alibi pendens which authorises courts first seised to exercise jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens works on the basis that a court conferred jurisdiction has discretion to 
decline jurisdiction if it determines that there is a more appropriate forum elsewhere 
to adjudicate the matter.514  The doctrine of forum non conveniens is therefore based 
on the principle of discretion and flexibility which is disapproved by the civil law 
tradition since it is likely to prolong litigation and cause uncertainty.  As such, in 
order to ensure that the operation of the rules of jurisdiction set forth in the Brussels I 
Regulation is not disturbed, the ECJ has put a stop to the use of forum non conveniens 
by courts in the United Kingdom in cases in which the Brussels I Regulation is 
applicable.515  In Owusu v Jackson, the ECJ ruled that if a court in a Member State 
that has been given jurisdiction under Article 2 (defendant’s domicile), the court 
cannot decline jurisdiction on the ground that a court of a non-Member State would be 
a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action.  This is so even if the jurisdiction 
of no other Member State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to 
any other Member State.516  Therefore, under this ruling, a court in a Member State 
is precluded to decline jurisdiction even if, in light of circumstances, another court is 
                                                 
513  Brussels I Regulation art 27. 
514 Australia is unique in its approach to forum conveniens in which it relies on the clearly 
inappropriate forum test, discussed in chapter 5. 
515  Owusu v Jackson (C-281/02) [2005] QB 801. 
516  Ibid [35], [37], [46]. 
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the more appropriate forum for the trial of the action.  While the restraint on the use 
of forum non conveniens will not disturb the operation of the Brussels I Regulation, it 
is also important not to overlook the administration of justice in having a matter being 
heard by the most appropriate forum. 
 
Following the restraint on the use of forum non conveniens, the ECJ also gave its 
ruling in Turner v Grovit, which banned the use of anti-suit injunctions by any court 
while the Brussels I Regulation is applicable.517  The anti-suit injunction is known in 
the common law tradition whereby a party may be prohibited from commencing or 
continuing proceedings before another judicial authority (even one abroad) if, for 
instance, the party to whom the anti-suit injunction order is directed has engaged in 
wrongful conduct and that the claimant has a legitimate interest in seeking to prevent 
it.518  In Turner v Grovit, however, it was held that a prohibition imposed by a court 
restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court 
interferes with the latter court’s jurisdiction to determine the dispute. 519   This 
interference is incompatible with the system of the Brussels Convention which is 
imbued with the concept of mutual trust in which the rules of jurisdiction in the 
Convention are common to all the courts of the Member States and should be 
interpreted and applied within the same authority by each of them.520  Accordingly, 
even if a proceeding which was commenced for the purpose of frustrating the existing 
proceedings such as the one in Turner v Grovit, by the application of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation, it would preclude the judicial authorities of a 
Member State from issuing orders to litigants restraining them from commencing or 
                                                 
517  Turner v Grovit (C-159/02) [2005] 1 AC 101. 
518  Ibid [11]-[12]. 
519  Ibid [27]. 
520  Ibid [31]-[33]. 
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continuing proceedings before judicial authorities of other Member States.521   
 
The restraint on the use of anti-suit injunctions, however, is likely to raise serious 
concerns as far as the administration of justice is concerned.  This is especially so if 
a proceeding was commenced purely for an ulterior motive such as to frustrate the 
existing proceedings.  Accordingly, it is argued that while it is important to maintain 
the operation of the Brussels I Regulation, there should be some room for flexibility 
where a court should be able to issue an anti-suit injunction in order to prevent any 
unjustified interference with the existing proceeding.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the provisions in the Brussels I Regulation that governs the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments within European Union Member States.  
It draws the conclusion that the Brussels I Regulation has created a scheme effective 
for the recognition and enforcement of judgments among the Member States.  This 
conclusion is drawn on two bases.  First, the requirement which must be satisfied by 
a party seeking to recognise and enforce a judgment under the Brussels I Regulation is 
minimal.  Accordingly, any judgment meeting the minimal requirements defined 
under the Brussels I Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in a Member 
State.  Second, the Brussels I Regulation simplifies the recognition and enforcement 
proceedings by unifying the rules of jurisdiction as sets forth in Chapter II.  This has 
the effect that by achieving a consensus among the Member States in relation to the 
basis of jurisdiction, a judgment that is rendered by a Member State and based upon 
any of the jurisdictional basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another 
Member State without further review of its underlying basis except in certain 
                                                 
521  Ibid [38]. 
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circumstances. 
 
Despite the simplification of the recognition and enforcement proceedings, it is 
argued that the Brussels I Regulation has a number of drawbacks especially 
considering from the perspective of adequacy of protection for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement.  For instance, the fact that the Brussels I Regulation 
has prescribed different rules of jurisdiction that a court in a Member State must 
exercise when rendering a judgment has rendered it discriminatory towards 
domiciliaries of non-Member States.  As noted, if a defendant is domiciled in a 
non-Member State and is sued in a court in a Member State, the Brussels I Regulation 
specifies that the basis of jurisdiction that a court purports to exercise against the 
defendant is to be determined by reference to the national law of the Member State 
where the defendant is being sued, while such a basis cannot be used when the 
defendant is a domiciliary of another Member State.  Consequently, the defendant 
may be subject to the jurisdiction of the court despite it being unreasonable, and 
worse, the underlying basis upon which the judgment is based cannot be subject to 
review for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  Another drawback under 
the Brussels I Regulation is that in order to maintain the operation of the Brussels I 
Regulation, there is a prohibition against the use of certain doctrines such as forum 
non conveniens and anti-suit injunction which are commonly applied by common law 
countries to ensure the administration of justice.  Thus, under the application of the 
Brussels I Regulation, a court conferred jurisdiction cannot decline jurisdiction even if, 
in light of the circumstances, it believes that it is not the best forum for the trial of the 
action.  Similarly, the prohibition against the use of anti-suit injunction would mean 
that a court of a Member State cannot issue orders restraining a party from 
commencing or continuing proceedings before a court of another Member State even 
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if the proceeding was for a bad intention for the purpose of frustrating the existing 
proceeding. 
 
The recognition and enforcement of judgments under the Brussels I Regulation is 
confined to a number of defences.  If any of the defences are proven, a court in a 
Member State is not obliged to recognise and enforce a judgment given by another 
Member State.  The purpose of the defences is to safeguard the recognition and 
enforcement proceedings since the Brussels I Regulation applies to a group of 
sovereign entities whose substantive and procedural laws are different from each other.  
However, the concern with the defences is whether adequate protection is provided to 
litigants as well as to judgment-enforcing Member States since they are construed 
narrowly in a way that the application of the defences should not disturb the objective 
of the Brussels I Regulation in facilitating the recognition and enforcement of 
Member State judgments.  For instance, under the public policy defence, a judgment 
rendered by a Member State may be denied recognition and enforcement if it is likely 
to violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing Member State.  However, the 
public policy defence under the framework of the Brussels I Regulation is construed 
narrowly in a way that it may be confined to violation of fundamental human rights 
and restricted to other grounds.  Consequently, there may be a shift from a national 
to European approach and may leave less room for national courts to define public 
policy exclusive to the nation.  Similarly, despite the purpose of defences for fraud 
and lack of notice to defendants being to ensure that there was no procedural 
irregularity in the court of origin; the Brussels I Regulation has however imposed a 
high standard before a party against whom recognition or enforcement is sought can 
successfully prove either of the defences to resist the recognition and enforcement of 
a Member State judgment. 
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Chapter Five  
The Hague Convention Negotiation for a Multilateral 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the efforts to date in creating a multilateral convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and identifies the causes of the 
failures of these efforts.  The purpose of considering the international perspective is 
that it is regarded as the most effective approach for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments.  A multilateral convention will unify the standards and 
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments over a large 
number of countries.  As such, it will have the effect of simplifying the recognition 
and enforcement proceedings and facilitating the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments among contracting states. 
 
There have been a number of attempts made for a worldwide convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Following a general background 
of the attempts in Part Two of this chapter, Part Three and Part Four explore the 
attempts made in 1962 and 1992 respectively.  As a result of the 1992 attempt, the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was concluded in 2005 and is open for 
signature.  The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is concerned with the 
choice of court agreements between parties in business to business contracts and any 
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judgment rendered on that basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another 
Contracting State.  Accordingly, Part Five of this chapter examines the provisions 
under the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and its likely effects in 
Australia, the United States and the European Community if implemented.522  This 
chapter draws the conclusion that the failure to conclude a worldwide convention on 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is not the issue of recognition 
and enforcement, but rather the question of underlying jurisdiction upon which 
foreign judgments may be based. 
 
5.2 Background 
As noted in previous chapters, the United States recognises the notion of comity and 
gives effect to foreign judgments on the basis of deference for sovereign states.  
Accordingly, the United States awards a liberal reception for judgments rendered 
abroad.  The liberal reception, however, is reversed when it comes to foreign 
recognition of judgments rendered by the United States’ courts.523  The reluctance 
shown from abroad is due to a number of concerns.  For instance, the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States is currently regulated 
under each state law.  The lack of a uniform approach in the United States may give 
foreign nations the impression that their judgments would not likely be recognised 
and enforced in the United States.  Also, despite the United States dropping the 
requirement of reciprocity for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 
                                                 
522  Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature 30 June 2005, 
44 ILM 1294 (not yet in force) (‘Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’). 
523  See, eg, Linda Silberman, ‘Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the 
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?’ (2002-3) 52 DePaul Law Review 319, 321; 
Russell J Weintraub, ‘How Substantial is our Need for Judgments-Recognition Convention and 
What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?’ (1998) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 167, 
178-84; Eric B Fastiff, ‘The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Civil and Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynold’s Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Problems’ (1995) 28(2) Cornell International Law Journal 469, 476. 
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whereby a United States court will recognise and enforce a foreign judgment provided 
that the foreign court will likewise do the same in return, many foreign nations still 
require the reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments.  Another concern is in 
relation to the United States’ law of personal jurisdiction.  In particular, the doing 
business jurisdiction, which provides that a defendant’s continuous and systematic 
activity in a foreign state unrelated to the underlying claim is sufficient to render the 
defendant subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state.  The doing business basis 
which does not require any connection between the defendant’s activity and the 
underlying claim is perceived by many nations as too broad and unreasonable.  
Similarly, there is a general concern in foreign countries with respect to the high level 
of damage awards in jury trials in the United States.524   
 
Accordingly, negotiation for a worldwide convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments was of a special interest to the United States as it 
would increase the likelihood that judgments rendered by the United States’ courts 
would be more accessible abroad.  Moreover, it would provide a solution to the 
United States to avoid the discriminatory treatment under the Brussels I Regulation, 
where a defendant domiciled in the United States and is sued in a court in a Member 
State, will be subject to the rules of jurisdiction to be determined by reference to the 
law of the Member State where the defendant is being sued.  The rules of national 
jurisdiction, however, are prohibited when the defendant is domiciled in a European 
Community Member State.  Accordingly, the United States had proposed on two 
occasions in 1962 and 1992, under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private 
                                                 
524  See, eg, Patrick J Borchers, ‘A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments Negotiations’ (1998) 24 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 157, 160; Matthew H Adler and Michele Crimaldi Zarychta, 
‘The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The United States Joins the Judgment 
Enforcement Band’ (2006) 27(1) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1, 4.  
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International Law, to negotiate a worldwide convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.525 
 
5.3 The 1962 Attempt 
In 1962, the United States initiated a negotiation for a worldwide convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Under the auspices of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, the work on the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
was concluded in 1969 and opened for signature in 1971.526  Since completion, 
however, only four countries have ratified the 1971 Convention.527 
 
There were a number of reasons put forward with respect to the lack of success of the 
1971 Convention.  In a report drawn up by the Permanent Bureau of the Conference, 
it was believed that other than for the reasons of the success of the Brussels 
Convention and the complex structure of the 1971 Convention discussed below, a 
substantial reason contributing to the failure of the 1971 Convention was that it was in 
the form of a convention simple, meaning it contained only rules for the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments and did not provide any rules of jurisdiction that a 
court in a contracting state may exercise when giving a judgment.528  As a result, a 
                                                 
525  The Hague Conference on Private International Law was founded in 1893 by the Government of 
the Netherlands to serve as a negotiating forum for civil and commercial matters. Currently there 
are 69 members in The Hague, including Australia, United States and the European Union. See 
generally Peter H Pfund, ‘The Hague Conference Celebrates its 100th Anniversary’ (1993) 28 Texas 
International Law Journal 531; Georges A L Droz, ‘A Comment on the Role of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law’ (1994) 57 Law and Contemporary Problems 3. 
526  Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature 1 Feb 1971, 1144 UNTS 249 (entered into 
force 20 August 1979) (hereinafter the ‘1971 Convention’). 
527  Current contracting states are Albania, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
528  See Catherine Kessedjian, Hague Conference, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matter: Preliminary Document No 7 of April 1997 (October 1997) [7]-[8] 
(‘Kessedjian Report’). For a general discussion of a simple, double and mixed convention, see 
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judgment given by one contracting state for recognition and enforcement in another 
contracting state will be subject to review of its underlying jurisdictional basis 
because of the differences in the rules of jurisdiction among contracting states.529  As 
such, a judgment may be denied recognition and enforcement if the underlying 
jurisdictional basis is unacceptable to the judgment-enforcing state.530  Thus, given 
that the 1971 Conventiononly addressed the enforcement of foreign judgments and 
not the underlying jurisdictional basis which is an important element for the purposes 
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it did not attract many nations. 
 
Another reason believed to have attributed to the failure of the 1971 Convention was 
the adoption of the Brussels Convention in 1968.531  As examined in Chapter Four, 
the Brussels Convention was created for the purpose of facilitating the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments among European Community Member States.  As such, 
the Brussels Convention was structured as a double convention.  This means that it 
contained not only rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, but that it 
also unified the rules of jurisdiction a court in a Member State may exercise when 
giving a judgment.  The effect of the unification of the rules of jurisdiction is that for 
the purposes of recognition and enforcement, a judgment that is rendered by a court in 
one Member State and based on any of the jurisdictions set forth in the Brussels 
Convention is entitled to recognition and enforcement in another Member State 
without further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  Therefore, given that 
the Brussels Convention was concluded around the same time as the 1971 Convention, 
it was believed that the mechanism provided under the Brussels Convention had 
                                                                                                                                            
generally Arthur T von Mehren, ‘Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of 
Recognition Conventions’ (1998) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 17. 
529  Kessedjian Report, above n 528, [8]. 
530  Ibid. 
531  Ibid [7]. 
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already captured the attention of the European Community since many of the 
countries that participated in the negotiations of the 1971 Convention were also 
members of the Brussels Convention.532 
 
Moreover, the unusual and complex structure of the 1971 Convention was believed to 
have undermined its attraction.  It was stipulated that, in order to implement the 1971 
Convention, there must be separate supplementary bilateral agreements entered into 
between the ratifying parties.  That is, in addition to the usual procedure for the 
implementation of a convention, each ratifying party must also negotiate a bilateral 
agreement with another ratifying party.533  Even though the bilateralisation meant 
that each ratifying party had the freedom to choose its treaty partners, it was 
excessively formal and believed to have reduced the willingness of countries to ratify 
the 1971 Convention.534 
 
In summary, the 1971 Convention was created for the purpose of regulating rules and 
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  However, the 
major concern with the 1971 Convention lies with the fact that it did not set out the 
rules of jurisdiction.  The consequence of which is that when a contracting state is 
asked to recognise and enforce another contracting state’s judgment, it may refuse to 
do so if the jurisdiction upon which the judgment is based is unrecognisable to the 
judgment-enforcing state.  Thus, given the differences of rules of jurisdiction among 
                                                 
532  Friedrich J Juenger, ‘A Hague Judgments Convention?’ (1998) 24 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 111, 112. 
533  Kurt H Nadelmann and Arthur T von Mehren, ‘The Extraordinary Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law’ (1966) 60 American Journal of International Law 803, 
804. Kurt H Nadelmann, ‘The Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague Conference 
Recommendation: What Steps Next?’ (1969) 82 Harvard Law Review 1282, 1283. 
534  Kessedjian Report, above n 528, [7]. 
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nation states, the 1971 Convention did not serve as an effective means for the 
purposes of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
5.4 The 1992 Attempt 
Despite the failure of the 1962 attempt, the United States once again proposed to the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1992 to negotiate a multilateral 
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.535  However, 
unlike the 1962 attempt, the 1992 negotiation was proposed along the line of a double 
convention model which addresses not only the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments but also the issue of jurisdiction.536  Following the United States’ 
proposal, a Special Commission was convened to study the proposal, and work on a 
convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments proceeded.  As 
a result, a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters was completed and adopted by the Special 
Commission on 30 October 1999.537   
 
The 1999 Preliminary Draft had the support of most delegates including the European 
Community and Australia, however, it was deemed unsatisfactory by the United 
States.  In a letter sent from the State Department to the Secretary General of The 
Hague Conference, the United States expressed its dissatisfaction with the 1999 
Preliminary Draft and stated that it ‘stands no chance of being accepted in the United 
                                                 
535  Letter, Edwin Williamson, Legal Adviser of the State Department, to Georges Droz, Secretary 
General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, regarding convention on 
judgments, 5 May 1992 < http://www.state.gov/s/l/c17852.htm> (‘Williamson Letter’). 
536  Ibid; Peter H Pfund, ‘The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare 
a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ (1998) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 7, 8. 
537  Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (30 October 1999) (‘1999 Preliminary Draft’). 
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States’ because of ‘fatal defects in approach, structure, and details of the text.’538  In 
June 2001 when a Diplomatic Conference was held in an attempt to improve the 1999 
Preliminary Draft, especially making way for the differences between the United 
States and the rest of the delegates, the delegates failed to reach a consensus on many 
of the items of the 1999 Preliminary Draft.539  As a result, the outcome of the 
Diplomatic Conference was an interim text with numerous alternatives and variations 
in many provisions.540   
 
A number of difficulties arose during the negotiations for a worldwide convention on 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that prevented a successful 
conclusion from being reached.  As will be examined in this section, while the main 
purpose of negotiations was to deal with the issue of the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments, the obstacles which stalled further negotiations were not 
provisions dealing with recognition and enforcement.  Rather, it was the lack of 
consensus among the participating countries, particularly between the United States 
on the one hand and the Europeans on the other, on a number of issues, including: the 
structure of the convention; jurisdiction; lis alibi pendens/forum non conveniens 
doctrines; and excessive damages, with the issue of jurisdiction as the ultimate 
deal-breaker. 
 
                                                 
538  Letter, Jeffrey D Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, State Department to 
Hans A van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 22 
February 2000, 3 <http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/intpil/doc00003.doc> (‘Kovar Letter’). 
539  Andrea Schulz, ‘The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Clauses’ (2005-6) 12 ILSA 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 433, 434. 
540  Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters, Summary of the Outcome of the Discussions in 
Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001: Interim Text 
<http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf>. 
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5.4.1 Structure: Double or Mixed Convention? 
One of the obstacles the 1992 attempt faced was the type of convention that should be 
adopted.  While it was contemplated in the beginning of negotiations that the 1999 
Preliminary Draft took the form of a double convention, the United States pushed for 
a mixed type of convention as a way to bridge the differences on jurisdictional 
approach.541 
 
As mentioned previously, a double convention sets forth the rules of jurisdiction that a 
court in a contracting state must exercise when rendering a judgment and regulates the 
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.  Under this 
type of convention, a judgment which is rendered and based on any of the 
jurisdictional grounds provided for in the convention will be entitled to recognition 
and enforcement in another contracting state without further review of its underlying 
jurisdictional basis.  Conversely, if a judgment was rendered by one contracting state 
upon jurisdiction that falls outside the bases set forth in the convention, the judgment 
will be denied recognition and enforcement in another contracting state.   
 
Despite the double convention which regulates the rules of jurisdiction on permitted 
and prohibited grounds, the United States was of the view that such an approach was 
not appropriate for a worldwide convention.  According to the United States, a 
double convention may work well for a group of states that have similar legal 
traditions and share similar cultural, political and economical background such as 
those within the European Community.  For negotiation of a worldwide convention 
involving a wide range of nations with a diversity of legal traditions, however, the 
United States argued that a structure following a double convention, whereby the 
                                                 
541  Williamson Letter, above n 535; Kessedjian report, above n 528, [18]-[19]. 
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rules of jurisdiction are either permitted or prohibited, would be too restrictive and 
inflexible to accommodate a large number of participating countries.  Accordingly, 
the United States proposed a mixed type of convention as a model for the worldwide 
convention.542   
 
A mixed convention is a type that, while regulating the rules of jurisdiction on 
permitted and prohibited grounds, also has an additional grey zone jurisdictional basis.  
This grey zone is like a catch-all list which contains jurisdiction that is neither 
permitted nor prohibited under the convention.  If a judgment is rendered under a 
basis which falls under the grey zone list, a contracting state is not required to 
recognise and enforce the judgment under the convention, but would remain free to 
recognise and enforce the judgment under its local law. 543   In light of its 
jurisdictional practices, the United States proposed the mixed convention as a way to 
retain jurisdictional grounds, which may be perceived expansive by other nations and 
denied abroad.544  Despite the proposal, however, it was not until a few months 
before the 1999 Preliminary Draft was completed that the Special Commission 
decided to adopt a mixed convention approach.545  As a result, the United States 
argued that although the 1999 Preliminary Draft was technically a mixed type, it was 
essentially drafted more as a double convention since a number of jurisdictional 
grounds commonly used by the United States were being placed under the prohibited 
category in the 1999 Preliminary Draft.546  Accordingly, if a United States court 
rendered a judgment that is based on a jurisdictional ground being placed under the 
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prohibited list, the judgment would not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in 
other contracting states. 
 
5.4.2 Jurisdiction 
As a result of disagreements over the structure of convention, a major obstacle 
remained was in relation to the rules of jurisdiction.  While the 1999 Preliminary 
Draft appeared as a mixed convention, which consisted of permitted, prohibited and 
grey list of jurisdiction, there were disagreements among the participating countries 
with respect to the grounds included in the prohibited list and the extent of the 
jurisdiction under the grey zone.  Also, there was concern by the United States 
delegates that some of the bases under the permitted list would go beyond the United 
States’ constitutional limitation of due process requirements. 
 
A Permitted Ground 
Under the permitted ground of jurisdiction, a judgment that is rendered by a court in 
one contracting state and based on the permitted grounds is entitled to be recognised 
and enforced in another contracting state.  While jurisdiction such as habitual 
residence of defendants, 547  choice of forum, 548  and voluntary appearance of 
defendants without contesting jurisdiction549 would be classified under the permitted 
grounds without much debate by participating countries, jurisdiction for contracts, 
branches and torts was of a considerable concern to the United States delegates.550   
 
                                                 
547  1999 Preliminary Draft art 3. 
548  Ibid art 4. 
549  Ibid art 5. 
550  Kovar Letter, above n 538, 6. 
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Under the 1999 Preliminary Draft, jurisdiction for contracts, branches and torts were 
rested on the claim and forum nexus.  That is, there must be a substantial connection 
between the forum state and the underlying claim before a court in the forum state can 
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.  Accordingly, Article 6 of the 1999 
Preliminary Draft stipulated that in contract cases, the forum state in which the place 
of performance took place would have jurisdiction.  Thus, in the case of the sale of 
goods, the place where the goods were supplied has jurisdiction and, in the case of 
service, the place where the service was provided has jurisdiction.551  Also, Article 9 
of the 1999 Preliminary Draft stipulated that courts, in a contracting state in which a 
branch, agency or another establishment of the defendant is situated, has jurisdiction, 
provided that the dispute relates directly to the activity of that branch, agency or 
establishment.552  Similarly, a plaintiff may bring an action in tort in courts in a 
contracting state if the act that caused injury occurred or the injury arose there.553 
 
Accordingly, the 1999 Preliminary Draft adopted the language of the Brussels I 
Regulation, which conferred special jurisdiction on courts based on the claim and 
forum nexus.  That is, a court in one contracting state may exercise jurisdiction 
against a defendant in another contracting state over a number of matters if there is a 
close connection between the cause of action and the forum state.  The claim and 
forum nexus basis, however, is not a recognised ground in the United States unless the 
parties can also establish a substantial connection between the defendant and the 
forum state.  Thus, a deadlock arose in negotiations whereby the United States’ 
constitutional limitation prevented any jurisdictional ground absent the defendant and 
forum nexus.  It appears that, in order to successfully conclude a worldwide 
                                                 
551  1999 Preliminary Draft art 6. 
552  Ibid art 9. 
553  Ibid art 10(1). 
 179 
convention, the constitutional limit of due process standard imposed on the United 
States’ practice of personal jurisdiction should be lifted so that the United States may 
be more flexible to consider or even accept jurisdictional grounds going beyond its 
constitutional limitation. 
 
B Prohibited Ground 
Under the prohibited list of jurisdiction, jurisdiction which is being placed under the 
prohibited list cannot be exercised by contracting states and judgments rendered on 
any of these grounds would not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in other 
contracting states.  This was a concern to the United States because the Europeans 
and many other participating countries were uncomfortable with the United States’ 
general jurisdiction and targeted to place it on the prohibited list. 
 
The prohibited jurisdiction is found in Article 18 of the 1999 Preliminary Draft, which 
stated that any rule of jurisdiction provided for under the national law of a contracting 
state is prohibited ‘if there is no substantial connection between the state and the 
dispute.’554  The United States’ doing business jurisdiction was identified as one of 
the prohibited grounds since,555 as examined in chapter three, a court may exercise 
jurisdiction against a defendant if the defendant has a continuous and systematic 
activity in the forum state even if the activities are completely unrelated to the 
underlying claim.  As such, a major impasse occurred where the United States 
delegates had intended to place the doing business jurisdiction under the grey zone, 
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while the European nations had preferred to eliminate this basis and place it on the 
prohibited list. 
 
Another basis which was identified under the prohibited list was the service of writ 
recognised in Australia and United States.556  As examined in Chapter Three, the 
service of writ requires that in order to be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state, 
the defendant must be served with the originating proceedings while present in that 
state.  This jurisdiction was objected to by the Europeans as a valid basis since, 
according to the civil law tradition, service of proceedings is merely a way of 
providing notice of proceedings and cannot constitute a valid basis to assume 
jurisdiction. 
 
In summary, the issue of jurisdiction was identified as a major factor preventing a 
successful Convention from being finalised.  On the one hand, the United States 
could not agree on the jurisdictional ground based on claim and forum nexus alone as 
such would go beyond the United States’ constitutional limitation.  One the other 
hand, the European Community does not recognise that a connection between the 
defendant and forum alone is capable of giving rise to a valid jurisdictional ground 
and intends to place the United States’ general doing business ground which does not 
require a substantial connection between the claim and forum on the prohibited list. 
 
5.4.3 Forum Non Conveniens and Lis Alibi Pendens 
The issue of whether and to what extent the doctrines of forum non conveniens and lis 
alibi pendens should be included in the 1999 Preliminary Draft posed another concern 
                                                 
556  Ibid art 18(2)(f). 
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for debate for the 1992 attempt for a worldwide convention on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.557  However, compromises among participating 
countries as to the adoption of these doctrines were reached and appeared in Article 
21 of the 1999 Preliminary Draft. 
 
As mentioned earlier, forum non conveniens is a doctrine known to common law 
countries such as Australia and the United States.  It gives court discretion to decline 
to hear a case if it believes that a better forum exists elsewhere to hear the dispute.  
This is for the purpose that if a matter is brought before a court which is not the 
appropriate forum for hearing the dispute, under the application of forum non 
conveniens, the court may decline to hear the case so as to ensure the administration 
of justice and to relieve potential hardship on both the defendant and the court. 
 
The forum non conveniens doctrine was endorsed by the United States Supreme Court 
in the leading case of Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert558 where the court held that trial courts 
may apply forum non conveniens if another court is more convenient and appropriate 
to hear the dispute.559  In this case, the court stated that when determining whether 
an adequate alternative forum exists, considerations should be given to both private 
convenience from the standpoint of the litigants (ie, relative ease of access to sources 
of proof, cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses) and interests of the public 
sector in the sense of convenience of the particular court in which the action is 
brought (ie, the workload of its members and the state of its calendar and the overall 
administration of justice), while still giving deference to the plaintiff’s choice of 
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forum.560  In Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno (‘Piper’),561 the United States Supreme 
Court further defined the forum non conveniens doctrine and held that the mere 
showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less 
favourable to the plaintiffs is not to be given substantial weight in the forum non 
conveniens inquiry.562  In other words, a court conferred jurisdiction may decline to 
exercise it even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is going to be less 
favourable to the plaintiff’s chance of recovery.563  Moreover, the Piper court held 
that:  
the central focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience … [forum non 
conveniens] will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum 
imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable 
to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.564 
 
In contrast to the United States where forum non conveniens is applied to search for a 
more appropriate forum on the basis of convenience, the Australian law of forum non 
conveniens relies on the clearly inappropriate forum test.  The clearly inappropriate 
forum test was formulated by a majority in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc 
v Fay (‘Oceanic’),565 after rejecting the test set forth by the House of Lords in 
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd (‘Spiliada’) which held that a court 
may dismiss or stay an action if there is a more appropriate tribunal for the hearing of 
the particular case, having regard to the interests of both plaintiff and defendant and 
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the ends of justice.566  The facts of Oceanic were that a resident of Queensland made 
a booking through a New South Wales travel agent for a cruise of the Greek islands 
on a vessel owned by a Greek company.  Upon payment of the fare for the cruise, 
the passenger was handed an ‘exchange order’ which stated that it would be 
exchanged for a ticket when the passenger boarded the vessel.  In Athens, the 
passenger exchanged the order and obtained a ticket upon which were printed a 
number of conditions, including that the courts of Greece should have exclusive 
jurisdiction for any action brought against the owner of the vessel.  The passenger 
was injured while on the cruise.  He brought an action against the owner of the 
vessel for negligence in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.  The owner applied 
for a stay of the action.567   
 
Citing Deane J’s judgment which was later endorsed in subsequent cases, the starting 
point in determining whether an application by a defendant for the dismissal or stay of 
an action must be the recognition of the prima facie right of a plaintiff who has 
regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to insist upon the exercise of 
that jurisdiction and to have his claim heard and determined.568  His Honour went on 
to consider the traditional principles laid down in Maritime Insurance Co Ltd v 
Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners569 and held that the modern content of the 
traditional principles governing the power of a court in this country to order that 
proceedings be stayed or dismissed on the ground that the action should have been 
brought in a tribunal of another country: 
                                                 
566  [1987] AC 460, 476. 
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568  Ibid 241-3 (Deane J). 
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should only be exercised in a clear case and onus lies upon the defendant to satisfy the 
local court in which the particular proceedings have been instituted that is so 
inappropriate a forum for their determination that their continuation would be 
oppressive and vexatious to him or her.570   
In other words, while courts in the United States and the United Kingdom would 
decline jurisdiction on the more appropriate forum test, an Australian court conferred 
jurisdiction will dismiss or stay an action if it determines that it is clearly an 
inappropriate forum to determine the dispute. 571   The rationale underlying the 
inappropriate forum test, as Deane J stated, ‘lies in the avoidance of injustice between 
the parties in the circumstances of the particular case rather than in more general 
considerations relating to the overall administration of justice.’572  In determining 
whether a stay of an action would be oppressive and vexatious, Deane J stated that 
these words should be read as describing the objective effect the continuance of the 
action would have on the defendant, rather than the conduct of the plaintiff in 
continuing with the proceeding in the selected forum.573 
 
The clearly inappropriate forum approach laid down in Oceanic was approved and 
applied in subsequent cases, beginning with the High Court decision in Voth v 
Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (‘Voth’).574  The majority of the court in Voth affirmed 
that in order to invoke the standard to dismiss or stay an action, the court must be 
satisfied that the continuance of the proceedings would be vexatious, oppressive and 
abusive of the court’s process, which rendered it an inappropriate forum for the 
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determination of the proceedings.575  In order to determine whether the selected 
forum is a clearly inappropriate forum, the court stated that the test only requires the 
court to consider its own appropriateness of the proceedings by focusing on the 
advantages and disadvantages arising from a continuation of the proceedings.  This 
is despite the fact that the availability of relief in a foreign forum will always be a 
relevant factor in deciding whether or not the selected forum is a clearly inappropriate 
one.576 
 
The clearly inappropriate forum test remains the current basis of law in Australia 
concerning the doctrine of forum non conveniens despite criticisms from scholars and 
commentators that it places more weight on the plaintiff’s choice of forum and 
imposes a high standard difficult for the defendant to discharge.577  In a recent 
decision in Puttick v Tenon Ltd where the court was invited to reconsider the 
principles enunciated in Voth, the court was of the view that the principles should be 
followed until the time comes for full argument to be developed about its 
correctness.578  It should be noted that since the discretionary power of courts to 
decline jurisdiction in interstate proceedings is already governed under the Service 
and Execution of Process Act and the Cross Vesting Acts examined in Chapter Three, 
the clearly inappropriate forum test seems to be limited to international cases.579 
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The doctrine of forum non conveniens is unknown in the civil law tradition.  In order 
to deal with situations concerning parallel litigation in multiple forums, the doctrine 
of lis alibi pendens is applied instead.  Lis alibi pendens provides that if two courts 
are seised of a dispute between the same parties that involves the same cause of action, 
the court second seised must stay or dismiss the case in favour of the court first 
seised.580  Accordingly, instead of conferring discretion upon a court to decline 
jurisdiction, lis alibi pendens requires that court first seised will have priority over the 
case. 
 
While both forum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens provide appropriate means to 
deal with forum shopping and parallel proceedings in multiple forums, there are 
disadvantages to both principles.  The former gives court discretion to decline 
jurisdiction so that a matter may be heard by the most appropriate court.  However, 
this flexibility is likely to make the proceedings long and costly.581  The latter, which 
requires the court first seised to hear a matter, will provide certainty and predictability 
in litigation.  However, the drawback is that it may give rise to situations where there 
may be a race to the courthouse since an action filed in a second court must be stayed 
and ultimately be dismissed in favour of the first action.582   
 
In spite of the differences between forum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens, there 
was a consensus reached in the 1999 Preliminary Draft.  Article 21 incorporated the 
                                                 
580  See, eg, Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [2002] OJ 
L 12/1, art 27. 
581  See, eg, Allan Philip, ‘The Global Hague Judgments Convention: Some Comments’ in Talia 
Einhorn and Kurt Siehr (eds), International Cooperation Through Private International Law: 
Essays in Memory of Peter E Nygh (TMC Asser Press, 2004) 299, 302.  
582  See, eg, Ronald A Brand, ‘Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Judgments’(2002) 37 Texas International Law Journal 467, 490. 
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lis alibi pendens doctrine and provided that the court second seised must stay 
proceedings in favour of the court first seised.583  However, the court second seised 
shall continue with the proceeding if the plaintiff in the court first seised had failed to 
pursue the action or if that court had not rendered a decision within a reasonable 
time.584  In Article 22 which incorporated the forum non conveniens doctrine, it 
provided that in exceptional circumstances where the court seised is clearly 
inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction, the court may suspend its 
proceedings for another court which has jurisdiction and is more appropriate to 
resolve the dispute.585 
 
5.4.4 Excessive Damages 
Another debate that arose during negotiations was in relation to the United States’ 
practice on jury verdicts and the award of damages.  Specifically, the participating 
countries were concerned with the United States’ punitive damages in product 
liability cases and statutory, multiple damages under the anti-trust legislation.586  
According to the civil law tradition, the principle upon which damages is based is 
generally compensatory in nature.  That is, it is to reimburse the aggrieved parties for 
what loss he or she has actually suffered.  Punitive or exemplary damages, by 
contrast, implicating some form of punishment and deterrence, are incompatible with 
the civil law notion of compensation.587  Accordingly, there have been incidents in 
which courts have refused to enforce the non-compensatory portion of American 
                                                 
583  1999 Preliminary Draft art 21(1). 
584  Ibid art 21(3). 
585  Ibid art 22. 
586  Adler and Zarychta, above n 524, 25; Borchers, above n 524, 162. 
587  See, eg, Volker Behr, ‘Enforcement of United States Money Judgments in Germany’ (1994) 13 
Journal of Law and Commerce 211, 227, 231; Joachim Rosengarten, ‘Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Germany: Acting for Australian Clients against German 
Defendants’ (1992) 20 Australian Business Law Review 230, 235. 
 188 
judgments on the ground of public policy.588  While punitive damages are also 
available in other common law countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom, 
the amount of damages awarded tends to be narrower and more restrictive in 
comparison to those in the United States.589 
 
A compromise was made by the United States delegates with respect to the award of 
damages as appeared in Article 33 of the 1999 Preliminary Draft.590  It stated that a 
court asked to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment may do so only to the extent 
that ‘similar or comparable damages could have been awarded in the state 
addressed.’ 591   Moreover, if the judgment debtor claimed and established that 
‘grossly excessive damages’ had been awarded, recognition may be limited to a lesser 
amount but ‘in no event less than that which could have been awarded in the state 
addressed in the same circumstances.’592 
 
5.5 2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
As mentioned earlier, in June 2001, a Diplomatic Conference was held to address the 
1999 Preliminary Draft.  However, the outcome was an interim text containing a 
number of alternatives and variations.  At that time, it was thought that the chances 
                                                 
588  See, eg, Joachim Zekoll, ‘The Enforceability of American Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark 
Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice’ (1992) 30 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 641 (discussing a decision in which the German Federal Court of Justice did not give effect to 
the punitive damage awarded by the American court on the basis of public policy). 
589  For a comparative view on the punitive damages amongst the common law countries, see, eg, John 
Y Gotanda, ‘Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis’ (2003-4) 42 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 391. See also Ronald A Brand, ‘Punitive Damages Revisited: Taking the 
Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments too far?’ (2004-5) 24 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 181 (the recent trend in the United States courts on the issue of awarding punitive 
damages has moved from the extensive discretion to the adoption of the Due Process to provide 
limits on the amount of punitive damages). 
590  1999 Preliminary Draft art 33.  
591  Ibid art 33(1). 
592  Ibid art 33(2). 
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of reaching a successful conclusion for a worldwide convention on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments were dim.  However, in light of the time and 
effort already spent on the negotiations, it was decided that efforts should be 
redirected at a convention of more limited scope.  Accordingly, an Informal Working 
Group was set up by The Hague Permanent Bureau to prepare a new instrument, 
limited to the choice of court agreements by the parties in commercial transactions.593  
Following a number of meetings between 2002 and 2004, a final text of the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was completed and adopted at the 
Diplomatic Session in June 2005.594   
 
The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements addresses the choice of court cases in 
business to business contracts.  Its objective is to establish a set of principles within 
an international legal regime that: 
provides certainty and ensures the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court 
agreements between the parties to commercial transactions and that govern the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from proceedings based on such 
agreements.595   
 
                                                 
593  The Hague Project on Judgments: Progress Made since the Meeting of the Commission on 
General Affairs and Policy of April 2003-Preliiminary Document No 10 of Feb 2004; Andrea 
Schulz, Preliminary Document No 22 of June 2003 – Report on the Work of the Informal Working 
Group on the Judgments Project in Particular on the Preliminary Text Achieved at its Third 
Meeting of March 2003 (2003) 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3507&dtid=35>. 
594   See generally Paul Beaumont, ‘Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: 
Background, Negotiations, Analysis and Current Status’ (2009) 5(1) Journal of Private 
International Law 125, 134; Ronald A Brand, ‘A Global Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 345; Ved P Nada, 
‘Landmark 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (2007) 42 Texas 
International Law Journal 773. 
595  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements Preamble. 
 190 
The following sections provide a brief account of the provisions under the Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements, including the scope and the rules on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
 
5.5.1 Scope 
The Convention will apply in international cases with respect to civil and commercial 
matters, where the parties entered into an exclusive choice of court agreement.596 
 
A International Cases 
The Convention applies only in international cases.  The definition for an 
international case varies, depending on whether it is for the purposes of jurisdiction or 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  In the event the concern is 
one of jurisdiction, a case is considered international unless the parties are resident in 
the same Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and all other elements 
relevant to the dispute are connected only with that State.  For recognition and 
enforcement purposes, however, a case is considered international where the 
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought.597 
 
B Civil and Commercial Matters 
The Convention applies to civil and commercial matters.  For the purpose of 
definition, the Convention excludes a number of matters from its scope.  These 
include consumer and employment contracts.598  Similarly, matters relating to family 
                                                 
596  Ibid art 1(1). 
597  Ibid art 1(2), (3). 
598  Ibid art 2(1). There are some who argue that the fact that the term ‘consumer’ is narrowly defined, 
the Convention may create situations in which there is a lack of appropriate protection of weak 
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law, wills and succession, insolvency, rights in rem in immovable property and 
intellectual property rights are also excluded if they arise as the object and not merely 
as a preliminary question of the proceedings.599 
 
C Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements 
The Convention applies to exclusive choice of court agreements.  It may, however, 
extend its scope to judgments given by a court designated in a non-exclusive choice of 
court agreement.  This is found in Article 22 in which states may reciprocally 
declare that they will recognise and enforce judgments of other Contracting States 
resulting from non-exclusive choice of court agreements.600  Accordingly, Article 22 
will have the effect of expanding the scope for the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments under the Convention. 
 
For the purposes of the Convention, an exclusive choice of court agreement is defined 
as an agreement concluded by two or more parties designating the courts, or one or 
more specific courts of one Contracting State, to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of 
any other courts for the resolution of any legal dispute between the parties.601  In 
order to qualify as an agreement for the purposes of the Convention, the agreement 
must be in writing or by any other means of communication which renders 
information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.602  As such, if an 
agreement has satisfied requirements stipulated under an instrument that provides 
                                                                                                                                            
parties (ie small business) especially in adhesion and non-negotiated contracts, see, eg, Adam E 
Kerns, ‘The Hague Convention and Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements: An Imperfect Match’ 
(2006) 20 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 509. 
599  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art 2(2)-(3). 
600  Ibid art 22. 
601  Ibid s 3(a). 
602  Ibid art 3(c). 
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more generous requirements than those under the Convention, the agreement will fall 
outside the scope of the Convention even if it is valid under that instrument.603 
 
Also, for the purposes of the Convention, a court designated in the agreement will be 
presumed to have exclusive jurisdiction unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise.604  This approach will change the legal positions in Australia and the 
United States where forum selection clauses are generally non-exclusive unless 
expressly stated otherwise.605  Moreover, in order to avoid the situation where the 
choice of court agreement is invalid on the basis that the contract under which it is 
contained is void, the Convention also provides severability of a choice of court 
agreement from the rest of the contract.  As is stated in Article 3(d), an exclusive 
choice of court agreement, which forms part of a contract, will be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.  As such, the validity of 
the exclusive choice of court agreement cannot be contested solely on the ground that 
the contract is not valid.606 
 
5.5.2 Jurisdiction 
The Convention specifies two basic principles with respect to the rules of jurisdiction.  
First, the court designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement has jurisdiction 
and must hear the case.  Second, any court not chosen by the parties does not have 
jurisdiction and must decline to hear the case.607 
 
                                                 
603  Andrea Schulz, ‘The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements’ (2006) 
2(2) Journal of Private International Law 243, 250-1. 
604  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art 3(b). 
605  Nanda, above n 594, 779. 
606  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art 3(d). 
607  Ibid arts 5-6. 
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A Jurisdiction of the Chosen Court 
Article 5 of the Convention states that the court or courts in one Contracting State 
designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement has jurisdiction to decide a 
dispute to which the agreement applies, except when the law of that Contracting State 
does not recognise the agreement as valid or in cases where the chosen court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction or the venue is improper.608  In the latter situations, where 
the chosen court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or the venue is improper, the chosen 
court may transfer the case to another court in that Contracting State.609  Other than 
these two instances, the court so designated must hear the case.   
 
This article does not give discretion to the chosen court to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction.610  Accordingly, this article will have a considerable impact on the 
existing practices in the United States and Australia since there will be no discretion 
to revert to the ground of forum non conveniens, whereby court conferred jurisdiction 
may decline to exercise it if it believes that another forum is better to hear the 
dispute.611  Similarly, the article will have impact on the Europeans as the lis alibi 
pendens doctrine will not apply because the designated court cannot refuse to hear the 
case under the rationale that another court is first seised with jurisdiction.612 
 
B Obligations of a Court not Chosen 
                                                 
608  Ibid art 5. 
609  Ibid art 5(3)(b). 
610 Ibid arts 5(2)-(3). 
611  Thalia Kruger, ‘The 20th Session of the Hague Conference: A New Choice of Court Convention 
and the Issue of EC Membership’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 447, 
451; Nada, above n 594, 781. 
612  Nanda, above n 594, 781. 
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Article 6 of the Convention stipulates the obligations of a court not chosen by the 
parties in an exclusive choice of court agreement.  It requires that any court in a 
Contracting State other than the designated court must suspend or dismiss the related 
proceeding. 613  However, the article goes on to state that under a number of 
circumstances, a court not chosen may hear the matter despite the choice of court 
agreement.  The circumstances include:614 the agreement between the parties being 
void under the law of the State of the chosen court; the lack of capacity of a party to 
enter into an agreement under the law of the State of the court seised; where giving 
effect to the agreement would result in a manifest injustice or would be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised; situations when the 
agreement cannot be performed due to exceptional reasons; and the chosen court has 
decided not to hear the case.  As far as the Australian perspective is concerned, this 
article would have some impact on Australian law since, as noted earlier, Australian 
courts may revert to the forum non conveniens doctrine when determining 
jurisdictional issue.  As such, courts had, on a number of instances, exercised 
jurisdiction contrary to the terms of a choice of court agreement.615 
 
5.5.3 Recognition and Enforcement 
After setting forth the rules of jurisdiction, Article 8 of the Convention states that a 
judgment resulting from jurisdiction exercised in accordance with an exclusive choice 
of court agreement must be recognised and enforced in all other Contracting States.616  
                                                 
613  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art 6. 
614  Ibid arts 6(a)-(e). 
615  See, eg, Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418. 
616 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art 8(1). 
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The condition upon which a judgment may be recognised and enforced is that it is 
enforceable in the Contracting State where it was rendered.617 
 
Under the Convention, there are a number of circumstances in which a court in one 
Contracting State may refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment rendered by 
another Contracting State.  To some extent, the circumstances which may justify 
non-recognition and non-enforcement under the Convention are similar to those in 
Australia, the United States and under the Brussels I Regulation.  These include:618 
the agreement is null and void under the law of the state of the chosen court; the lack 
of capacity of a party to conclude an agreement under the law of the state where 
recognition and enforcement is sought; the defendant was not notified of the original 
proceedings in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his 
defence; the judgment was obtained by fraud; the recognition and enforcement of the 
judgment would be contrary to the public policy of the Contracting State where 
recognition and enforcement is sought; and conflict of judgments.  In addition, 
Article 11 of the Convention specifies that a court in a Contracting State may refuse 
to recognise and enforce a judgment ‘if, and only to the extent that, the judgment 
awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a 
party for actual loss or harm suffered.’619  Accordingly, Article 11 concerns the 
award of judgments which may be considerably high in amount.620 
 
                                                 
617  Ibid art 8(3). 
618  Ibid arts 9 (a)-(g). 
619  Ibid art 11. 
620  Adler and Zarychta, above n 524, 34. 
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5.5.4 Final Remarks on 2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
Despite the failure of efforts to create a multilateral convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, the conclusion of the Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements is a significant step forward towards international harmonisation.  
It unifies the rules in cases in choice of court agreements and as a result, it will 
increase certainty and predictability for parties involved in international transactions 
having a choice of forum clause.  As such, it is hoped that, in addition to the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
regulating the recognition and enforcement proceedings based on arbitration clauses, 
the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements will offer to the business world 
another option of dispute resolution.621  Moreover, even though the Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements is only focused on one basis of jurisdiction and is narrow 
in scope, it will serve as a foundation for future work on multilateral harmonisation on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
The United States signed the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in January 
2009.622  This was done as, given that the United States’ extended reception of 
foreign judgments does not seem to be returned abroad due to reasons mentioned in 
Part Two of this chapter, the United States hoped that, by signing on to this 
convention, it will level the playing field and will provide reciprocity of enforcement 
of judgments rendered by the United States in other contracting states.623  That said, 
the United States has not ratified the Convention at the time of writing.  On 5 March 
                                                 
621  The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
opened for signature 10 June 1958, UNTS 38 (1959) (entered into force 7 June 1959). See also 
Brand, above n 594, 346. 
622  Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Status Table 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98>. 
623  American Bar Association, Recommendation, adopted by the House of Delegates Aug 7-8 2006, 2, 
4 <http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/policy/investment/hcca0806.pdf>. 
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2012, a study group meeting of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on 
Private International Law was held to discuss the issue on how to implement 
domestically the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 624   A solution 
proposed in the meeting was that the Convention be implemented through a 
‘cooperative federalism’ approach involving parallel federal and state law.  Under 
this approach, a ratification of the Convention would be accompanied by federal 
implementing legislation.  However, any state in the United States may opt out of the 
federal statute and instead implement the Convention through state enactment of a 
uniform act being developed by the Uniform Law Commission.625  The Uniform Act 
has been approved in 2012 and is ready for enactment by all the states. 
 
As far as the European Community is concerned, while the Brussels I Regulation has 
already created a harmonised system in respect of jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of resulting judgments, the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
will have the benefit of reducing legal uncertainty for European Community 
companies engaging in business contracts outside the European Community. 626  
Accordingly, the Council of the European Union approved the signing of the 
Convention on behalf of the European Community, and signed the Convention on 1 
April 2009.  However, in order to ensure a harmonised application of the Convention 
and the Brussels I Regulation, Article 26 of the Convention provides that where none 
of the parties is resident in a contracting state that is not a Member State of the 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation (ie Brussels I Regulation); the rules of 
                                                 
624 US Department of State, Public meeting on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 
5 March 2012 <http://www.stage.gov/s/1/187706.htm> 
625 Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act 2012 (the ‘Uniform Act’). 
626 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the Signing by the European 
Community of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, Brussels 5.9.2008 COM (2008) 
538 final, [2] <http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/com_2008_0538_en.pdf>. 
 198 
the Organisation will prevail.  The Convention will prevail, however, if one of the 
parties is resident in a contracting state that is not a Member State of the 
Organisation.627   
 
Australia has not signed the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements at the time of 
writing.  It is doubtful whether it will do so in coming years given that it has been 
eight years since the Convention is concluded and open for signature and that some of 
the world’s largest economies such as the United States and European Union has not 
yet ratified the Convention.  That said, however, it is envisaged that the 
implementation of the Convention in Australia would establish a common standard 
and harmonise jurisdictional rules which, in turn, would promote legal certainty and 
predictability for the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter considers the attempts to negotiate, under the auspices of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, a multilateral convention on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments.  A multilateral convention is regarded as the 
most effective approach for the purposes of recognition and enforcement since it will 
unify the recognition and enforcement procedures over a large number of 
participating countries.  However, the two attempts at negotiation initiated in 1962 
and 1992 did not reach the conclusion initially contemplated, principally due to the 
issue of underlying jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
627  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art 26(6). 
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On the one hand, the 1962 attempt was based on the form of a convention simple, 
which addressed only the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and not the issue on jurisdiction that a court in a contracting state may 
exercise when rendering a judgment.  Accordingly, it was believed that a convention 
of this type was not appealing to many nations since, under this type of convention, a 
judgment rendered by one contracting state for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement in another contracting state may be subject to review of its underlying 
jurisdictional basis.  On the other hand, the 1992 attempt aimed to unify the rules of 
jurisdiction and the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of resulting 
judgments.  This will have the effect that a judgment given by a court in one 
contracting state and rendered upon any of the prescribed jurisdictional grounds will 
be entitled to be recognised and enforced in another contracting state without further 
review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  However, the major obstacle which 
stalled further negotiation under the 1992 attempt was the lack of consensus among 
the participating countries over the heads of jurisdiction to be included in the 
convention. 
 
Following the failure of the 1992 attempt to create a worldwide convention on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was concluded in 2005 instead.  The 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements sets forth the rules of jurisdiction on the 
choice of court clauses between parties in commercial contracts and any judgment 
rendered on that basis by one contracting state is entitled to be recognised and 
enforced in other contracting states.  Despite the Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements being narrow in scope, it will increase certainty and predictability for 
parties involved in international commercial transactions.  Thus, while the 
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implementation of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements will have some 
impacts on the existing laws in Australia, the United States and the European 
Community, it offers an option of dispute resolution for parties engaged in 
international commercial transactions. 
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Chapter Six  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Overview of the Dissertation 
This study examines the existing regimes for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and the European Community and 
makes recommendations aimed at improving the means upon which foreign 
judgments are recognised and enforced in those selected jurisdictions.  For the 
purpose of this study, two competing objectives are considered.  First, the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments should be consistent with the 
notion of finality of litigation, which requires that there should be an end to litigation 
and that a judgment obtained in one suit should become final and conclusive in the 
second suit without the need for re-litigating substantive issues.  And second, given 
the differences of laws between those which rendered and those asked to recognise 
and enforce judgments, there ought to be circumstances in which the notion of finality 
of litigation may be overridden and a court may refuse to recognise and enforce a 
foreign judgment if to do so would be unjust or unfair.  Accordingly, it is a balancing 
of the competing objectives of finality, which promotes the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, on the one hand, and exceptions that may justify 
non-recognition and non-enforcement on the other, that this dissertation seeks to 
achieve through its recommendations. 
 
Chapter Two sets the stage by considering the theoretical frameworks and policy 
considerations underlying and supporting the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
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judgments in the selected jurisdictions.  Under the theoretical frameworks, the 
United States recognises the notion of comity, under which foreign judgments are 
recognised and enforced in the United States as a matter of deference for sovereign 
entities.  As such, the United States has adopted a liberal reception towards foreign 
judgments.  In Australia, while courts will recognise and enforce foreign judgments 
at common law on the basis of obligation theory, by which a foreign judgment is 
analogous as a debt arising between parties in a private transaction, the statutory 
scheme that governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments requires 
reciprocity.  That is, there must be a reciprocal arrangement between Australia and a 
foreign jurisdiction before a foreign judgment rendered by that jurisdiction can be 
recognised and enforced in an Australian court.  Similarly, the Brussels I Regulation 
which governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments among European Union 
Member States operates upon the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments between Member States.  With respect to policy considerations, this 
chapter considers the notion of finality of litigation argued as an important objective 
for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  The finality of litigation has its 
origin from the doctrine of res judicata and carries the objective that, in the interests 
of litigants and the public as a whole, there should be an end to litigation and 
judgment.  Accordingly, the objective of finality of litigation will encourage states or 
countries to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to them.  However, due to the 
significant differences between the laws of the country which rendered and those 
asked to recognise and enforce judgments, this chapter further argues that a court may, 
in certain circumstances, refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if to do 
so would be unjust or unfair.  However, this is not to say that the mere differences of 
laws between judgment-rendering and judgment-enforcing states would justify the 
non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  Rather, the 
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circumstances in which judgments may be denied recognition and enforcement 
include that the judgment was obtained as a result of fraud, denial of litigants’ rights 
to a fair hearing or the effect of recognising and enforcing the judgment is likely to 
violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing state. 
 
Chapters Three and Four consider the current regimes for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in the selected jurisdictions.  Chapter Three 
considers the positions in Australia and the United States as to the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments rendered by courts interstate and in a foreign country.  It 
is concluded in this chapter that in order to maintain a single and integrated nation, 
there are constitutional and legislative requirements authorising Australian or United 
States courts to recognise and enforce interstate judgments.  However, it is noted that 
in the United States, given the degree of variation of laws among the states, a state 
court asked to recognise and enforce an interstate judgment may review the judgment 
under certain grounds to ensure that it was obtained fairly and appropriately.  As far 
as foreign judgments are concerned, an Australian or a United States court will not 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment unless the judgment has satisfied a number 
of requirements and does not fall under any of the exceptions to justify 
non-recognition and non-enforcement.  The purpose of the requirements and 
defences is to ensure the administration of justice, which is important given the 
significant differences of substantive and procedural laws between the country which 
rendered and those in Australia or the United States asked to recognise and 
enforcement foreign judgments.  However, it is argued that the requirements and 
defences should not be imposed and construed in a way that may cause hardship for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments particularly in light of 
modern-day trade and commerce. 
 204 
 
In Chapter Four, the focus of examination is the provisions under the Brussels I 
Regulation, which governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments within 
European Union Member States.  This chapter concludes that the Brussels I 
Regulation has created an effective scheme facilitating the recognition and 
enforcement of Member State judgments since, under the Brussels I Regulation, there 
is only a minimal requirement that needs to be satisfied for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement.  Moreover, a judgment that is rendered by a court in 
one Member State and based upon any of the jurisdictions set forth in the Brussels I 
Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another Member State without 
further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  However, the concern with the 
Brussels I Regulation is that by implementing a liberal recognition and enforcement 
scheme as such, whether there is adequate protection available to safeguard the 
judgment-enforcing Member State, as well as those against whom recognition or 
enforcement is sought.  
 
Chapter Five considers the efforts made to date in creating a multilateral convention 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  A multilateral convention 
is regarded as the most effective means for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments since it will unify the standards and procedures over a large number of 
participating countries.  However, the two attempts initiated in 1962 and 1992 for a 
worldwide convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under 
the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International law did not result in 
much of success.  As identified, the main reason in failing to reach a worldwide 
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments was not on the 
issue of the procedures for recognition and enforcement, but rather with the question 
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of underlying jurisdiction upon which judgments may be based.  This chapter also 
considers the provisions under the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
concluded in 2005 as a result of the 1992 attempt.  It is argued that while the 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is narrow in scope since it regulates the 
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of judgments based on the forum 
selection clauses between parties in commercial contracts, it will provide increased 
certainty and predictability for parties involved in business-to-business agreements 
containing a choice of forum clause. 
 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
This section provides a summary of findings drawn from the research study.  In short, 
it is found that in Australia and the United States, while courts are authorised by 
constitutional and legislative requirements to give conclusive effect to interstate 
judgments, the recognition and enforcement actions involving foreign judgments may 
be subject to review under a number of requirements and defences as a way to ensure 
the administration of justice.  In contrast, the Brussels I Regulation has provided a 
scheme that simplifies the recognition and enforcement proceedings and facilitates the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments among European Union Member States.  
However, concern over the liberal recognition and enforcement scheme provided 
under the Brussels I Regulation lies in the adequacy of protection to 
judgment-enforcing Member States, as well as those against whom recognition or 
enforcement is sought. 
 
6.2.1 Interstate Judgments in Australia and United States 
Due to the effects of the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit principle 
and the provisions under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), it is 
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argued that Australia has, by and large, created an effective scheme for the recognition 
and enforcement of interstate judgments.  Under the Service and Execution of 
Process Act 1992 (Cth), a judgment that is rendered in one state or territory will be 
given conclusive effect and enforced in another state or territory upon the mere filing 
of the judgment with an appropriate court.  For the purpose of enforcement, there is 
no requirement that needs to be satisfied other than the judgment must be enforceable 
in the state where it was originally given.  Also, a judgment that is registered in a 
state or territory as an interstate judgment cannot be subject to any form of review, 
whether it is the jurisdictional competence of the court that rendered the judgment or 
any of the defences available at common law. 
 
In the United States, the full faith and credit principle under the United States 
Constitution and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1964 requires 
that a judgment given by a state court in the United States should be treated as being 
conclusive and enforced in another state court.  However, as observed in Chapter 
Three, an interstate judgment that is registered under the Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act 1964 for enforcement purpose may be subject to review under 
a number of grounds.  These include whether the court that rendered the judgment 
was jurisdictionally competent to do so and whether the parties were given a fair and 
proper opportunity in presenting his or her claim or defence to the court of origin.  
The underlying rationale of the judicial review is that under the current state of the 
law in the United States, there is a degree of variation of substantive and procedural 
laws among the states.  As such, where a state court is asked to enforce an interstate 
judgment, the court may refuse to do so if the court that rendered the judgment lacks 
jurisdiction or the judgment was obtained in the original proceedings as a result of 
depriving parties’ rights to a fair hearing. 
 207 
 
6.2.2 Foreign Judgments in Australia and United States 
In comparison to interstate judgments, an Australian or a United States court will not 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment unless the judgment has satisfied a number 
of requirements and does not fall under any of the defences to justify non-recognition 
and non-enforcement. 
 
A Requirement 
With respect to the requirements that must be satisfied for the purposes of recognition 
and enforcement in Australia and the United States, it is argued that the requirement 
of underlying jurisdiction is problematic as far as advancing the objective of finality 
of litigation is concerned.  In Australia, it is required that a foreign judgment must be 
based on presence or submission before a court will recognise and enforce the 
judgment.  In other words, the defendant against whom recognition and enforcement 
is sought must have been served with the writ while present within the territory where 
the foreign court sits or submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.  There is 
generally no concern with submission since it is based on parties’ voluntary 
submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.  Difficulty may arise, however, 
with respect to presence.  Under the presence requirement, there is generally no 
difficulty in establishing jurisdiction if the defendant is a natural person, as long as he 
or she is present in the foreign territory and is served with the original proceedings.  
However, the presence requirement is problematic if the defendant is a company.  
Under the Australian requirement, before a company may be subject to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court, it must have some presence inside the territory where 
the foreign court sits, such as by maintaining a branch office or having a 
representative to carry on the business on the behalf of the company in the foreign 
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territory.  Even though the presence requirement is to ensure that the company 
against whom recognition and enforcement is sought has a substantial connection 
with the territory where the foreign court sits, it is too narrow and outdated.  This is 
especially so in modern-day trade and commerce where companies may take the 
advantage of technological advancement when conducting foreign business.  As 
such, it is not unusual that companies engaged in international commercial 
transactions may not necessarily have any form of presence in the foreign territory 
where the business was conducted since all the communications were carried out 
electronically.  Accordingly, by relying on the presence requirement which is 
outdated in light of modern-day technology, it is likely to render a foreign judgment 
unenforceable in an Australian court if the company was not present in the foreign 
territory nor did it submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. 
 
In the United States, the requirement is that a court will recognise and enforce a 
foreign judgment if it was rendered in the foreign proceeding on the basis of: parties’ 
consent to or voluntary appearance in the foreign proceedings; a substantial 
connection between the defendant and the forum state (minimum contacts test); or in 
the event the defendant is a natural person, the defendant was served with the writ 
while present in the foreign territory (in-state service).  As with the position in 
Australia, there is generally no concern with the requirements of the consent and 
appearance and in-state service insofar as the objective of finality of litigation is 
concerned.  There are however, concerns with the minimum contacts test.  As 
explained earlier, the purpose of the minimum contacts test is to ensure that there be a 
substantial connection between the defendant and the territory where the foreign court 
sits.  However, it fails to provide a satisfactory means for the purposes of recognition 
and enforcement.  The argument rests upon two reasons.  First, the minimum 
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contacts test is a fact-driven basis and lacks certainty and predictability.  And second, 
by relying on the defendant and forum nexus, the minimum contacts requirement may 
be inflexible in certain circumstances.   
 
As far as the first reason is concerned, this is associated with the nature of the 
minimum contacts test.  As examined in Chapter Three, the Supreme Court of the 
United States had ruled that the minimum contacts test is established in situations 
where there is a single or occasional act of the defendant within the forum state 
provided that the act is related to the underlying event (know as the specific 
jurisdiction) or where the defendant had a systematic and continuous activity in the 
forum state despite the fact that the activity is unrelated to the underlying event 
(known as the general jurisdiction).  However, whether there is a minimum contact 
between the defendant and the forum state will depend on the facts under 
consideration.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Asahi 
Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, even if there is a sufficient connection between 
the defendant and the forum state, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment may be refused if the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant is 
unreasonable and unfair so as to violate the notions of fair play and substantial justice.  
Accordingly, while the minimum contacts test provides a basis more flexible than the 
presence requirement in Australia, its lack of certainty and predictability may 
undermine the effect of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
The second reason to justify the argument that the minimum contacts test does not 
provide a satisfactory means for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, this is 
principally associated with the scope of the test.  As noted, the minimum contacts 
test is confined to the connection between the defendant and the forum state.  Thus, 
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in the event there is no defendant and forum nexus but a judgment is rendered by a 
court on the basis of, for instance, a substantial connection between the subject matter 
of the proceeding and the forum state, the judgment rendered on that basis would not 
be capable of being recognised and enforced in the United States despite the forum 
court was, in light of circumstances, the appropriate court for hearing the matter. 
 
B Defences 
There are a number of defences recognised in Australia and the United States to 
justify the non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  If any of the 
defences are established, an Australian or a United States court can refuse to recognise 
and enforce the foreign judgment.  While the defences are impediments as far as the 
objective of finality of litigation is concerned, the purpose of the defences is to ensure 
fundamental rights and interests of litigants and judgment-enforcing states are not 
violated upon the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia or 
the United States. 
 
Under the defence of fraud, the general approach is that fresh evidence which was 
unavailable and could not have been reasonably known to the defendant at the time of 
original proceedings may be alleged to challenge the validity of the judgment at the 
recognition and enforcement stage.  Accordingly, the fraud defence provides a 
safeguard that a judgment which is the result of fraudulent means should not be 
honoured in subsequent proceedings.  On the other hand, evidence of fraud which 
has already been dealt with or could have been raised and dealt with in original 
proceedings, cannot be raised as a defence in subsequent proceedings.  This principle 
will prevent re-examination of issues and encourage parties to participate fully in 
original proceedings.   
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As examined in Chapter Three, the Australian scheme allows a party to raise the issue 
of fraud at the recognition and enforcement stage even if it has or could have been 
dealt with in the foreign proceedings when the judgment was rendered.  The 
supporting argument for this position is that no one should be able to take advantage 
of his or her wrong and that re-examination of evidence of fraud is appropriate in 
circumstances where the court that rendered the judgment is not the best qualified to 
deal with the issue of fraud.  However, as far as advancing the objective of finality of 
litigation is concerned, it is likely to waste judicial resources in re-trying a dispute and 
may indirectly imply that litigants need not participate completely in original 
proceedings since the same evidence could have been raised in subsequent 
proceedings. 
 
The natural justice defence applies as a safeguard to ensure that there would be no 
procedural irregularity in the original proceedings when the judgment was delivered.  
There are two recognised grounds upon which the natural justice defence may be 
alleged: due notice and opportunity to be heard.  Therefore, if it was established that 
a defendant was not given due notice of the original proceedings or a defendant, while 
appearing in the original proceedings, was unfairly prejudiced in presenting his or her 
case before that court, a judgment given in the original proceedings under any of these 
two grounds will be denied recognition and enforcement in Australia or the United 
States. 
  
Further to the procedural irregularities of due notice and opportunity to be heard, an 
Australian court will refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if there was a 
breach of the Australian court’s view of substantial justice.  Under the substantial 
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injustice defence, it gives court a broad discretion in refusing to recognise and enforce 
a foreign judgment since there is no confined scope as to what would amount to a 
breach of substantial justice.  Consequently, the application of the substantial 
injustice defence may cause uncertainty for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.  On the other hand, the substantial injustice defence offers 
protection to parties other than the two primary grounds of due notice and opportunity 
to be heard.  This additional protection is arguably necessary considering the 
significant differences of substantive and procedural laws between nation states. 
 
A foreign judgment may also be denied recognition and enforcement in Australia or 
the United States if the effect of recognising and enforcing the judgment is likely to 
violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing state or there is a conflict of 
judgments.  Under the public policy defence, courts in Austalia or the United States 
will refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment if to do so will violate 
fundamental values and interests of the judgment-enforcing state.  While the public 
policy exception gives courts discretion for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement, the authorities in Australia and the United States have indicated that 
courts will not exercise this exception lightly and will only do so if the public policy 
is of a higher order such as public morals or ethics.  Similarly, in order to resolve 
situations where parallel proceedings are brought in multiple states, a foreign 
judgment will be denied recognition and enforcement if it is incompatible with 
another foreign judgment or with an earlier judgment of the forum state in which 
recognition is sought on the same cause of action. 
 
C Statutory Schemes 
In Australia, the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) provides uniform procedures for 
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the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments throughout Australia.  Under 
the application of the FJA, instead of commencing local proceedings as is required 
under the common law action, the enforcement of a foreign judgment is by means of 
registration of the judgment by the Australian court.  However, the problem with the 
FJA is that it is narrow in application, extends only to judgments upon which foreign 
courts have entered into reciprocal arrangements for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments with Australian courts.  Accordingly, the FJA 
covers only a small fraction of nations worldwide and does not include some of 
Australia’s important trading partners such as the United States.  Thus, in situations 
where the FJA is inapplicable, parties seeking the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Australia will be forced to commece common law proceedings.  
As a result of which, the FJA’s limited application may undermine efficiency in 
commercial affairs and fail to strengthen the trading relationships between countries 
not having reciprocal arrangements with Australian courts. 
 
In the United States, there is currently no national approach concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Rather, whether a foreign 
judgment is capable of being recognised and enforced in the United States will 
depend on the law of the state where recognition and enforcement is sought.  To date, 
33 states in the United States have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act to govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and, 
among which, a significant eight have imposed reciprocity in their versions of the 
Uniform Act.  Consequently, the lack of uniformity is likely to cause difficulties for 
parties seeking the recognition and enforcement proceedings in the United States 
since the parties must pay attention to the version of the Uniform Act of the state 
where recognition and enforcement is sought.  Moreover, with the variations of the 
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provisions of the Uniform Act among the states, a foreign judgment may be denied 
recognition and enforcement in the state where reciprocity is imposed as a mandatory 
requirement, and there is no reciprocal arrangement between the judgment-rendering 
and judgment-enforcing states. 
 
6.2.3 Brussels I Regulation 
It is argued that the Brussels I Regulation has created an effective scheme facilitating 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments among the European Union Member 
States.  The argument is drawn on a number of bases.  First, there is only a minimal 
requirement that must be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and enforcement 
under the Brussels I Regulation, namely, the judgment is: pronounced by a court or 
tribunal of a Member State; qualified as a civil and commercial matter defined under 
the Brussels I Regulation; and enforceable in the Member State where it was 
originally given.  Second, given the structure of the Brussels I Regulation which 
regulates not only the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, it 
also sets forth a uniform standard for the rules of jurisdiction that a Member State 
court must assume when rendering a judgment.  Accordingly, except in certain 
circumstances, a judgment that is rendered by a Member State and based on any of the 
permitted jurisdictional basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another 
Member State without further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  In this 
respect, the Brussels I Regulation has created a scheme which is an improvement 
compared to the national schemes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  In the Australian scheme, for example, in order to recognise and enforce 
a foreign judgment in an Australian court, the court asked to do so is required to 
review the underlying basis such that the judgment for recognition and enforcement 
was rendered upon a jurisdictional basis valid and recognisable in Australia.  In 
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contrast, the Brussels I Regulation has done away with such a requirement; a 
judgment rendered upon any of the bases specified under the Brussels I Regulation 
must be recognised and enforced in other Member States. 
 
Despite the Brussels I Regulation having created an effective scheme for the purposes 
of recognition and enforcement, there are concerns as to the adequacy of protection 
available under the Brussels I Regulation to safeguard the liberal recognition and 
enforcement scheme.  This is particularly so since the Brussels I Regulation applies 
to a group of sovereign entities whose substantive and procedural laws are different 
from each other.  Thus, it is important that a court in a Member State should be able 
to refuse to recognise and enforce another Member State’s judgment if to do so would 
be unjust or unfair.  For instance, under the public policy defence, a court in a 
Member State may refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment given by another 
Member State if the effect will violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing 
Member State.  That said however, it is observed that the public policy defence 
within the framework of the Brussels I Regulation is construed narrowly, confined to 
violation of fundamental human rights and restricted to other grounds.  Consequently, 
this may leave less room for national courts to define public policy exclusive to the 
nation.  Similarly, while the purpose of defences for fraud and lack of notice on 
defendants is to ensure that the defendant’s rights to a fair hearing was not violated in 
the court of origin, it is observed that the Brussels I Regulation has imposed a high 
standard before a defendant can successfully prove either of the defences to resist the 
recognition and enforcement of a Member State judgment. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
This section proposes two recommendations for the purpose of improving the way in 
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which foreign judgments are recognised and enforced in the selected jurisdictions. 
 
Recommendation One-National reforms in Australia and United States 
It is recommended that the laws in both Australia and the United States for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments should undergo reforms.  The 
reforms should include: 
 
 Adopting the real and substantial connection test formulated by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Morguard Investments v De Savoye 628  and Beals v 
Saldanha629 as the new jurisdictional basis; 
 Liberalising the existing defences to safeguard the application of the real and 
substantial connection test; 
 Extending the application of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) in Australia 
to include its important trading partners; and 
 Implementing a federal legislative scheme in the United States to govern the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
Recommendation Two-A Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
It is recommended that a convention be created which provides for contracting states 
to implement uniform standards in their domestic law.  The proposed convention 
should include rules of jurisdiction that a court in a contracting state must exercise 
when rendering a judgment and procedures for the recognition and enforcement of 
resulting judgments. 
                                                 
628  [1990] 76 DLR (4th) 256. 
629  [2003] 3 SCR 416. 
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 Rules of Jurisdiction 
The convention should set forth the bases of jurisdiction that a court in a contracting 
state must exercise when rendering a judgment.  This will have the effect that when a 
judgment is rendered by a court in one contracting state based on any of the 
jurisdictional bases set forth in the convention, the judgment should be entitled to be 
recognised and enforced in another contracting state without further review of its 
underlying jurisdictional basis.  For the purpose, it is recommended that the bases of 
jurisdiction should include: (i) submission and (ii) the real and substantial connection 
test. 
 
Also, the convention should contain a provision dealing with situations where a 
proceeding is brought in a court in one contracting state which is not the best forum in 
determining the dispute or where proceedings involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties are brought in courts of different contracting states.  For 
this purpose, it is recommended that the effect of both the doctrines of forum non 
conveniens and lis alibi pendens should be adopted in the proposed convention. 
 
 Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
The convention should contain a set of provisions regulating the procedures for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments among contracting states.  These include 
the adoption of a registration scheme which allows judgments rendered by one 
contracting state to be filed and registered in courts in other contracting states for the 
purposes of recognition and enforcement.  The convention should also specify the 
circumstances in which judgments rendered by one contracting state may be validly 
 218 
refused recognition and enforcement in another contracting state.  The factors which 
may justify non-recognition and non-enforcement should include fraud, breach of 
natural justice, the violation of public policy and conflict of judgments. 
 
6.3.1 Recommendation One-Reform in Australia and United States 
A The Real and Substantial Connection Test 
i Australia 
Under the current state of the law in Australia, it is required that in order for a court to 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, the judgment must have been rendered 
upon the jurisdictional basis of submission and presence.  In other words, the 
defendant against whom recognition and enforcement is sought must either submit to 
the jurisdiction of the foreign court or was served with the writ while present within 
the foreign territory.  The submission basis, which requires that parties may submit 
to the jurisdiction of a foreign court by prior express agreement or voluntary 
appearance, is sound and reasonable.  The presence basis, however, is in need of 
reform.  In particular, insofar as a company is concerned, the requirement that a 
company must have some presence inside the state where the foreign court sits to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of that state, is arguably outdated.  This is particularly so 
since, with modern-day technology, it is not unusual that companies may conduct 
foreign business without having any presence in a foreign state.  As such, if a foreign 
judgment was rendered against a company which did not have any presence in a 
foreign state, such as by having a branch office or a representative to carry on 
business on its behalf, the judgment would be denied recognition and enforcement in 
an Australian court if the company did not submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court. 
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It is recommended that the real and substantial connection test formulated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments v De Savoye and Beals v 
Saldanha to replace the presence requirement as the new jurisdictional basis in 
Australia for the purposes of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.    
The justification for adopting the real and substantial connection basis is as follows.  
First, as far as corporate defendants are concerned, the real and substantial connection 
test does not require presence either through maintaining a branch office or having a 
representative to carry on business in the foreign territory.  Instead, as long as there 
is a real and substantial connection between the territory where the judgment was 
rendered and the subject matter of the proceeding or the defendant, a judgment 
rendered by a court on that basis is entitled to be recognised and enforced by another 
court.  On this basis, it is argued that the real and substantial connection test not only 
provides a broad basis for the purposes of recongition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments against corporate defendants, it also reflects the trend of modern-day 
international commercial transactions.  Second, by adopting the real and substantial 
connection test as the new jurisdictional basis for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments against an individual person, it will replace the 
presence requirement whereby an individual can be sued in a foreign territory and the 
resulting judgment is entitled to be recognised and enforced in an Australian court 
despite the fact that he or she was only passing through and has no substantial 
connection with that territory.  Accordingly, the adoption of the real and substantial 
connection in Australia will save the trouble for parties to litigate in a territory where 
he or she has no real and substantial connection with that territory. Moreover, it will 
relieve courts from hearing such a matter unless the real and substantial connection 
between the territory where the proceedings are heard and the subject matter of the 
proceedings or the defendant can be established.  Third, as noted in previous 
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chapters, the application of the real and substantial connection test will create 
uncertainty and unpredictability since it is a test which operates upon order and 
fairness and whether there has been a real and substantial connection will depend on 
the facts under consideration.  However, as far as the finality of litigation is 
concerned, a broad jurisdictional basis will encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and enhance international commercial transactions. 
 
Having recommended that Australia should adopt the real and substantial connection 
test as the new jurisdictional basis, it is not to say that the test should be adopted as it 
stands.  Rather, in order to prevent situations where the application of the real and 
substantial connection test may create uncertainty and unpredictability and therefore 
undermine the effect of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is 
further recommended that the real and substantial connection test be adopted with 
caution, by setting out connecting factors which would be considered real and 
substantial.  For this purpose, it is helpful to refer to court decisions that have given 
consideration to connecting factors relevant to the real and substantial connection test.  
In a recent decision in Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd,630 (Van Breda) the Supreme 
Court of Canada refined the connecting factors laid down in Muscutt v Courcelles.631  
According to Van Breda, the core of the real and substantial connection test is the 
connection that the plaintiff’s claim has to the forum and the connection of the 
defendant to the forum. 632  Other factors relevant in determining the real and 
substantial connection test include the involvement of other parties; whether the 
courts would be willing to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment; and a court 
should not assume jurisdiction if it would not be prepared to recognise and enforce a 
                                                 
630 343 D.L.R. (4th) 577. 
631 (2002) 213 DLR 577. 
632 Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd 343 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [78]. 
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foreign judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis. 633   While the 
identification of a set of presumptive connecting factors will bring greater clarity and 
predictability when applying the real and substantial connection test, the Van Breda 
court recognised the importance of order and fairness in any given situation and noted 
that the values of order and fairness and comity should serve as a useful analytical 
tools for assessing the strength of the relationship with a forum to which the factor in 
question points.634 
 
The real and substantial connection test is not unfamiliar to jurisdictions outside 
Canada.  In Indyka v Indyka635 concerning the recognition in England of a decree of 
divorce pronounced by a court in Czechoslovakia, the House of Lords was of the view 
that the Czechoslovakia decree should be recognised because there was a real and 
substantial connection between the petitioner and Czechoslovakia where the decree 
was made, on the basis that the petitioner had established her continuous residence 
there for more than three years.636  The Indyka principle was followed in Australia in 
Bishop v Bishop where the court held that the Japanese divorce, being pronounced by 
the Japanese court on the basis of parties’ substantial residence in Japan, was 
recognisable in Australia.637  
 
In light of the nature of the real and substantial connection test which provides a 
broad basis comparing to the presence requirement on the one hand and the 
application of which is likely to create uncertainty on the other, it is recommended 
that the real and substantial connection test be adopted in Australia in verifying the 
                                                 
633 Ibid, [62]-[63], [79]. 
634 Ibid, [92]. 
635 [1969] 1 AC 33. 
636 Ibid, 68. 
637 Bishop v Bishop (1972) 18 FLR 35, 48-9. 
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recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 638 accompanied by a list of 
presumptive connecting factors which may be updated from time to time.  The list of 
connecting factors should include, for instance, the connection between the forum and 
the plaintiff’s claim; the connection between the forum and the defendant; the court’s 
willingness to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment rendered on the same 
jurisdictional basis; the place where the underlying event occurred; the location of the 
subject matter; and order and fairness to parties if jurisdiction is exercised on real and 
substantial connection basis. 
 
As far as interstate judgments are concerned, however, it is suggested that the 
adoption of the real and substantial connection test should have no effect on the 
existing scheme for the recognition dnd enforcement of interstate judgments.  This is 
because, as Professor Mortensen argues, the Service and Execution of Process Act 
1992 (Cth) which regulates the rules of jurisdiction and the enforcement of interstate 
judgments already gives a more generous basis than the real and substantial 
connection test since, under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), a 
judgment rendered by a state is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another state 
and without any form of review.639  Thus, even though the adoption of the real and 
substantial connection test in Australia will create different standards of jurisdiction 
for the recognition and enforcement of interstate and foreign judgments, the fact that 
the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) has already provided a generous 
scheme to support the enforcement of interstate judgments, it is appropriate to look 
                                                 
638 There have been a number of suggestions made in respect of the adoption of the real and substantial 
connection test in Australia. See, eg, C R Einstein and Alexander Phipps, Trends in International 
Commercial Litigation Part II-The Future of Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law (2005) Supreme 
Court of New South Wales [13] 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwPrint1/SCO_einsteinjulyaugust20
05>; Tadmore, above n 78, 185-6. 
639 Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 7, 145 [5.22]. 
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for a new standard to support the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
especially in the modern-day context. 
 
ii United States 
Under the current regime in the United States, other than jurisdictional bases of 
in-state service and consent/ appearance, a state court will not recognise and enforce 
an interstate or a foreign judgment unless the judgment is within the boundary of due 
process standards.  This means that the interstate or the foreign judgment must have 
been rendered on the basis that there is a substantial connection between the 
judgment-rendering state and the defendant (the minimum contacts test) and that the 
assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant is not unreasonable and unfair so as to 
violate the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.   
 
As argued in the dissertation, there are a number of concerns with the due process 
standards.  First, the minimum contacts test focuses on the connection between the 
forum state and the defendant.  Therefore, any judgment rendered by a court lacking 
this nexus will not be capable of being recognised and enforced in the United States 
even if the court is the appropriate forum for hearing the matter.  Second, while the 
due process requirement provides a broad basis for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement since an interstate or a foreign judgment is entitled to be recognised and 
enforced in the United States as long as there is a substantial connection between the 
forum state and the defendant, its uncertainty and unpredictability is problematic.  
As examined earlier, the Supreme Court of the United States has not given a clear 
indication as to what would amount to a minimum contact between a forum state and 
a defendant and ruled that whether the assumption of jurisdiction by a court is within 
the confined scope of the due process standards will depend on the facts of the case.  
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Moreover, as noted that after the decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior 
Court,640 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that even if there is a 
sufficient connection between a defendant and a forum state, the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments may still be refused if the assertion of jurisdiction over the 
defendant violates the notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
 
Accordingly, two recommendations are made.  First, the constitutional limitation of 
due process standards imposed upon the rules of jurisdiction should be lifted.  And 
second, the real and substantial connection test formulated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Morguard Investments v De Savoye and Beals v Saldanha should be 
adopted as the new jurisdictional basis. 
 
Under the first recommendation that the constitutional concept of due process 
standards be lifted from the rules jurisdiction, this is recommended on the basis that 
by treating personal jurisdiction under the restraint of constitutional law, the rules 
may be inflexible at times involving the counting of contacts between the defendant 
and the forum state, and fail to take into account practical considerations.  For 
instance in Worldwide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson641 considered in Chapter Three, 
while the collision occurred in the state of Oklahoma involving a car sold by 
Worldwide Volkswagen, the court was unable to exercise jurisdiction against 
Worldwide Volkswagen because it did not conduct business in that state and therefore 
it was held that there was no sufficient connection between Worldwide Volkswagen 
and the Oklahoma State.  Moreover, by fixing the jurisdictional principle under the 
constitutional limitation, it gives little discretion to the United States to depart from 
                                                 
640  94 L Ed 2d 92 (1987). 
641  444 US 286 (1980). 
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the supreme authority.  As seen in Chapter Five where the United States delegates in 
negotiations for a worldwide convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, they were unable to accept any rule of jurisdiction 
that would go against the constitutional concept of due process standards.   
 
It follows that if personal jurisdiction is not bound under the constitutional concept of 
due process standards, the second recommendation is that the real and substantial 
connection test formulated in Morguard and Beals should be adopted in the United 
States as the new jurisdictional basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  Similar to the reasoning put forward in respect of the proposal for 
reform in Australia, the real and substantial connection test is a generous basis for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  By adopting the real and 
substantial connection, it will liberalise the minimum contacts test to include the real 
and substantial connection between the forum state and the subject matter of the 
proceeding.  Consequently, an interstate or a foreign judgment will be recognised 
and enforced in the United States if there is a real and substantial connection between 
the forum state and the subject matter of the proceeding despite the absence of the 
defendant and forum nexus.  However, as noted previously, the real and substantial 
connection test is a test which operates upon the nature of circumstances and therefore, 
it is likely to create uncertainty and unpredictability.  Accordingly, it is desirable to 
set forth certain guidelines as to the connecting factors to safeguard the application of 
the test.  In respect of the connecting factors, it is proposed that factors such as the 
connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim; the connection between the 
forum and the defendant; the place where the underlying event took place; and the 
degree of fairness and unfairness to both plaintiffs and defendants if jurisdiction is 
assumed by the forum court, should be considered. 
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B Liberalise the existing defences to safeguard the application of the real and 
substantial connection test 
It is recommended that if Australia or the United States is to adopt the real and 
substantial connection test as the new head of jurisdiction, there should be reform of 
the law concerning the existing defences to safeguard the application of the new test.  
This is for the purpose that with the real and substantial connection test being so 
broad and flexible, it will have the effect of making the recognition and enforcement 
actions easy for foreign claimants.  Accordingly, it is important to ensure that there 
is adequate protection to local defendants against whom the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is sought, as well as to judgment-enforcing states to 
prevent any injustice or unfairness if a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced in 
Australia or the United States. 
 
One of the defences which may be liberalised is the fraud defence.  As examined in 
Chapter Three, the United States has taken the approach that in order to set aside an 
interstate or a foreign judgment on the ground of fraud, the party must show that there 
is an extrinsic fraud.  That is, the fraud complained of was not and could not have 
been reasonably known and dealt with in the original proceedings when the judgment 
was rendered.  Australian courts have however favoured a different approach with 
respect to the defence of fraud.  In order to resist the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments on the basis of fraud in Australia, the party alleging the defence 
only needs to show that the foreign court was misled into coming to a wrong decision 
by evidence which was false.  Accordingly, evidence of fraud which was dealt with 
in the original proceedings may still be raised at the recognition and enforcement 
stage.  It is recommended that the Australian approach to the fraud defence is 
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appropriate to safeguard the application of the real and substantial connection test 
since, under the test, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are 
becoming easier in Australia and the United States.  All the more it is important to 
ensure that the foreign judgment for the purposes of recognition and enforcement is 
not the result of any fraudulent means.  That said however, it is suggested that the 
broad basis of fraud, if alleged at the recognition and enforcement stage, should be 
taken with particular caution.  In order to prevent situations where fraud was alleged 
at the recognition and enforcement stage simply for the purpose of abusing the 
process, when considering this defence courts should take into account all the 
circumstances, such as whether the evidence is so material that re-examination is 
required. 
 
Another defence which should be liberalised to safeguard the application of the real 
and substantial connection test is the public policy defence.  As noted previously, in 
order for an Australian or a United States court to refuse to recognise and enforce a 
foreign judgment on public policy ground, the public policy has to be of a higher 
order such as public morals or ethics that is fundamental to the judgment-enforcing 
state.  However, in view of the real and substantial connection test, it is 
recommended that the public policy defence be extended to include situations where 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would violate the 
judgment-enforcing court’s view of fair play and substantial justice.  That said, it is 
not suggesting that the mere differences of laws between the judgment-rendering and 
judgment-enforcing states would be regarded as a violation of the notion of fair play 
and substantial justice.  Rather, what would be considered as a violation of the 
notion should be weighed against factors such whether parties were afforded a fair 
opportunity in presenting his or her case.  After all, the purpose of liberalising this 
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part of the public policy defence is that it would create a safety-valve to ensure that 
rights and interests of litigants and judgment-enforcing states are not deprived of a 
remedy. 
 
C Extend the application of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) in Australia 
The Foreign Judgments Acts 1991 (Cth) is federal legislation and regulates the 
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments throughout 
Australia.  While the application of the FJA has the benefit over the common law 
action since, instead of commencing a local proceeding as required under the common 
law action, a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced under the FJA upon the 
registration of the judgment with an appropriate court, there are a number of 
drawbacks.  One of the shortcomings with the FJA is that it is narrow in 
geographical application, extending only to judgments upon which foreign courts 
would give substantial treatment of judgments rendered by Australian courts.  
Although the reciprocal requirement will ensure the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments between Australia and foreign jurisdictions, the fact is that 
the FJA only extends to a small number of countries worldwide and more importantly, 
it does not include some of Australia’s important trading partners.  As such, a party 
who has obtained a judgment in a jurisdiction that does not have a reciprocal 
arrangement with Australian courts is left with the common law action for recognition 
and enforcement despite it having had a substantial trading relationship with 
Australia. 
 
It is recommended that the FJA should undergo reform to extend its application.  In 
particular, the FJA should at least be extended to countries with which Australia has 
close trading relationships.  By doing so, a party seeking the recognition and 
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enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia can pursue the action under the 
legislative scheme instead of commencing a new action under the common law 
proceedings.  Also, by extending the application to Australia’s important trading 
partners, it may have the effect of increasing the likelihood that parties are more 
willing to enter into transnational dealings with Australia since there is an assurance 
that their rights and remedies are likely to be recognised and enforced in Australia.642 
 
D Implement a federal legislative scheme in the United States 
Under the current regimes in the United States, there is no national approach but the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgmens is regulated by the state versions of 
the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act 1962.  The problems with 
this arrangement are that to date, only 33 states have adopted the Uniform Act and 
among the 33 states, there is a variarion of the provisions of the Uniform Act.  For 
instance, a significant eight among the 33 states have imposed reciprocity as a 
requirement for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  Consequently, a 
foreign judgment which is recognised and enforced in one state may be denied 
recognition and enforcement if the same proceedings were brought in another state 
where reciprocity is imposed as a mandatory requirement for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement, and there is no reciprocal arrangement between the 
judgment-rendering and judgment-enforcing states. 
 
It is recommended that the United States should adopt a national approach by 
implementing a federal legislative scheme to govern the recognition and enforcement 
                                                 
642  See also, Tadmore, above n 78, 178-9; Einstein and Phipps, above n 317, [3], [9]. 
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of foreign judgments.643  One of the benefits of a national approach is that it would 
unify the rules among the states, as well as between the state and federal systems.  
Accordingly, parties to the recognition and enforcement proceedings can expect the 
same outcome regardless of which state the action is brought.644 
 
The idea of having a federal legislative scheme in the United States for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is not new, however.  In fact, 
negotiations at the Hague Conference for a worldwide convention on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments examined in Chapter Five had 
encouraged the American Law Institute (‘ALI’) to initiate a project on a federal 
statute concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.645  The 
ALI’s judgments project was initially prepared to implement the proposed Hague 
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  The ALI 
continued the project despite the failure of negotiation with a goal of producing a draft 
statute that would make the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
uniform throughout the United States.646   
 
A major concern arose under the ALI’s proposed federal statute was whether 
reciprocity should be included as a requirement for the recognition and enforcement 
                                                 
643  See also Ronald A Brand, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In 
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance’ (1991) 67 Notre Dame Law Review 253, 298 
(where Professor Brand argues that federal legislation may be the most direct path to true 
unification of United States law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments). 
644  Ibid 292-3. 
645  Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, 
Proposed Final Draft (11 April 2005). See also, Linda J Silberman and Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘A 
Different Challenge for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, 
and an American Statute’ (2000) 75 Indiana Law Journal 635. 
646  Franklin O Ballard, ‘Turnabout if Fair Play: Why a Reciprocity Requirement Should be Included 
in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Federal Statute’ (2005) 28(1) Houston Journal of 
International Law 199, 207. 
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of foreign judgments.647  As examined in Chapter Two, reciprocity is a notion that a 
state will recognise and enforce a foreign judgment provided that foreign states will 
give similar reception for its judgments in return.  In this respect, while reciprocity 
will induce a court to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, it may also have the 
retaliation effect against states which do not return the same favour of recognising and 
enforcing judgments.  Whether or not reciprocity is worthwhile resurrecting in the 
United States’ jurisprudence is debatable.648  However, as far as advancing the 
objective of finality of litigation is concerned, reciprocity will limit the recognition 
and enforcement effect to judgments where there are reciprocal arrangements between 
the United States and foreign jurisdictions.  As such, any judgment rendered by a 
country that does not have a reciprocal arrangement with the United States will be 
denied recognition and enforcement in the United States. 
 
6.3.2 Recommendation Two-A Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
This section introduces a convention that provides for contracting states to implement 
in their domestic law uniform standards for the rules of jurisdiction, which a court in a 
contracting state must exercise when giving a judgment, and the procedures for the 
recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.   
 
Despite the creation of a worldwide convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments has proven to be a difficult task, as seen in Chapter Five where the 
                                                 
647  The proposed section on reciprocity is found in s 7 of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, Proposed Final Draft (11 April 2005) (s 7(a) 
sets forth the fundamental reciprocity requirement: A foreign judgment shall not be recognised or 
enforced in a court in the United States if the court finds that comparable judgments of courts in 
the United States would not be recognised or enforced in the courts of the state of origin). 
648  See, eg, Ballard, above n 645, 217 (the inclusion of the reciprocity requirement is likely to lead to 
broader recognition of United States judgments abroad, saving United States judgments holders 
the added time and expense of relitigating their claims in a foreign court). 
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recent attempts at the Hague Conference on Private International Law failed, a 
worldwide convention is likely to improve this area of law in a number of aspects.  
For instance, it will unify the standards and procedures for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments over a large number of countries and, therefore, 
simplify the recognition and enforcement proceedings and facilitate the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments among contracting states.  Further, by having a set of 
uniform standards, it will enhance cross-border transactions since the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments will not be subject to national laws which vary 
from country to country and even from state to state.  
 
The purpose of providing a uniform standard of rules of jurisdiction is that a judgment 
that is rendered by a contracting state and based on any of the stipulated basis is 
entitled to recognition and enforcement in another contracting state without further 
review of its underlying jurisdictional basis.  Thus, under the rules of jurisdiction, it 
is proposed that the jurisdictional bases should include submission and the real and 
substantial connection test.  Reasons for proposing these two bases are as follows.  
First, submission is recognised as a valid ground in many countries.  Second, the real 
and substantial connection test is consistent with the policy of finality of litigation as 
it provides a broad basis allowing a court to assume jurisdiction.  Third, in light of 
the purpose of the proposed convention which is to facilitate the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments among contracting states, a broad jurisdictional basis will 
serve this purpose well.  With respect to the recognition and enforcement procedures, 
the convention should contain provisions facilitating the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments among contracting states and specify a number of circumstances in 
which a contracting state is not obliged to recognise and enforce judgments rendered 
by another contracting state. 
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With respect to the participating countries for the convention, given that the 
provisions proposed under the convention would be more familiar to countries with a 
common law jurisdiction, it is envisaged that the convention will have a better 
reception from countries such as Australia and Canada (hereinafter ‘Common Law 
Countries’).  As far as the United States is concerned, the major reluctance 
preventing acceptance of the proposed convention would relate to the rules of 
jurisdiction.  As noted in previous chapters, the United States’ practice of jurisdiction 
is based on the requirement of a connection between the defendant and the state 
proposing to exercise jurisdiction.  The real and substantial connection test, however, 
which is based on the real and substantial connection between the territory where the 
judgment was rendered and the defendant or the subject matter of the proceeding, 
would violate a United States’ standard requirement.  
 
A Objective and Scope 
The objective of the convention is to provide a scheme facilitating the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments among contracting states.  In order to reflect this objective, 
the convention will provide uniform standards for the rules of jurisdiction and a set of 
provisions governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
 
This convention should apply to any judgment given by a contracting state.  For the 
purpose of the convention, a judgment should mean a final or interlocutory order 
given or made by a court in civil or commercial proceedings as opposed to criminal or 
public proceeding (ie, administrative matters) since determination of criminal or 
public proceedings may require consideration of the public policy of a country or state.  
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Also, the convention shall not apply to matters relating to family law, wills and 
bankruptcy since those proceedings would involve local rules and proceedings that 
vary among contracting states. 
 
For the operation of this convention, a country will be invited to accede to the 
convention on the condition that the existing parties to the convention unanimously 
agree to its participation. 
 
B Jurisdiction 
The bases of jurisdiction a court in a contracting state must exercise when rendering a 
judgment should include: (i) submission; and (ii) the real and substantial connection 
test. 
 
i Submission 
A court should have jurisdiction if parties submit to the jurisdiction of the court by 
prior express agreement or voluntary appearance.   
 
Prior Express Agreement 
The parties may designate a court or courts in a contracting state to settle any dispute 
which arises or may arise between the parties.  The court or courts so designated 
should have exclusive jurisdiction unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 
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In the event the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements applies between the 
parties in business to business contracts, the Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements should have priority over this convention. 
 
Appearance 
A court should have jurisdiction if a defendant voluntarily appeared in that court and 
proceeded on the merits without contesting jurisdiction.  However, in the event the 
defendant made an appearance for the purposes of contesting jurisdiction or inviting 
court not to exercise jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as a submission to the 
jurisdiction of that court. 
 
ii Real and Substantial Connection Test 
A court should have jurisdiction if there is a real and substantial connection between 
the contracting state where the court sits and the subject matter of the action or the 
defendant. 
 
However, the problem with the real and substantial connection basis is that it may fly 
in the face of the United States’ requirement.  As examined earlier, the law of 
personal jurisdiction in the United States specifies that in order for a defendant to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state, there must be a substantial connection 
between the forum state and the defendant.  Therefore, a court’s assumption of 
jurisdiction lacking the defendant and forum state nexus will violate the United States’ 
requirement and a judgment rendered on that basis will be denied recognition and 
enforcement in the United States.   
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It is recommended that, given the purpose of the convention is to implement an 
extended scheme for the recognition and enforcement of judgments among 
contracting states, a generous rule of jurisdiction is desirable and will achieve the 
intended purpose.  Accordingly, the real and substantial connection test should be 
adopted since it will expand the United States’ requirement by including the subject 
matter and forum state nexus.  However, as noted previously, the real and substantial 
connection test is generous and lacks certainty and predictability.  Thus, it is further 
recommended that in order to ensure the effectiveness of the real and substantial 
connection test, the convention should contain a list of connecting factors that must be 
considered by courts purporting to exercise jurisdiction.  The connecting factors 
should include, for instance, the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s 
claim; the connection between the forum and the defendant; the court’s willingness to 
recognise and enforce a foreign judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; 
the place where the underlying event occurred; the location of the subject matter; and 
the requirement of order and fairness to parties if jurisdiction is assumed.  
 
C Forum Non Conveniens and Lis Alibi Pendens 
The convention should contain a provision incorporating both the doctrines of forum 
non conveniens and lis alibi pendens in dealing with situations where there may be 
forum shopping and parallel proceedings in multiple states.  As examined earlier, the 
doctrine forum non conveniens is recognised in Common Law Countries and gives 
court discretion to decline jurisdiction if it determines that a court elsewhere is the 
more appropriate court for hearing the matter (however Australian courts favour the 
clearly inappropriate forum test examined in Chapter Five).  While forum non 
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conveniens is based on the principle of discretion and provides flexibility, it is likely 
to prolong litigation and cause uncertainty.  Lis alibi pendens, on the other hand, is 
favoured by civil law countries.  It states that the court first seised should have 
jurisdiction and any court other than the court first seised should decline jurisdiction.  
The lis alibi pendens doctrine therefore allows no flexibility and aims to provide 
certainty in litigation proceedings.   
 
In view of the pros and cons of the doctrines, it is recommended that the convention 
should adopt both the doctrines of forum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens.  This 
recommendation follows the approach in the 1999 Preliminary Draft for a worldwide 
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments examined in 
Chapter Five.  In the 1999 Preliminary Draft, it states that when proceedings 
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the 
courts of different contracting states, the court second seised should suspend the 
proceeding if the court first seised has jurisdiction and is expected to render a 
judgment capable of being recognised under the convention.  However, in certain 
circumstances regulated by the convention, the court first seised may suspend its 
proceeding if it determines that it is clearly inappropriate for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction and if a court of another contracting state has jurisdiction and is clearly 
more appropriate to resolve the dispute.  In determining whether the court first seised 
should suspend the proceeding, the court should take into account factors such as any 
inconvenience to the parties, the nature and location of the evidence and whether there 
is an exclusive choice of court agreement made between the parties.649  
 
                                                 
649  Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (30 October 1999) (‘1999 Preliminary Draft’), arts 21-22. 
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D Recognition and Enforcement 
After setting forth the common rules of jurisdiction, the second part of the convention 
should regulate the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of resulting 
judgments among contracting states.   
 
The convention should implement a registration scheme, under which a judgment 
rendered by a court in one contracting state is filed in courts in other contracting states 
for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.  The conditions upon which a 
judgment is capable of being registered are that it is a judgment: (a) being rendered by 
a court or tribunal in a contracting state; (b) which falls under the scope of the 
convention; and (c) enforceable in the contracting state where it was originally given. 
 
E Defences 
The convention should contain a number of defences which, if established, will allow 
one contracting state to refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment given by other 
contracting states.  The defences should include: fraud, denial of natural justice, 
violation of public policy and conflict of judgments.   
 
i Fraud 
A contracting state should refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment rendered by 
another contracting state if there was fraud.  In order to establish fraud, there must be 
evidence which was unknown and unavailable in the original proceedings when the 
judgment was rendered.  In other words, in light of the circumstances, if evidence 
had been dealt with or could have been reasonably discovered and dealt with in the 
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original proceedings, it cannot be raised at the recognition and enforcement stage.  
The reason of imposing such a limit on the fraud defence is to ensure the operation of 
the proposed convention among contracting states so that a party seeking to raise 
fraud cannot do so unless it was unknown and could not have been dealt with at the 
judgment-rendering stage and that the fraud defence is proper to ensure the 
administration of justice. 
 
ii Natural Justice 
A contracting state should refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment rendered by 
another contracting state if there was a breach of natural justice.  In order to establish 
this defence, the party against whom recognition and enforcement is sought must be 
able to show that there is a: a) lack of sufficient notice, or b) lack of opportunity to be 
heard.  A court in determining whether there has been a lack of notice and 
opportunity to be heard, must inquire into the procedural law of the contracting state 
where the judgment was originally rendered.  In other words, the 
judgment-enforcing court should not impose its own standard of requirements when 
assessing the adequacy of notice and whether there is an opportunity to be heard as 
this may result in different requirements being imposed and complicate the 
recognition and enforcement proceedings. 
 
As far as substantial injustice is concerned, it should not be imposed as a defence to 
resist the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  This is because, first, 
the substantial injustice defence will create uncertainty since there is no confined 
scope and what will amount to substantial injustice varies among contracting states.  
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Second, the purpose of natural justice defence is to ensure that parties’ rights to a fair 
hearing are not deprived.  Thus, any defence other than lack of notice and an 
opportunity to be heard (ie, the differences of procedures) should be considered 
against the benchmark of litigants’ rights to a fair hearing. 
 
iii Public Policy 
A contracting state should refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment rendered by 
another contracting state if the effect of recognising and enforcing the judgment is 
likely to violate the public policy of the judgment-enforcing state.  This defence will 
therefore protect fundamental values and interests of a contracting state.  However, 
with the underlying purpose of the convention in mind, namely to create an extended 
scheme for the recognition and enforcement of judgments among contracting states, 
the public policy defence should properly be allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances.  Examples where the public policy defence may be allowed include 
the violation of moral and ethical policy of a contracting state or of fundamental rights 
of individuals such as the right to be represented by legal attorneys. 
 
iv Conflict of Judgments 
A contracting state should refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment rendered by 
another contracting state if there is a conflict of judgments.  A conflict of judgments 
will occur in situations where two judgments involving the same cause of action entail 
legal consequences that are mutually exclusive.  Thus, a contracting state should be 
able to refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment of another contracting state if it is 
in conflict with: (a) another judgment of the contracting state where recognition is 
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sought on the same cause of action; or (b) an earlier judgment given in another 
contracting state or a third-state, involving the same cause of action and between the 
same parties. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments between state A and state B, four scenarios can arise: 
 
Scenario 1:  Both state A and B give effect to their respective judgments;  
Scenario 2:  State A does not give effect to judgments of state B, whereas state B 
gives effect to judgments of state A; 
Scenario 3:  State A gives effect to judgments of state B, whereas state B does not 
give effect to judgments of state A; and 
Scenario 4:  Neither state A nor state B gives effect to their respective judgments. 
 
 State A gives effect State A does not give effect 
State B gives effect Benefit    Cost    Net 
A:  +12       -2      10 
B:  +12       -2      10 
Benefit    Cost    Net 
A:   +12       0     +12 
B:    0        -2      -2 
State B does not give effect Benefit    Cost    Net 
A:   0        -2      -2 
B:   +12       0     +12 
Benefit    Cost    Net 
A:   0         0       0  
B:   0         0       0 
 
Assuming: 
+12: net benefit to one country of having its judgment enforced 
-2: cost of enforcing a foreign judgment 
 
Results: 
Both state A and state B receive the maximum benefit by not enforcing the other 
state’s judgment. 
Each state gains +10 by mutual enforcement, whereas mutual non-enforcement is 0.  
 
Reference: Mark D Rosen, ‘Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments be Enforced?’ 
(2004) 88 Minnesota Law Review 783. 
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Appendix 2  
Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992  
Schedule Superior Courts  
 
Country  Courts  
New Zealand  
Court of Appeal 
High Court  
Province of Alberta, Canada  
Supreme Court of Canada 
Court of Appeal of Alberta 
Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta  
Bahamas, The Commonwealth of the  
Court of Appeal  
Supreme Court  
Province of British Columbia, Canada  
Supreme Court of Canada  
Court of Appeal of British Columbia  
Supreme Court of British Columbia  
British Virgin Islands  Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court  
Cayman Islands  Grand Court  
Dominica,  
Commonwealth of  
Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court  
Court of Appeal  
High Court of Justice  
Falkland Islands  
Court of Appeal  
Supreme Court  
Fiji, Republic of  
Supreme Court  
Court of Appeal  
High Court  
France (French Republic)  
Cour de Cassation  
Cours d'Appel  
Tribunaux de grand instance  
Tribunaux de commerce  
Cours d'assise  
Tribunaux correctionnels  
Germany, Federal  
Republic of  
Bundesgerichtshof  
Oberlandesgerichte  
Bayerische Oberste Landesgericht  
Landgerichte  
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Gibraltar  
Court of Appeal  
Supreme Court  
Grenada  
Supreme Court (consisting of the:  
Court of Appeal; High Court)  
Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of 
China, The  
Court of Final Appeal 
High Court 
(consisting of the: Court of Appeal; Court of First Instance)  
Israel, State of  
Supreme Court  
District Courts  
Moslem Religious Courts  
Druze Religious Courts  
Italy (Italian Republic)  
Corte Suprema di Cassazione  
Corte di Assise  
Corte d'Appello  
Tribunale  
Japan  
Supreme Court  
High Courts  
District Courts  
Family Courts  
Korea, Republic of  
Supreme Court  
Appellate Courts 
District Courts 
Family Court 
Patent Court 
Administrative Court  
Malawi  
High Court 
Supreme Court  
Province of Manitoba, Canada  Court of the Queen's Bench of Manitoba  
Montserrat  
Privy Council  
Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal  
High Court of Montserrat  
Papua New Guinea  Supreme Court of Justice National Court of Justice  
Poland, Republic of  
Supreme Court 
Commercial Courts 
Courts of Appeal 
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Provincial Courts  
St Helena  Supreme Court  
St Kitts and Nevis, Federation of  
Privy Council  
Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal  
High Court (Saint Christopher Circuit)  
High Court (Nevis Circuit)  
St Vincent and the Grenadines  
Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (consisting of the:  
Court of Appeal,  
High Court)  
Seychelles, Republic of  
Court of Appeal  
Supreme Court  
Singapore, Republic of  
Privy Council: in respect of orders made on appeals from the 
Singapore Supreme Court and filed with the Court of Appeal 
of Singapore  
Supreme Court of Singapore (consisting of the: Court of 
Appeal; High Court)  
Solomon Islands  
Court of Appeal  
High Court  
Sri Lanka  
Supreme Court  
Court of Appeal 
High Court 
District Court  
Switzerland  
Bundesgericht  
Kantonale Obere Gerichte  
Handelsgerichte  
Taiwan  
Supreme Court 
High Courts 
District Courts  
Tonga  
Court of Appeal 
Supreme Court  
Tuvalu  
Court of Appeal  
High Court  
United Kingdom, The  
House of Lords  
Supreme Court of England and Wales  
Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland  
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Court of Session  
Western Samoa  
Court of Appeal 
Supreme Court of Western Samoa  
Specified inferior courts 
(1) Each District Court of New Zealand 
(2) The following inferior courts of the United Kingdom: 
 (a) County Courts (England and Wales); 
(b) County Courts (Northern Ireland); 
 (c) Sheriff Courts (Scotland); 
(3) The following inferior courts of Canada:  
(a) the Provincial Court of Alberta;  
(b) the Provincial Court of British Columbia;  
(c) the Provincial Court of Manitoba.  
(4) The following inferior courts of Switzerland:  
(a) Bezirksgerichte;  
(b) Erstinstanzliche Gerichte;  
(c) Arbeitsgerichte;  
(d) Mietgerichte.  
(5) Each District Court of the Republic of Poland 
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Appendix 3  
Comparison of the Requirements and Defences under the Common 
Law Scheme 
 
 AUSTRALIA UNITED STATES 
REQUIREMENTS Jurisdiction 
->Presence 
->Submission 
Jurisdiction 
->Presence 
->Submission 
->Due process standards 
 Final & Conclusive Final & Conclusive 
  Adequacy of Notice 
  A system of civilized jurisprudence 
 Fixed Debt Fixed Debt 
 Identical Parties  
DEFENCES Fraud Fraud 
 Violation of Natural Justice Violation of Natural Justice 
 Contrary to Public Policy Contrary to Public Policy 
 Incompatible Judgments Incompatible Judgments 
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Appendix 4  
Comparison of the Statutory Schemes under the FJA, UFMJRA and 
Restatement (Third) 
 
 FJA UFMJRA RESTATEMENT 
THIRD 
REQUIREMENT Final & Conclusive Final & Conclusive Final & Conclusive 
 Reciprocity   
 Application Made 
within 6 Years of the 
Date of Judgment 
  
 Judgment not wholly 
Satisfied 
  
 Judgment Enforceable 
in the Original Court 
Judgment Enforceable 
where Rendered 
 
GROUNDS OF 
NON-RECOGNITION 
 Lack of Fair 
Procedures 
Compatible with Due 
Process (Mandatory) 
Lack of Fair 
Procedures 
Compatible with Due 
Process (Mandatory) 
 Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Personal Jurisdiction 
(Mandatory) 
Personal Jurisdiction 
(Mandatory) 
  Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction 
(Mandatory) 
Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction 
(Discretionary) 
 Lack of Notice 
 
Lack of Notice 
(Discretionary) 
Lack of Notice 
(Discretionary) 
 Judgment Obtained by 
Fraud 
Judgment Obtained by 
Fraud (Discretionary) 
Judgment Obtained by 
Fraud (Discretionary) 
 Contrary to Public 
Policy 
Contrary to Public 
Policy (Discretionary) 
Contrary to Public 
Policy (Discretionary) 
 Incompatible Judgments Incompatible 
Judgments 
(Discretionary) 
Incompatible 
Judgments 
(Discretionary) 
   Inconvenience Forum 
(Discretionary) 
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